FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY

1973

VOL·51 NO·2 $2·50 A COPY

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY 1973

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Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. All mail, including correspondence about subscriptions, should be sent to this address. Cable address Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $10.00 a year, post-free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Reprints of articles are available for purchase. Printed at 10 McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

Vol. 51, No. 2.

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 51 JANUARY 1973 No. 2

THE RELEVANCE OF TRADITIONAL STRATEGY

By Michael Howard

IT is a somber thought that, at a time when so large a proportion of the human race remains near starvation level, about six percent of the world's resources, or something under $200 billion, is still being devoted to military expenditure, with no serious likelihood of this situation fundamentally changing during the remainder of this century. Social scientists will continue to seek basic causes in the hope of offering total solutions, but at the political working level the explanation is simple enough. Any sovereign state—that is, any community which wishes to maintain a capacity for independent political action—may have to use or indicate its capacity and readiness to use force—functional and purposive violence—to protect itself against coercion by other states. Given the state system, peace is possible only when there is freedom from all fear of coercion; and in the absence of any supranational authority enforcing a universal rule of law, such freedom from fear still depends at least partly on independent or collective military capability. Such is the conventional wisdom which will continue to rule mankind until we develop a viable alternative, or until there develops so strong a global sense of community that coercion, the use of force to impose one's will on others, becomes literally unthinkable. At present, unfortunately, such coercion is by no means unthinkable even within the most stable of communities and the most powerful of sovereign states.

Military strategy is organized coercion. It can be defensive or offensive: either posture involves the use or threatened use of force to compel an adversary to abandon his preferred course of action and conform to one's will. The traditional object of mili-

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tary operations was to force one's opponent into a position where the only alternatives open to him were compliance with one's own demands or acceptance of an intolerable level of destruction, extending even to total annihilation—whether of his armed forces, or his social system, or both. Against a very weak adversary it might not be necessary to use serious strategy (the art of the *strategon,* or general) at all. Pure coercion was then possible at the level of "gunboat diplomacy." But since it is normally the object of any community to escape from such a condition of total vulnerability, whether by developing its own power or enlisting the support of an effective protector, the opportunities for such pure coercion in the international system tend constantly to diminish; and a state resorting to force as an instrument of policy will require a strategy appropriate for overcoming an opposing, and armed, will.

The development of strategy as an activity consciously studied, analyzed and practiced according to principles rationally deduced from experience went *pari passu* in Europe with the development of the state system itself; with the development, that is, of communities conscious of their identities and expecting from their governments protection against coercion by alien groups. Before the seventeenth century such protection was rarely possible. Outside such compact and defensible areas as the Low Countries and the Lombard Plain, warfare consisted often of no more than predatory raids whose object was to inflict the maximum damage on the peoples and possessions of one's adversary; it was a process of mutual and sometimes simultaneous coercion. The protection of territory against such raids by the creation of adequate, fixed defenses and instantly available armed forces required a level of social mobilization and a control over economic resources such as European princes were only beginning to establish during the seventeenth century. Fortified frontiers and standing armies with their own supply systems were in fact an intrinsic part of the development of the state itself. Once direct coercion was no longer possible, serious strategy, the struggle to outwit and disarm the enemy, had to begin.

How strategy then developed from the eighteenth up to the twentieth centuries, how it was affected by technical transformations in transportation and weapons systems and by the broadening of popular participation in national affairs, has been described too often for it to be necessary to say much about it here. An

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activity limited in the eighteenth century to professional forces absorbing a tiny proportion of national resources became, by the twentieth century, the concern of the whole community. Resources, enormously increased by industrial development, were made available in their entirety to governments by the expansion of their general administrative competence. Thus, strategic triumphs by limited forces over limited forces, such as had in Napoleon's time been accepted as politically decisive, were treated in the twentieth century as incidental reverses by governments which could draw on apparently limitless resources of money and manpower to repair the damage. Lightning military strokes might still be effective against physically or morally unprepared opponents, as the Germans found in 1939 and 1940, but in general the Second World War bore out the lesson of the First. Against a fully mobilized and determined adversary, nothing short of the erosion of his entire physical and moral resources to a point of virtual impotence could be effective in reducing him to a condition in which he could be truly "coerced."

II

The experience of the First World War made it clear, also, that the morale and cohesion of the community as a whole were at least as important an element in military effectiveness as weapons technology or expertise in generalship. Between the Wars there was much discussion of the possibility of reducing or even eliminating the need for military operations by concentrating on this factor—civilian morale—alone: whether by subversion and psychological warfare, as Hitler often suggested, or by the direct use of air power, as Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell believed. But the Second World War gave little comfort to either school of thought. Whatever the effectiveness of strategic bombing in other respects, civilian morale proved the last element affected. If anything, bombing intensified the solidarity between government and people in democracies and totalitarian states alike. As for subversion, this was a weapon of which great things were expected by belligerents when they were weak, but which they downgraded as soon as they were strong enough to do so. Hitler's alleged "fifth column" successes against the West in 1939–40 were rather the result of his insight into the existing weaknesses of the democracies than of any specific measures he took to exploit them. Against the Soviet Union he disdained sub-

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version altogether, and there is little evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union devoted any considerable resources to subversion within Germany. The British during their period of maximum weakness in 1940 and 1941 did indeed hope that subversion, together with bombing and blockade, might bring about the collapse of the Nazi empire, but with hindsight we can see how unrealistic such hopes were. Subversion had no serious place in U.S. plans, and after 1942 even the British came to regard the European Resistance as purely ancillary to Allied military operations.

Traditional strategy, in short, assumed that in any conflict the antagonists were in complete control of their national resources and that their governments commanded a total consensus of national will. Violence between states was considered to be totally crystallized into those manifestations of it initiated and controlled by governments. When this proved not to be so, professional fighting forces often reacted with anger and embarrassment, treating friendly partisans with suspicion and hostile ones with savagery. Partisan operations were for them a retrograde step to the sporadic and uncontrolled violence, the isolated and reciprocal atrocities, of which war had so largely consisted before the state had acquired a monopoly of force and channeled it along rational and purposive ends sanctioned and to some degree controlled by international law.

Such an attitude was natural enough in conflicts occurring within a settled social framework which both belligerents were concerned to preserve. But it was out of place in conflicts in which at least one of the belligerents was concerned not with preserving that framework but with destroying it. The Second World War was for some of its participants a struggle of this type, and so, of course, have been a large number of armed conflicts since. The revolutionary objective and its methods can exist within the pattern of traditional strategy. The Nazis sought to achieve military victory by orthodox methods before introducing their new order, but Communist resistance movements in Western Europe, like that of Mao Tse-tung against Japan, were consciously making war and revolution at the same time. While eroding the power and authority of a foreign invader, it was all to the good if they could in the process discredit the established institutions and dispossess the native élites who were collaborating with him. So there developed within the womb of traditional strategy a new technique of revolutionary war: of growing from

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weakness to strength, of erosion from the periphery to the center, of the use of violence to discredit and humiliate authority where it could not be overthrown directly, of substituting an alternative hierarchy of government with patently effective sanctions and rewards. All these techniques could be used against an unpopular invader. But they could be just as effective in a domestic situation—especially against a colonial occupier whose charisma had been destroyed by external defeat, or an indigenous régime which, in conditions of prolonged turbulence, had failed to establish its legitimacy. It was this kind of strategy which was being perfected in the middle years of the twentieth century. Its object was no longer the coercion of a community from outside; it was the transformation of its social and political structure from within.

The implications of this revolutionary strategy for international politics, considerable though they are, can be and have been overrated. Until now its effectiveness has been limited to the fragile structures of colonial, and the chaotic conditions of post-colonial and similar societies, and it has yet to be shown that it can really be an effective technique in international conflict between major powers. The tendency commented on earlier for subversion to be used by powers in their weakness and abandoned once they are strong certainly appears to apply to the Soviet Union, whose relations with revolutionary movements throughout the world have grown steadily cooler as it has established a position of respectable international strength. The Russians have had more opportunity than most to observe how seldom it is that successful insurgents make docile satellites, and the Chinese seem to have no illusions about this in Vietnam. Without underrating the skill and relish with which Communist powers first trouble waters and then fish in them, one can now say with reasonable certainty that the successes of revolutionary warfare during the past quarter of a century have owed more to the peculiar circumstances of a post-colonial epoch than to any farsighted strategy masterminded in Moscow or Peking.

Still, these historical circumstances—the "objective conditions" so beloved by Marxists—have to be taken into account by any contemporary student of strategy. One must be properly cautious about extrapolating from the confused conditions of the Third World, where the impact of Western culture first shattered indigenous forms of authority and then abandoned those it had

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put in their place, to the more settled societies of the developed world, whose traditional value systems give their governmental structures and established authorities deeper roots of legitimacy. But it is no longer possible to assume that any of these developed societies are inherently stable. Those in continental Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, have been ravaged by war, occupation and revolution for over half a century. Beyond the Iron Curtain a precarious order is maintained only by totalitarian discipline. In Western Europe the political system impresses less by its stability than by its confusion. The Anglo-Saxon nations whose fortunate geographical circumstances enabled them to escape the worst ravages of the World Wars have their own problems in adjusting their institutions and their values to the bewilderingly rapid social transformation, brought about by their very economic successes. In their dislocation only a very optimistic Marxist would see a situation which could be exploited to the point of takeover by revolutionary cadres. But these societies are unhappy, confused and decreasingly responsive to traditional authority. Their complexity makes them highly vulnerable to the violence of ruthless minorities. And only a very optimistic patriot would hope that they could achieve the same degree of social mobilization, the same dedicated unanimity, that brought them all, on whichever side, through the two World Wars. This is a factor which must be borne very much in mind when assessing the viability of strategies on the part of Western societies which involve the use of nuclear weapons and the credibility of nuclear threats.

III

Nuclear weapons could at first be seen simply as an extension of a long trend in military technology, which for a hundred years had been making armed forces capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive, so that firepower rather than manpower could be used to overthrow the opposing forces. Their timely development spared the United States the disagreeable necessity of deploying a massive conventional invasion force to complete the defeat of Japan. But when the further step was taken to the development of thermonuclear weapons with ballistic-missile delivery systems, it seemed that the entire apparatus of traditional strategic thought could now be discarded. The whole object of traditional strategy had been so to deploy armed force as to compel the enemy to face

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the inescapable alternatives of unacceptable destruction or compliance with one's will. Now thermonuclear weapons confronted him with these alternatives before a shot had been fired. Had not technology therefore replaced strategy altogether as a means of political coercion?

The answer could be "yes" only if the state concerned did not face equally unacceptable destruction itself—which of course in a confrontation between nuclear powers, it did. The strategic situation had thus reverted to that of the sixteenth century and earlier epochs, when princes could not prevent their rivals from ravaging their territories, but only deter them by taking hostages or retaliating in kind. Governments again found themselves unable to protect their populations. Some early British strategic thinkers did indeed speak of the need for civilians to be prepared to "take it" as they had taken the 1940 Blitz—an attitude which probably only increased the recruiting rates of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Well-intentioned American statesmen declared their resolve to shrink from no sacrifice in order to live up to their obligations; but behind the rhetoric lay the disagreeable fact that they were proposing to incur for the peoples for whose safety they were responsible a holocaust of horror inconceivably greater than anything suffered by the far more disciplined and cohesive societies which had endured the two World Wars. The political credibility of nuclear strategy indeed decreased in indirect ratio to its technical credibility, for it was precisely those technologically advanced societies best able to build sophisticated weapons systems whose social and political structure made them least likely to be able to endure, or even seriously to contemplate, the costs of nuclear war.

Can it then be said that in the nuclear age traditional strategic concepts retain any validity at all?

Certainly these concepts have shown themselves to be still valid in conflicts between non-nuclear powers. In the wars between India and Pakistan and between Israel and her Arab neighbors the techniques and even sometimes the weapons of the Second World War still showed themselves highly effective. But between these operations and those of 1939–45 we must note one major difference. Non-nuclear powers are in general poor powers. (An armed conflict between highly industrialized but non-nuclear states is, under existing world conditions, very difficult to visualize indeed.) Such powers lack the industrial base which enabled

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the belligerents in the World Wars to fight prolonged conflicts of attrition. The forces which they have *en presence* with their first-line reserves are often all the strength they possess. For that reason their strategy can revert to a Napoleonic model. It is quite possible for them to destroy their enemy's entire available armed forces in a single battle or series of battles and leave him literally defenseless. At this level, war in the hands of skillful commanders and well-trained and equipped troops can still be a very effective instrument of policy.

It is highly doubtful whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons by such powers would make it any more effective, since it would then be subject to all the constraints and uncertainties of conflicts between nuclear powers considered below. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons might be a reinforcement for those concerned to preserve the status quo, but "nuclear blackmail" has yet to be shown to be an effective weapon in the hands of those who wish to change it. Not only would threats of nuclear action for offensive purposes depend on verbal credibility alone, in contrast to the visible deployment of conventional forces, but such a threat would cause reverberations throughout the international system whose outcome would be very difficult to assess. There are indeed national leaders in the Third World who might not be particularly interested in assessing them; but the strategist, like the economist, has to assume a degree of rationality for his calculations which is not always met with in the real world.

It may be this kind of rationality which has deterred nuclear powers from using their nuclear capability to coerce non-nuclear parties (if we except Khrushchev's barely serious statements at the time of Suez) even when, as in the case of the United States and North Vietnam, they are in open military conflict with them. But this restraint may also be due not so much to rational calculation as to an almost instinctive feeling on the part of policy-makers that any short-term advantage which might be gained by the use of nuclear weapons, even against an adversary who had neither the capacity to retaliate nor allies willing to do so for him, would be rapidly swallowed up in the costs to the international system as a whole, and that those costs would be borne by the initiator in the long run as much as anyone else—not least in terms of his own internal social cohesion. But this sentiment derives from a value-system which is far from universally shared throughout the world, and it cannot be denied that the use of

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nuclear threats to coerce a non-nuclear state by a power with the technical capability and political will to implement them remains a finite, if at present remote, possibility.

IV

Today, however, nuclear powers see their nuclear capability almost wholly in terms of holding one another in check. Soon after nuclear parity emerged in the middle-1950s, a school of thought arose in the West which argued that since in effect the nuclear capabilities of the major powers now cancelled one another out, traditional strategic concepts would once again become valid, and conventional forces would be required to fulfill much the same role as before. This argument did not stand up to close analysis. However reluctant a state might be to use its nuclear forces at the beginning of a conflict with another nuclear power, this reluctance would be likely to diminish the closer it approached to defeat; and the prospects of its ultimately surrendering with its nuclear arsenal intact would be very slight indeed. Each side would therefore fight in the knowledge that its opponents might at any moment decide to introduce nuclear weapons into the struggle; and the greater the success of its own conventional forces in battle, the more likely would such a decision on the part of its opponent become. The temptation to preëmpt would thus be strong on both sides, and even if it were to be resisted non-nuclear forces would have to deploy and operate on the assumption that nuclear weapons might at any moment be used against them. Traditional strategic concepts thus have to be profoundly modified. The nuclear element can neither be left out of account altogether nor postponed to the later stages of an action. It is present from the very beginning of hostilities as an inescapable dimension affecting the calculations of both adversaries.

Under these conditions the task of conventional forces is not to act according to traditional concepts as if nuclear weapons did not exist, but to operate so as to minimize the possibility of the adversary using his nuclear forces at all, and to maximize the credibility of the nuclear threat of their own government. The first role primarily required of conventional forces would be taking the offensive. If the opponent's nuclear weapons were small in quantity it might be possible to destroy them by a conventional surprise attack. If the object of the conflict was the con-

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trol of disputed territory, conventional forces might seize the area by a rapid attack and force on their adversary the decision to use nuclear weapons to evict them. Even if such territory could not be easily seized, other hostages more vulnerable might be nearer to hand, as the population of West Berlin understands very well. Or a low-profile strategy might be adopted in which the attacker approached his objective by stages, each so slight that no nuclear reaction was credible. Under conditions of nuclear parity, the power which can force upon its adversary the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons enjoys an enormous strategic advantage. For the military planner must never leave out of his calculations the fundamental fact that his political masters, however brave their rhetoric, will grasp at every excuse not to authorize nuclear release, or to delay doing so for as long as they possibly can.

Can this nuclear threat indeed ever appear credible—especially when made by the leaders of pluralistic democracies with all their lack of social cohesion and political consensus? The question is one that haunts policy-makers. But we can take as our starting point the argument so frequently enunciated in the context of NATO by a former British Minister for Defence that it deserves to be known as "Healey's Theorem": if there is one chance in a hundred of nuclear weapons being used, the odds would be sufficient to deter an aggressor even if they were not enough to reassure an ally. The nature of the stakes involved, which would make such a decision so appalling for those who have to take it, would make even the bare possibility that it might be taken equally dreadful for their adversary. When we discuss the question of nuclear credibility we are doing so on a quite unique scale of magnitude—or, if such a word exists, minitude. A microscopic degree of credibility, as of some hideously powerful poison, may be all that is needed to work effectively.

There are degrees, however, even of microscopic credibility. The credibility of a retaliatory second strike is far from microscopic: this indeed is a technical rather than a political problem. So long as it is technically feasible, there is little reason to question the credibility of a governmental decision to retaliate after its territory has been subjected to nuclear attack—or to build a system in advance to make such retaliation automatic. But once we start moving away from maximum credibility of this kind, the political problems multiply even if the technical difficulties

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diminish. It is considerably less credible that a state would initiate the use of nuclear weapons in response to an invasion of its territory by purely conventional forces. A decision to accept conquest rather than holocaust, to be Red rather than dead, would be an entirely rational one to take in the circumstances, and one which an aggressor might expect from societies preoccupied with material welfare and having a low degree of social cohesion. Even less credible would be a decision to use nuclear weapons in response to the invasion of anyone else's territory, given the possibility of nuclear retaliation against one's own. Beyond that, the likelihood of any state initiating the use of nuclear weapons in an offensive action against an adversary with an invulnerable second-strike capability becomes more remote still.

It is obvious enough that the credibility of nuclear use will be in direct ratio to the degree to which the actual territory of a state is under threat. The strategic problem is thus how to increase that credibility for politico-military objectives other than pure territorial defense—a problem which has preoccupied NATO planners for the past 20-odd years. They have not been entirely unsuccessful in solving it, for the function of the conventional forces in Western Europe is precisely this: to maximize the credibility of a decision by the United States to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in response to an invasion of territory other than its own.

Within the European context this has become a familiar concept. The crude "plate-glass window," "trip-wire" or "burglar-alarm" analogies of the 1950s, like the more grandiose image of "the sword and the shield" which was rather more popular in SHAPE, were discarded in the 1960s in favor of the concept, elastic in itself, of "flexible response." But even the most dedicated exponents of flexible response did not suggest that the conventional defense of Europe should be decoupled from American nuclear striking power. For them conventional forces were rather a kind of fuse which should be made as long as possible so that even when it was lit there would still be time to stamp out the flame before it reached the nuclear powder-barrel. Once fighting began, and particularly once American forces were involved, the decision to use nuclear weapons, at first on a small and local scale to prevent total military collapse, would become a highly credible option; and once low-yield nuclear weapons had been used, the way would be frighteningly clear for escalation up to almost any

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level. The object of strategy had remained unchanged since before the advent of the nuclear age—coercing one's opponent into abandoning his preferred course of action by posing the alternative of unacceptable punishment; but that object was now to be achieved less by manipulation of actual forces than by manipulation of risks.

A study of the possible confrontation of the superpowers in Europe, or indeed in Cuba, indicates two conclusions. First, to make a nuclear threat an effective instrument either of offensive or of defensive coercion, the engagement of conventional forces is a prior necessity—a detonator to the otherwise inert mass of nuclear credibility. The engagement of such forces produces a conflict situation and a conflict mentality for which the decision to introduce nuclear weapons becomes, even for confused pluralistic societies, not simply an academic possibility but a horrible real-life probability. Precisely because of that linkage, the deployment of conventional forces, whether by land or sea, can therefore be a very effective instrument of policy indeed. This was clearly the lesson which the Soviet Navy learned from Cuba, and this perhaps is the true significance of Soviet maritime expansion. It does not indicate, as has sometimes been suggested, that the Russians have read Mahan and are seeking "command of the sea." It shows rather that they have learned from an earlier age of naval history that the political effectiveness of warships lies, like that of a policeman on the beat, less in the force they can command themselves than in their capacity to represent and if need be to commit the total strength and interest of their state. They play the role of fuses which nobody in his right senses would wish to ignite.

The second point is this. The more remote a crisis or a country from the territory of a nuclear power, the more necessary it will be for that power to deploy conventional forces if it wishes to demonstrate the intensity of its interest in that area, and the less will be the significance of its bare nuclear strength. An American nuclear threat in the context of the Middle East would command little credibility unless it arose in the context of such a commitment of conventional forces. In the context of Cuba, however, a very much smaller commitment was needed: the intensity of American interest in that area required no emphasis. Conversely, the Soviet Union would have required a considerable commitment of conventional strength in the Caribbean to enhance the

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credibility of any nuclear threat it might have made. It is in the light of this principle that the presence of American forces in Western Europe must be considered. It could certainly be argued that American interest in that area is so evident that it no longer requires so massive a commitment of American forces to demonstrate it. But some commitment of forces there must be if the American nuclear guarantee is to remain credible either to the allies or to the adversaries of the United States. The reduction of existing American troop levels in Europe is not therefore necessarily to be seen as a lessening of American interest. But unless European forces are prepared to make up the balance, it could lead to a significant shortening of the conventional fuse leading to the ultimate nuclear holocaust.

In what sense, if at all, would these conventional forces of nuclear powers operate against one another in accordance with the principles of traditional strategy? Only to this extent: that it would be their function to confront their adversary at every point with the alternatives of withdrawal or facing the possibility of unacceptable punishment, by making the risk of nuclear release more probable with every step he took. Their object must be to make the use of nuclear weapons unnecessary while at the same time making the prospect of it convincing. As in the days of pre-Napoleonic strategy the movement of forces once again becomes part of the bargaining process, an indicator of resolution or of willingness to consider accommodation. To that extent classical models have relevance for nuclear as for non-nuclear powers, but the models must be those, not that of Napoleon with his decisive battles nor those of Napoleon's successors with their total wars of attrition, but of Napoleon's eighteenth-century predecessors: men who had much to lose and little to gain from war, who fearfully committed their forces to battle and maneuvered them cautiously; men with limited resources and often a divided public opinion within their domains.

V

But all such precedents must be considered with extreme caution. The historical conditions which made traditional strategy possible have now very largely disappeared. It is not just that governments can no longer protect their populations against wholesale destruction by their enemies. The change goes deeper than this. The whole governmental control of violence which

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made military strategy possible at all—which indeed made peace possible at all—is being rapidly eroded. The state monopoly has been broken. Violence is being increasingly employed, whether against the international community as a whole by groups which pride themselves on standing outside the existing state-system, or by groups with comparatively limited and local objectives, economic as well as political. The violence which was once concentrated into wars conducted by legitimate authorities with carefully identified forces according to agreed conventions is fast becoming as generalized as it was in the centuries before any state mechanism existed to maintain order and security by organized and legitimized coercion.

Yet this sinister development may have its advantages. It is not likely that any government feels sufficiently immune from its dangers to contemplate with much satisfaction the damage suffered by its rivals. It is even less likely that any government, however radical, feels confident of its ability systematically to manipulate these movements so as to advance its own state interests. If this generalized political violence were really to increase to a level at which it appeared seriously to threaten the structure of the international state system as it has developed over the past three hundred years, governments of every color might find that they had a common interest which transcended their rivalries—much as the interest in survival transcends the ideological rivalries of the superpowers. Anarchy is little more attractive as a prospect than is nuclear holocaust. The development of common and coöperative procedures to maintain governmental authority could then increase yet further those transnational links which offer the best hope of creating a world community in which states will need neither to practice, nor to fear, nor to prepare for mutual coercion. Only then will traditional strategy be truly and, one hopes, permanently irrelevant.

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CAN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE LAST OUT THE CENTURY?

By Fred Charles Iklé

THE autumn of last year marked half the road from the beginning of the nuclear era to the year 2000. Mankind has been spared nuclear devastation since the annihilation of two Japanese cities by the only two nuclear weapons then existing. But the destructiveness of nuclear arsenals, now increased many thousandfold, has sunk into human consciousness like man's knowledge of his mortality.

We all turn away, however, from the thought that nuclear war may be as inescapable as death, and may end our lives and our society within this generation or the next. We plan and work every day for the twenty-first century—as parents educating our children, as young workers saving for retirement, as a nation that seeks to preserve its physical environment, its political traditions, its cultural heritage. For this larger horizon—encompassing for the younger generation simply the common expectation of a healthy life—we do in fact assume "nuclear immortality." We believe, or we act as if we believe, that thanks to a certain international order, the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons with their almost incomprehensible destructiveness will never be used.

Yet, this order is so constructed that it cannot move toward abolition of nuclear weapons. It demands, as the necessary condition for avoiding nuclear war, the very preservation of these arms, always ready to destroy entire nations.

This ever-present danger once caused great anguish among the informed public in Western countries and evoked a diffused anxiety everywhere. Since the mid-1960s, the concern of both the public and the specialists has become far less acute, even though Soviet strategic forces have grown dramatically. Since 1968, confidence has been encouraged by the prospect of agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and, in May 1972, by the Moscow accords.

These initial agreements are designed, at least from the American perspective, first to preserve mutual deterrence as the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and second, to stabilize it by curbing the build-up of nuclear forces. As seen by a majority of American government

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officials, congressional leaders and civilian experts, these two objectives should govern our strategic arms-control policy as well as our own force planning for the foreseeable future. Other objectives (such as protecting cities) are held to jeopardize deterrence, and massive arms reductions or general and complete disarmament are considered utopian as well as dangerous.

According to this view, there are no alternatives to our current approach to mutual deterrence that deserve serious consideration. Even though the military services, government agencies and experts may differ on particular points of doctrine and choices of weapons, the dominant view of the workings of mutual deterrence has come to uphold three far-reaching dogmas:

One: our nuclear forces must be designed almost exclusively for "retaliation" in response to a Soviet nuclear attack—particularly an attempt to disarm us through a sudden strike.

Two: our forces must be designed and operated in such a way that this "retaliation" can be swift, inflicted through a single, massive and—above all—prompt strike. What would happen after this strike is of little concern for strategic planning.

Three: the threatened "retaliation" must be the killing of a major fraction of the Soviet population; moreover, the same ability to kill our population must be guaranteed the Soviet government in order to eliminate its main incentive for increasing Soviet forces. Thus, deterrence is "stabilized" by keeping it mutual.

This third dogma dictates not only our desire that Russian cities should remain essentially undefended, but also our willingness to abstain from defending our cities and even to hobble our capability to destroy Soviet nuclear arms. Proponents of this arrangement argue that it will lead to "arms race stability;" critics maintain that guaranteeing capabilities for Mutual Assured Destruction is indeed a "MAD" strategy.

Soviet military writers, by and large, express other views. Above all, they reject the idea that their forces should be designed for retaliation only, stressing instead the need to be prepared for fighting a nuclear war. Among Americans interested in nuclear strategy, however, only a minority now oppose any of these dogmas, and fewer still would reject them all. Absence of any one of these three elements—it is widely believed—would undermine deterrence, stimulate an arms race, or both.

Yet, these assumed requirements of stable deterrence are to a large extent the heritage of strategic policies from prior decades,

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now obsolete. They are a perilous way to protect ourselves from nuclear catastrophe and harmful to the prospects of strategic disarmament. Happily, they are dispensable for deterrence. Over the decades to come, we can develop and put into effect a safer and more humane strategy to prevent nuclear war.

II

It was Winston Churchill who in 1955 first expounded the essential ideas of mutual deterrence to the world at large. In that celebrated "balance of terror" speech, he made a "formidable admission," as he himself called it: "The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dugout. This is a blank." The most disturbing defect, today, in the prevalent thinking on nuclear strategy is the cavalier disregard for this blank.

An almost exclusive emphasis on deterrence could be defended as a satisfactory long-term policy if it could be convincingly argued that successful deterrence was tantamount to prevention of nuclear war. There exists no rational basis for such an argument. No matter how cataclysmic the threatened "assured destruction," those calculated decisions which our deterrent seeks to prevent are not the sole processes that could lead to nuclear war. We simply cannot know which of the various potential causes is most probable—whether it be a coherently calculated decision to attack, or an "irrational" decision or technical accident. Yet the approach now prevailing puts almost all effort into preventing the "rational" decision.

Moreover, our current strategy explicitly selects for nearly exclusive emphasis a very special type of intended attack. It has thus become the overriding concern of American strategic analysts and force planners to ensure that our intercontinental arms would be capable of "retaliating" after a Soviet attack sought to destroy them. It so happens that the problem of deterring such an attack lends itself to rigorous analysis, *provided* one postulates that a particular type of rationality governs a Soviet decision whether or not to launch it. The fascinating opportunity for such intellectual rigor—so exceptional in military and political affairs—may partly explain why this problem has commanded so dominant a place in American strategic thinking.

This analysis has now become the canonical way of determining the adequacy of our strategic forces. It uses *our* ideas about

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how surprise attacks could be designed, our estimates of what weapons the Soviets have and how they would perform, our latest findings about the performance of our own weapons, and, as soon as we discover a mistake in these calculations, our corrections. That is to say, we impute to the Soviet military leadership our imaginativeness (or lack of it) in inventing "successful" attacks, our state of knowledge (or ignorance) of how the weapons on both sides would perform in the vortex of a thermonuclear war and our diligence (or carelessness) in calculations.

The results of such calculations are taken most seriously by American defense planners. Should they suggest a way in which our "retaliatory" capability might be jeopardized, we institute remedies: we harden, disperse or add penetration aids. Should they show that we could still inflict massive destruction, we conclude that all is well. To be sure, we must consider surprise strikes against us based on our understanding of how the relationship between the two strategic forces might be exploited. But we should not disregard all other risks.

Yet this is what the canonical analysis does. It makes a peculiar assumption about the "rationality" of the Soviet decision we need to deter. On the long slope descending from rationality to irrationality, it postulates that only a short stretch needs to be considered. We must prepare—it is argued—for the possibility that Soviet leaders might move so far down this slope as to be tempted to decide on a surprise attack, provided the calculations that we impute to their military staff indicate the attack would "succeed." That is, we prepare for the event that Soviet leaders might judge how a global nuclear war would turn out by relying on such largely untested calculations, trusting their military advisers to have used unbiased estimates and avoided gross mistakes. But we need not prepare for the possibility that Soviet leaders might be somewhat less "rational" and let a cabal of officers mislead them by twisting the enormously complicated data to show that a surprise attack could "succeed" even where our own analysis clearly indicates it would fail.

Or, to put it differently, our analysis implicitly argues that we have to prepare for a certain type of Soviet leader: a man who could be tempted to launch a surprise attack if the calculations we impute to them promise "success;" who would ignore the dangers of long-term radioactive fallout (which our analysis omits) and expect they could stay on top of the postwar chaos

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(about which our analysis says next to nothing). But we need not prepare—it is argued—for Soviet leaders who might be "less rational" in an acute crisis and who might rely on their ability to launch an attack so designed as to deter us from retaliating. Such a stratagem of "counter-deterrence" would seek to cripple our nuclear forces in a surprise attack while sparing our cities, in order to deter the U.S. President from reprisal against Russian cities lest withheld Soviet forces then devastate American cities.

When leaders of a powerful country are credited with a willingness to gamble on some scheme for nuclear surprise attack—a scheme whose calculations they cannot validate, whose assumptions they cannot test and whose failure would mean the end of their régime or even their country—how rational a decision are we assuming in our posture of deterrence? When the prevailing American view of mutual deterrence postulates that both the Russian nuclear posture and our own must be designed to deter an opponent of such degraded rationality, why stop at this particular degradation in judgment?

The narrowness of our canonical analysis of what it takes to keep deterrence stable can perhaps be traced to the traumatic American experience of the Pearl Harbor attack. By a few easy protective measures we could have denied the Japanese militarists their success in 1941. This lesson we have learned well, and with good reason. We should not permit such a surprise attack to become easy, lest we invite it during some crisis when our antagonist sees himself forced to choose among deadly alternatives.

To make a surprise attack unsuccessful, however, is not necessarily to deter it. By 1945, after all, the Japanese surprise attack had turned into a failure. Shortly before the attack was launched, Emperor Hirohito anticipated such an outcome and asked his military leaders how they envisaged defeating the United States, given its superior industrial might. His question never received an answer.[1] Would hardening, dispersal and a higher alertness of the American forces in 1941 have made the Japanese military abstain, or merely have driven them to redesign their attack?

Pearl Harbor thus provides a lesson beyond that of the danger of forces vulnerable to surprise attack. The Japanese military evidently expected that the United States, if it were disarmed

[1] Many other examples can be found of aggressive wars that have been planned without at all considering how they were to end. See the author's "Every War Must End." New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

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in the Pacific, would not mount the terribly costly effort of striking back. In choosing this gamble, they were even more "irrational" than future Soviet leaders would have to be to gamble on "counter-deterrence," since our striking back after Pearl Harbor did not invite the devastation of American cities. Yet today, our European-based nuclear arms, for instance, are vulnerable to a "counter-deterrence" attack.

Rather recent history reminds us that men can acquire positions of power who are willing to see their nation destroyed in pursuit of causes which only they and their henchmen espouse. In countries that tolerate a dictatorship, a leader might always rise to the top who deems it a virtue, perhaps part of his revolutionary creed, to live dangerously—*vivere pericolosamente,* as Benito Mussolini put it. What a sad irony that the nations that had to fight Hitler to his last bunker should now rely on an interlock of their military postures, making survival depend on the rationality of all future leaders in all major nuclear powers.

III

In the 1950s, prior to the missile age and Russia's massive build-up of her nuclear forces, one heard a great deal about the risk of accidental war. Now, when American and Soviet missiles by the thousands are poised in constant readiness, this concern has curiously diminished. To justify this more relaxed attitude, some might point to the fact that no unauthorized detonation has ever occurred, or cite the American-Soviet agreements of 1971 for improving the hotline or recall the elaborate safeguards with which the military seem to protect nuclear weapons.

But nobody can predict that the fatal accident or unauthorized act will never happen. The hazard is too elusive. It is inherent not only in the ineradicable possibility of technical defects, but also in the inevitable vulnerability to human error of all command and operational procedures—during periods of high alert as well as during the many years of quiet waiting. So exceedingly complex are modern weapons systems, both in their internal mechanisms and in their intricate interactions, that it seems doubtful whether any group of experts could ever ferret out every unintended ramification, discover every lurking danger. Indeed, the very word "system" misleads in that it suggests a clearly bounded combination of parts, their interactions all designed to serve the intended purpose.

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The deadly danger is deepened by the fact that latent hazards can only be corrected if they are sought out. To look, day in and day out, for some hidden risk of accident is not a task, however, that captures the attention of top decision-makers. It is far from unusual in military operations for serious oversights or occasional incompetence to go undetected or uncorrected until after a major disaster. For example, after the North Korean seizure in 1968 of the American reconnaissance ship *Pueblo,* when the crew had been unable to destroy all the cryptographic material before capture, destructive incendiary devices were suddenly permitted aboard ship. Previously, such devices had been prohibited because of the fire hazard, and the development of safer ones had been neglected. Safeguards rarely come without costs, and often appear to pose counteracting hazards.

Drastic shortcomings in the Defense Department's worldwide communications came to the attention of a congressional subcommittee after the Israeli attack in 1967 on the American ship *Liberty*. At the beginning of the Six-Day War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to order the *Liberty* into safer waters. Over a period of 13 hours prior to the Israeli attack, they sent their order in at least four messages. Two of the messages were misrouted to the Philippines and one of these was thence sent to the National Security Agency in Maryland, there merely to be filed. Another message was routed over two paths to be doubly sure; in the first path it was lost in a relay station, in the second delayed until many hours after the attack. The fourth message also arrived too late. This failure in emergency communications occurred under almost perfect conditions: no facilities had been disabled, there was no enemy jamming, and no restrictions on the use of available communication modes had been imposed.

It can be argued that safeguards for nuclear arms are likely to be more stringent and more carefully designed than arrangements protecting cryptographic equipment or procedures for transmitting top-level emergency commands. But those Russians and Americans who monitor the safety of strategic arms cannot afford to learn from past accidents to probe for and correct critical hazards. When it comes to defects in safeguards that might lead to an accidental nuclear war, our societies cannot survive by learning through trial and error.

Polaris and Poseidon submarines suffer from communication difficulties so serious that "some of the messages never get deliv-

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ered," as a senior naval officer put it. To permit "retaliation" after a massive surprise attack, officers on American and Russian missile-carrying submarines must be ready, presumably, to launch their enormously destructive loads even after military communications networks have been destroyed. Yet, they must never inadvertently or deliberately misconstrue an order to launch—during all the long years the submarines will cruise the oceans as part of the "stable" deterrent, as well as during the confusion and turmoil of a global crisis. Will this formidable requirement always be met?

The peril may well be greater on the Soviet side. Since the American military establishment is relatively open to outside scrutiny, pressures to ferret out safety hazards or institute perhaps costly remedies can come from civilians in the executive branch, congressional committees and even the public. Under the compartmentalized, pervasive secrecy of the Soviet military, however, past accidents and present hazards can be kept not only from the public but from senior civilian authorities as well.

Given that occasional incompetence or malfeasance is predictable in large institutions—whether military or civilian—the safety of nuclear armaments remains a constantly pressing uncertainty. Given the huge and far-flung missile forces, ready to be launched from land and sea on both sides, the scope for disaster by accident is immense. Given that our strategic dogmas demand the targeting of populations and denial of defensive measures, the carnage would be without restraint. And as if all this were not terrifying enough, some proponents of these dogmas want to push matters to the brink.

Various influential people have urged that the United States adopt procedures to launch its missile force upon receipt of a warning that a Soviet surprise attack is on the way. Senator Fulbright, for example, recommended in 1969 that our missiles should be launched "immediately" upon warning of a Soviet attack, "without any fiddling around about it, even without asking the computer what to do," even if the warning indicated a "light attack." Other American senators and government advisers have also advocated that, in the event our forces became more vulnerable, we adopt a policy of launching our missiles on warning. According to at least two of these advocates—Jerome Wiesner, President Kennedy's Science Adviser, and Richard Garwin, member of President Nixon's Science Advisory Committee—

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it might not even be necessary to wait for the first nuclear detonation before launching.

But what might appear as a deliberate attack within the few minutes before the expected impact could have been a false warning; even an actual nuclear explosion could have been accidental. The short time available to execute a "retaliatory" launch-on-warning of our missile forces would not be enough to resolve this uncertainty.

Advocacy of a launch-on-warning policy might be viewed as a passing aberration in a fluid debate, if it were not for institutional pressures among the military that will keep driving in the same direction. Those branches of American and Russian military services that believe they must continue to press the case for land-based missile forces will—because of the increasing vulnerability of these forces—be ever more tempted to stress launch-on-warning as an option. To make this option more acceptable, new warning systems would be acquired; these in turn would strengthen vested interests in favor of this policy.

In Russia, such pressures may be even more compelling, because Soviet strategic thinking continues to consider favorably "preëmption," that is, striking at the enemy before he can complete—or even start—his attack. For instance, the 1968 edition of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii's book on Soviet military strategy refers to surveillance systems for detecting "the adversary's immediate preparations for a nuclear attack" as well as his massive missile launch, making it possible "to bar an aggressor's surprise attack and deliver prompt nuclear strikes against him." As recently as 1971, Defense Minister Grechko stressed the importance of speed for "frustrating an aggressor's surprise blows and successfully carrying out those military tasks, especially by the rocket troops . . . which must be fulfilled in a matter of seconds." In a matter of seconds—through technical accident or human failure—mutual deterrence might thus collapse.

President Nixon, in his last two foreign policy messages, has rejected a launch-on-warning policy. However, should one side give the appearance of adopting it, the other might feel compelled to institute faster launch procedures, creating an "arms race" in reducing safeguards against accidental war. Under mounting pressures from Soviet "hawks," and from some American "doves" as well as "hawks," in both countries responsible people in the center may not keep enough influence to halt this

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race. The very fact that well-informed and well-intentioned advisers now recommend, in essence, that the balance of terror should rest on hair-triggered doomsday machines offers a chilling reminder that we cannot rely on unswerving rationality among those who might affect critical strategic decisions.

The launch-on-warning aberration is only the most conspicuous outgrowth of the belief that to prevent nuclear war we have but to deter it. Our present strategic policy aggravates the risk of accidental war through many less visible practices as well as by its grand design.

IV

While the current overemphasis on mutual deterrence against a "rational" surprise attack dates from the mid-1960s, the other two dogmas of our nuclear strategy are largely the legacy of earlier periods. This is particularly true of the dogma that "retaliation" must be swift, inflicted in an all-out strike.

The world's first nuclear force—the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC)—was established in a period when we did not have to deter nuclear attack, but seriously feared the Red Army might move into Western Europe with its preponderant conventional strength. SAC became the remedy for the weakness perceived in the United States because of our extensive unilateral disarmament following World War II. One cannot appreciate the thinking of American leaders at that time, unless one makes an effort to recall how imminent they judged the likelihood that the Russians would launch an all-out ground attack in Europe.

Accordingly, to fight a war seemed at least as important a mission for SAC as to deter one. And in planning to fight a war, American strategists took account of what they had learned from the bombing raids in World War II. Whereas they had found that urban societies could continue to support a war effort as long as the damage was partial and gradual, it still seemed possible that sudden and extensive destruction would produce a collapse. Thus, the strategy that had not fully succeeded against Hitler because of technological limitations now seemed feasible thanks to the atomic bomb. Our new weapons could administer the "knock-out blow" against Russia's cities—the industrial and political centers—in order to halt the Red Army's advance against Western Europe. Hence, to be an effective war-fighting strategy, atomic bombing had to be a concentrated, quick blow.

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As the Russians also began to acquire a nuclear capability, American strategists came to fear attack on European or even American cities, as an act of "retaliation" should SAC carry out the attack that would leave the advancing Red Army without support from the homeland. Thus, the first priority for SAC in the mid-1950s became the destruction of the Soviet nuclear capability before it could be used. This priority provided a second reason for our nuclear strike to be prompt and massive.

Initially, our strategic forces for this disarming strike lacked intercontinental range; they had to be based in North Africa or Europe to reach their targets. Later, we assigned an increasingly large role in this mission to our growing intercontinental arms, which meant they had to be capable of reaching their targets early enough to prevent the launching of most of the Soviet weapons. Thanks to the new solid fuel technology, our U.S.-based missiles could be launched in minutes and Minuteman became our principal land-based missile force. The requirement for speed, stemming from the disarming mission of our forces protecting Western Europe and appropriate perhaps for the 1950s and early 1960s, was thereby transferred to the arms that were to remain a principal element in our intercontinental deterrent for the 1970s and beyond.

After 1963, however, our dominant strategic philosophy shifted from the emphasis on the disarming strike to the principle of "mutual assured destruction." This shift was primarily motivated by our view of the arms race: we feared that our efforts to maintain a capability for a disarming strike would stimulate a continuing build-up of Soviet forces; and conversely, we hoped that our restraint would be reciprocated. Accordingly, we began to deny ourselves the capability to defend against those Soviet forces that could escape our quick, disarming strike in behalf of NATO, and—further undermining this earlier mission of our strategic forces—we began to curtail our capability to hit Soviet forces. In 1971, for example, the Senate referred explicitly to this new arms-control thinking in voting against funds to improve the accuracy of our missiles.

As a result of these developments, our current strategic posture is afflicted by a deep but strangely concealed contradiction. Those of our forces that serve to protect our NATO allies are still largely designed and operated in accordance with the earlier strategy threatening, in response to a major conventional attack,

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a nuclear first strike that would seek to disarm. But our global deterrence posture now has to meet the opposite requirement: to eschew, and through agreement mutually to preclude, a nuclear disarming capability. Meanwhile, some of our allies have come to regard our nuclear forces based on their soil as the most tangible symbol committing our entire deterrent forces to their defense, so that our former technological reason for overseas basing has been replaced by a political one. In the midst of the incompatibility between our nuclear strategy for NATO and our global deterrence policy, our so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons—also a legacy of a bygone era—introduce yet another anachronism of obsolete posture and technology.

To make the historical evolution still more complex, starting about 1960 the growing Soviet nuclear capability seemed to threaten more than just vengeful destruction of our cities so as to deter NATO's nuclear "knock-out" response to a Red Army advance. Soviet intercontinental missiles began to pose the canonical threat that figures so prominently in our strategic analysis —the massive surprise attack to disarm the United States. Given that the major portion of our strategic forces had been designed primarily for the prompt disarming strike in response to a Soviet invasion of Europe, they had not been primarily designed to survive a Soviet nuclear attack. For this new mission—"retaliation" in response to the Soviet nuclear strike—our bombers and missiles had to be launched promptly, before they were all destroyed on the ground. Here was the third reason conspiring to keep our strategic thinking riveted to the notion that "retaliation" had to be swift.

V

Clearly distinguishable from the notion that "retaliation" must be a swift, massive strike in any strategy of mutual deterrence is the now equally prevalent dogma that this strike must be designed to kill millions of people. This dogma can also be traced to the technical and conceptual limitations of strategic bombing in World War II. One has to recall the emotions and theories behind Hitler's raids on Coventry and London, and the deliberate bombing of residential areas in Hamburg, Tokyo, Dresden and Hiroshima, to understand how we could have arrived where we are today. After World War II, military experts began to recognize that the immensely greater destructive power of nuclear

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weapons could compensate for the inaccuracy of aerial bombing, hence permitting destruction of small-sized military targets. But only if these targets were in unpopulated areas could they be destroyed without the killing of civilian populations. A nuclear weapon small enough to avoid vast civilian damage, yet accurate enough to hit most military targets, was not within the technology of the first nuclear decade.

As our strategic planners began to grapple with the role of nuclear weapons, not only was their vision confined by these technological limitations; but their sensitivity to the distinction between combatants and civilians—long cultivated through civilizing centuries—had become dulled by the strategic bombing in World War II. And given that we were then still planning how to fight—not to deter—a nuclear war, the mass killing of noncombatants came to be viewed as a "bonus effect," a useful by-product of the bombing campaign on which we relied to win in the event of World War III. Our "knock-out blow" would paralyze the Red Army not only by demolishing railroad yards, factories and party headquarters, but also by decimating urban populations and thus (perhaps) crushing Russia's "morale."

This history—not reasoned strategic analysis—led us into the habit of thinking that one had to threaten the killing of millions and millions of people in order to deter an "aggressor." None the less, the question of whether or not cities should be the targets of the "retaliatory" strike remained unsettled. In the late 1950s, a few strategists began to make the case that we should avoid hitting Russian cities in our initial strike responding to Soviet aggression. Instead, we should seek to destroy whatever Soviet nuclear weapons had not yet been used as well as other military targets, holding Soviet cities "hostage" to deter attacks on our cities. This strategy, it was then argued, would not only serve us better if nuclear war should break out for whatever reason, but would be just as effective to deter it.

During his first two years in office, Secretary of Defense McNamara came out in support of this new strategy and advocated military efforts consistent with it, such as civil defense and "counterforce" capabilities. Yet, after 1963, he began to promote the concept of "assured destruction." Initially, he perhaps meant to use this concept primarily as a convenient bureaucratic tactic. By pointing out our overwhelming capability for "assured destruction," he had a precise, statistical measurement for arguing

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against budgetary pressures from the military services, that we had more than enough arms for deterrence.

What began as a budgetary device within the Defense Department, conveniently fitting the need to shift defense dollars from our strategic forces to Vietnam from 1965 on, ended up as one of the dogmas governing our strategic and arms-control policy. We came to view a "retaliatory" threat to kill a major fraction of the Russian population as necessary for deterrence. And we came to believe that forces tailored to this threat were the only alternative to forces that appeared to jeopardize Russia's nuclear deterrent and hence would stimulate an arms race.

As "assured destruction" became the yardstick of nuclear strategy, the underlying calculations adopted a brutally simplifying index of success. It considered only those hostages whose death from the retaliatory strike would be certain and exactly calculable—those killed by the direct blast and heat effects of our weapons. In gauging the excellence of our deterrent—as reflected in statistics presented to Congress—those Russians who would be killed or injured by fires, fallout and famine were excluded. Cognoscenti call this method of calculation the "cookie cutter" —nuclear weapons are assumed to "take out" hostages in a neat circle, like a piece of dough.

Such tasteless jargon helps to conceal the peculiar reasoning that is implicit in the modern approach to deterrence. We impute to the potential aggressor enough rationality or compassion to be reliably deterred by the prospect that calculable millions of his compatriots would meet prompt and certain death from "direct weapons effects;" we somehow do not trust him to be deterred by the prospect of the less easily measured millions who would suffer and die from radiation sickness, untreated injuries or starvation. And while destruction of industry has been mentioned as being part of our "assured destruction," the question whether one could spare people and target only industry has scarcely been raised. Yet, by permitting evacuation, for instance, separation of urban industries and populations might be accomplished.

The Nixon administration properly discontinued flaunting of these gruesome statistics to demonstrate the reliability of our deterrent. None the less, most American strategic experts still use the same calculus.

Our arms-control experts and military planners insulate them-

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selves from the potential implications of their labors by layers of dehumanizing abstractions and bland metaphors. Thus, "assured destruction" fails to indicate what is to be destroyed; but then "assured genocide" would reveal the truth too starkly. The common phrase, "deterring a potential aggressor," conveys a false simplicity about the processes that might lead to a nuclear attack, as if we had to worry only about some ambitious despot who sits calculating whether or not to start a nuclear war. A moral perversity lies hidden behind the standard formula: in the event this "aggressor" attacks, we must "retaliate by knocking out *his* cities." Tomas de Torquemada, who burned 10,000 heretics at the stake, could claim principles more humane than our nuclear strategy; for his tribunals found all his victims guilty of having knowingly committed mortal sin.

The jargon of American strategic analysis works like a narcotic. It dulls our sense of moral outrage about the tragic confrontation of nuclear arsenals, primed and constantly perfected to unleash widespread genocide. It fosters the current smug complacence regarding the soundness and stability of mutual deterrence. It blinds us to the fact that our method for preventing nuclear war rests on a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages—the mass killing of hostages.

Indeed, our nuclear strategy is supposed to work the better, the larger the number of hostages that would pay with their lives should the strategy fail. This view has become so ingrained that the number of hostages who could be killed through a "second strike" by either superpower is often used as a measure of the "stability" of deterrence. Our very motive behind the recent treaty curbing the deployment of missile defenses is to keep this number reliably high.

In the long run, preserving a mutual threat of genocide may impede the reduction of tension and distrust between the two nuclear superpowers that we all hope for. It is far better, of course, for major powers to maintain peace between them by planning for deterrence instead of for war. But to stabilize deterrence by keeping ready arsenals for instant and unrestrained slaughter of men, women and children is likely to impose a wrenching perspective on the officialdom of both nations. Such a "stabilization" perpetuates an arms-control philosophy that, at its core, is incredibly hostile. How would American-British relations have developed in the nineteenth century if, instead of

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the Rush-Bagot agreement, we had negotiated the establishment of armaments on each side permanently primed to destroy most cities in the United States and England?

Despite the arcane jargon of modern deterrence theory, ordinary Americans and Russians cannot escape the realization that their generation and their children's generation are destined to remain the chosen target of the nuclear forces on the other side. Toward each other as a people, Americans and Russians harbor practically no feelings of hostility, but by our theories they must indefinitely face each other as the most fearful threat to their future existence.

VI

Mercifully, no inhuman power condemns us to live perpetually in the grim jail of our own ideas. Alternatives can be found, although it may take decades to construct a better order for the prevention of nuclear war and the task will require the work of many minds. This is all the more reason for beginning today.

A good place to begin is to cast out the dogma that to deter nuclear attack, the threatened response must be the mass killing of people. By taking advantage of modern technology, we should be able to escape the evil dilemma that the strategic forces on both sides must either be designed to kill people or else jeopardize the opponent's confidence in his deterrent. The potential accuracy of "smart" bombs and missiles and current choices in weapon effects could enable both sides to avoid the killing of vast millions and yet to inflict assured destruction on military, industrial and transportation assets—the sinews and muscles of the régime initiating war. Combined with this change in concept and techniques of "retaliation," we must design solutions more stable than in the past to the problem of achieving invulnerable deterrent forces. No matter how accurately each side can aim its own weapons, we want to make it physically impossible for most of the strategic arms to be destroyed by sudden attack.

It is premature to judge whether such a change in capabilities and doctrine might eventually make it desirable for us and the Russians to permit active defenses for urban populations while prohibiting them for military assets other than the nuclear deterrent. If such discrimination were to become technically feasible, its desirability would depend not only on American-Soviet rela-

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tions at that time, but also on the danger of attack, if any, from other nuclear powers.

The second dogma we have to discard is that response to nuclear attack must be the prompt, even instant, launching of nearly the entire nuclear force. By eliminating the need to design our arms for instant launching, we can reduce vulnerability in many new ways. Precisely how to design forces that are far less vulnerable because they are not meant for instant reaction is a task for future research. We may not now see promising approaches; over all these years we have never made the effort. Arms buried thousands of feet underground come to mind, with provision for reaching the surface—and their targets—weeks or months after attack. By insisting that our strategic arms be capable of swift launch, we have restricted our engineers to such vulnerable arrangements as aircraft in delicately ready conditions and missiles exposed on or near the surface.

If we can eliminate the vulnerability of our strategic arms to surprise attack, we will have broken the vicious circle: that they must be ready for prompt launching because they are vulnerable, and that they are vulnerable because they must be ready. Furthermore, should the Russians come to agree with us, we could jointly decide to replace the doomsday catapults invented in the 1950s with arms that are incapable of being launched swiftly. If the strategic order could be transformed in this way, the dominant fear of surprise attack which drives our arms competition would loosen its grip. Weapons incapable of quick launching tend to be less suitable for surprise; and against truly invulnerable nuclear armaments, surprise would have lost its purpose.

Neither we nor the Russians will suddenly scuttle all our hair-triggered engines of destruction. By abandoning the dogma of speed, however, both of us can shift intellectual energies and budgetary resources to develop different nuclear armaments. Strategic weapons have a long lifetime; between the initial concept and the scrap heap, up to 25 years may elapse. What we engineer during this decade will have to prevent nuclear war into the next century.

Discarding the dogma of speed would result in another gain, perhaps even more important than reduced vulnerability. It would go a long way to reduce the danger of accidental war. By eliminating the requirement for launching entire missile forces in a matter of minutes, we can get rid of the triggering

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mechanisms and sensitive command procedures where some obscure malfunction might lead to cataclysm. Time is the best healer of mistakes, whether technical or human. The insistence on speed leaves insufficient time for double-checking; it denies opportunities for correction. If rapidity becomes the overriding concern, independent monitors tend to get pushed aside. Until about 1950, the Atomic Energy Commission shared in the custody of the nuclear weapons deployed by the military. But the notion that these weapons had to be ready for immediate use led President Truman to turn them over to the sole custody of the military.

Although avoiding the killing of hostages, these changes would not make nuclear war less unacceptable as an instrument of policy. Deterrence would remain: the conventional military might of the aggressor nation—its navy, army and air force with their logistics support—would be the first to suffer "assured destruction." Such a prospect would make even less tempting the planning of nuclear war than today's actual or imagined opportunities for a quick strike to deprive the opponent of his nuclear weapons. And the risk of the destruction of cities would still loom in the background.

Could the Soviet leaders be induced to accept such an evolution? We have lately devoted a major effort to teach our dogmas to the Russians—some feel with considerable success. Certain stubborn positions in Soviet strategic thought, however, manifest a less narrow view of deterrence by showing greater concern for dangers of a nuclear war that cannot be deterred, and reflect a longer time-perspective than we have developed. Once freed from our dogmas, we may discover that the distance in strategic views between us and the Russians is less than it appears today.

The greatest obstacles to the necessary reconstruction of our strategic order may well be intellectual and institutional rigidities. We justify our old habits of thinking because we are so competently familiar with the arguments against change. We are disposed to reject suggestions for improvement by demanding a perfect solution at the outset.

Military services cling to the type of weapons to which they have become accustomed, seeking marginal improvements rather than radical innovation. For instance, the United States Navy in the 1950s was at first reluctant to press ahead with the Polaris program, preferring to stress the strategic mission of carrier-

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based aircraft. Similarly, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and the United States Air Force will probably want to hold on to their land-based missile forces well beyond the 1970s. Much is made about the importance of preserving our "triad" of strategic forces, as if the fact that we happened to acquire bombers, missiles and submarines created some sacred trinity. Means outlive their ends among military organizations, for it is to the means that institutional loyalties and intellectual craftsmanship are devoted.

The scholasticism justifying our current policy is full of contradictions. On the one hand, we brush aside the immorality of threatening to kill millions of hostages, assuming that the threat will deter and that to deter means to prevent nuclear war. On the other hand, we argue that we must be poised to carry out "retaliation" swiftly and thus convey determination for irrational vengeance, since all rational purpose of retaliation would have disappeared when its time had come. We want to maintain a vague threat of using nuclear weapons first to deter massive conventional attack; yet, to stabilize mutual deterrence we must not threaten Soviet nuclear arms nor defend against them. . . .

The result of such contradictions is a cancelling out of good intentions. In some years, our arms policy is dominated by our preoccupation with the arms race and the view that we should therefore hobble our forces. In other years, we decide to refurbish our so-called options for attacking Russia's nuclear arms. Left to itself, this pulling and hauling between *yin* and *yang* will not lead the world into a safer era. On the contrary, the bureaucratic struggle may result in the worst compromise among the biases of contending factions. While luck has been with us so far, strategic thinking must and can find a new path into the twenty-first century.

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THE CHANGING ESSENCE OF POWER

By Seyom Brown

TODAY's political flux features on its diplomatic surface three interacting trends: a disintegration of the cold-war coalitions, the rise of nonsecurity issues to the top of diplomatic agendas, and a diversification of friendships and adversary relations. These surface movements are the expression of deeper currents, which, if appropriately exploited by providential statesmanship, could fundamentally alter the essence of world politics, changing the structures and ingredients of power itself.

Let us examine each trend in turn, accepting the risks of oversimplification that are inescapable in any broad projection of the future.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union are today less anxious than they were in the 1950s and 1960s that shifts by smaller countries toward nonalignment, neutralism or even the other's coalition will fundamentally affect either of their vital security interests. Changes in military technology have reduced the value of forward bases not only for strategic deterrence but also for combat and reconnaissance in large-scale conventional war. An exception is Eastern Europe, where the Soviets still insist upon a security belt made up of completely loyal allies. Elsewhere, superpower protection, having become less credible, loses some of its value, while at the same time the price of securing that protection rises. This generates high incentives for the smaller countries to strike postures of independence in the hope of creating more opportunity for diplomatic maneuver against both superpowers. In turn, the superpowers find the fidelity of their allies less reliable. New geopolitical doctrines that assert a reduced security requirement for allies are given greater play in military planning and foreign policy generally. Ideologies which make it imperative to defend on a global basis the good people against the bad are pushed aside in favor of more "pragmatic" considerations.

Second, the loosening of the hierarchical relationship between the superpowers and their smaller allies within each of the grand cold-war coalitions gives freer play to conflicts over nonsecurity issues—economic primarily—while the relative emerg-

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ence of the nonsecurity issues reinforces the fragmentation of these coalitions. When protection against a threatening enemy coalition was the most pressing concern, the subordination of special economic, political and cultural interests to the requirements of the common defense was more readily accepted as was the hegemony over one's coalition by the country with the most powerful military capabilities. Today, questions concerning the best means of providing for the common defense of the coalition—strategies toward the opposing coalition, the allocation of roles and burdens among the members—are still prominent. But the ability of the United States on the one side, and the Soviet Union on the other, to prevail over their respective allies in intra-coalition politics has been decreasing, in considerable measure because of the increasing ability of lesser members, when nonmilitary matters are at issue, to form coalitions with one another or with nonaligned countries, and even with members of the other cold-war coalition. This aspect of the process of coalition disintegration is beginning to play a role even among the Warsaw Pact countries. Thus, some countries have an incentive to push nonsecurity issues to the top of international agendas partly for the purpose of increasing their bargaining power vis-à-vis the coalition superpower; and to the extent that the rise in nonsecurity issues and the construction of multiple coalitions are the results of East-West détente, these countries develop a vested interest in the evaporation of cold-war issues. In this way the disintegration of the cold-war coalitions, once begun, sets in motion other forces that tend to accelerate the pace and force of the erosion.

Next, the disintegration of global bipolarity and the rise of nonsecurity issues open new opportunities, and provide greater incentives, for countries to cultivate a wider and more diverse range of international friends than was possible previously. In the heyday of the cold-war coalitions each superpower, while competing for allies all around the globe, made firm distinctions between its coalition partners and members of the enemy camp. Rarely would lesser members of either alliance deal bilaterally with members of the opposing alliance unless the exchanges were stage-managed by the alliance leader. Even for transactions within the camp, when important political or economic issues were being negotiated, the superpower was usually heavily involved and bilateral or multilateral dealings among a subset of members were discouraged—unless, of course, the superpower

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was one of the parties. To be sure, "nonaligned" countries (notably India, Egypt and Indonesia) played the field, but many statesmen and analysts assumed this international stance was untenable over the long run. Now it is precisely such a flexible posture, in many respects resembling nonalignment, that seems to be serving as the model for realistic diplomacy.

Thus, more and more, divergences in worldview or differences in social systems are insufficient causes to bar cordial relations among countries. Economic intercourse, technological coöperation and scientific and cultural exchanges are considered legitimate among virtually all possible combinations of countries; and increasingly, organizations and forums for these purposes are using functional or geographic rather than ideological criteria for participation. Multilateral groupings established for coöperation in various fields have crosscutting memberships —for example: some members of a given security grouping find themselves co-members of a regional environmental control grouping with countries which are in the adversary security grouping, and a different subset of members of each of these groupings are participants in a space-communications system. This means that rival international coalitions also vary in membership according to the issues in dispute.

II

If the dominant tendencies continue to mature as indicated above, an international system whose essential characteristics are grossly different not only from the bipolar cold-war system but also from previous "balance-of-power" systems could emerge full blown, very likely by the 1980s. We can only conjecture as to what these essential characteristics will be, and even then only in broadest outline. But, admitting the guesswork inherent in such an exercise, and recognizing the possibility that unpredictable contingencies—such as rapprochement between Russia and the People's Republic of China plus a renewal of belligerent expansionism by either or both—could halt or reverse the disintegration of the cold-war coalitions, it is not too early to try a sketch of the emerging system.

First and foremost, the new system would feature a change in the nature of international power itself. If the international power of a country is defined as the capacity to influence other countries to accede to its objectives, then in a system character-

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ized by multiple and crosscutting coalitions formed around a variety of issues, the properties of power would be significantly different than in the predominantly bipolar system. In the new system, those with the most influence are likely to be those which are major constructive participants in the widest variety of coalitions and partnerships, since such countries would have the largest supply of usable political currency—in effect, promissory notes that say: "We will support you on this issue, if you support us on that issue." Conversely, threats to withdraw support would serve as negative sanctions.

The power-maximizing country would want to have its own pledges of support universally honored and highly valued; frequently, these would be in the form of financial assets or economic and technical inputs it can make available to the projects desired by others. Such a country also would want to be able to convert pledges it has collected from others into currency for its own use. When these are from poorer countries which lack surplus material assets, they may be in the form of votes in the various multinational forums whose endorsement is important to projects desired by the richer country.

Power in the form of promises to apply or withhold military capabilities—the dominant form of power during the cold war—would still be of ultimate decisive importance in conflicts over vital security interests. But it would have little utility compared with other forms of power, and sometimes even a negative effect, in bargaining over the nonsecurity issues around which coalitions would be forming and reforming. For the threat to apply military power carries a high risk of devaluing the other bargaining chips in one's possession, since it is almost certain so to alienate the involved societies from one another that they dismantle their coöperative projects and withdraw from mutual coalition partnerships in virtually all fields. Pairs of countries that have few interlocking relationships to start with (as used to be the case with East-West relations in the cold war) can afford to be indifferent to such a falling out between them. But active participants in the emerging international system, with elaborate overlapping of interests and coalitions, ought to be highly constrained by the knowledge that their opponents in one area are often their supporters in another.

If coercive bargaining strategies must be resorted to, the prudent statesman will conserve his overall store of influence by

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proffering, withholding and withdrawing assets well below the level of military force and avoiding the development of total nation-to-nation or coalition-to-coalition hostility. Rarely should a specific dispute warrant the costs, in loss of influence, that would accompany escalation to war threats, the mobilization of military alliances or the polarization of international politics.

What, then, becomes of today's great powers, especially the two superpowers? How would they stand under new criteria of power? America and Russia could continue to be the most influential in the emerging system by virtue of their command over economic resources, technological skills and military capabilities. But if they were to rely primarily on the coercive leverage of their first-ranking material positions instead of exploiting the opportunities in the new system for participating in multiple coalitions, they might find themselves falling behind other actors in usable power. Moreover, in competition with each other for global influence, the United States and the Soviet Union would find that constructive coöperation with smaller countries gains more votes in global and regional forums than coercive or denial strategies.

The nine or more members of the European Economic Community (EEC), when acting as a unit on particular international issues, could well emerge as an equally powerful unit in world politics—especially if the United States and the Soviet Union continue to act as if the obsolete bipolar confrontation of security communities still were the essence of international relations. The usable power of the West European group in any case would not stem from its military capability. It would derive principally from techno-economic capabilities, cultural ties, geography and diplomatic skill. The EEC countries are well situated for coalition-building with the countries of Eastern Europe, being partners or competitors in a larger all-European market and over the use of common all-European resources: river basins, seas, energy supplies, air space and the atmosphere. Moreover, the West Europeans can be expected to be especially active in maintaining and constructing North-South interdependencies, building particularly upon the intimate connections France maintains with most of her former colonies in Africa and upon British Commonwealth ties.

Japan, though envisioned as equal to or surpassing the Soviet Union in gross national product by the end of the century, is

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nevertheless likely to rank lower in overall power (as defined here), and possibly will remain somewhat behind the EEC. While having the high technological and financial assets to assure that other countries desire her coöperation, Japan herself, because of extensive reliance on others for raw materials, will continue to be vitally dependent on the good will of others, and on the absence of regional or global conflicts that could interrupt her supply lines. She has neither the potential for self-sufficiency of the United States or the Soviet Union, nor the historic community ties of EEC countries to Third-World partners, to insulate this vulnerable dependency. As such she must please as well as be pleased. A hefty military capability will be of practically no use to her in day-to-day bargaining relationships, and, in light of recent history, even the slightest suggestion that she might attempt to escalate a dispute over economic matters to the military level would surely alienate a large number of her suppliers, and revive a broad international coalition against her.

The fifth great power, China, must rely almost entirely upon skillful diplomacy, rather than exchangeable material assets, to exert any great influence beyond her borders. The only wide swath she can hope to cut in international coalition politics is as a champion of the Third-World countries, among whom she may continue to be the only nuclear-armed nation for some time. But China's nuclear capability, even if useful to deter military attacks upon herself, is unlikely to be pertinent as a bargaining counter on behalf of other members of any Third-World coalition. Her diplomatic leadership opportunities in the Third World will depend rather on the degree and quality of the Third-World policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, the EEC countries and Japan. If the industrialized great powers, either as a result of preoccupation with their own rivalries or a moral indifference to Third-World concerns, appear to be treating the less-developed countries as pawns, the way will be open for China to strike heroic poses in international forums as an aggressive spokesman for the world's poor.

China also can be expected to exploit any opportunities for driving wedges between the Soviet Union and the East European countries, as a part of her continuing effort to be an alternative pole of attraction in the world Communist movement. As either a major market or source of specialized products, China will be of growing importance to many countries, but not of

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decisively greater importance than major countries or regional groupings in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia or Southeast Asia.

III

Yet, though one may thus seek to assess the present great powers, it would be misleading to characterize the relationships among the five most powerful actors in the emerging system as a five-sided balance of power, since this conveys rough equality of weight among the five in their intramural competition. Most of the usable kinds of power at the disposal of each are incommensurate; and in specific categories some of the countries are clearly more powerful than others.

Wars between Europe and the United States, between the United States and Japan, or between Japan and Europe, are too implausible for the respective military balances between these pairs to have any important effects on disputes likely to arise among them. Even between the United States (or Europe) and the Soviet Union (or China), Japan and the Soviet Union or Japan and China, the rapid escalation of any particular dispute to the war-threat level would be rarely if ever warranted, given the costs and risks of this pattern of interaction and the availability (in the system we have postulated) of nonmilitary means of exerting pressure. The only pair for which the military equation may yet be immediately relevant is China and Russia—given a continuation of their border dispute.

In the nonmilitary categories of power, the relationships among the five often lack any common denominator for measurement; and to the extent that there are comparable categories, they tend to exhibit imbalance more than symmetry. Thus, the Soviet Union and members of COMECON probably would be more in need of commerce with the West than vice versa. On the other hand, being state-controlled economies, the Socialist countries could more easily subject their commercial negotiations to the requirements of their international political maneuvers. Japan, as suggested above, would be more vulnerable to economic pressures involving a potential cut-off or increase in price in essential raw material sources, particularly petroleum products, than the United States, Russia or China. Western Europe would also be weak in this respect. But the power of each of the major actors to influence the flow and price of raw

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materials could come to depend most of all on its overall relationship with producer countries in the Third World.

On the increasingly important issues of terms of access to and privileges in the space and ocean environments, and international ecological standards and controls, who gets what, when and how would be highly dependent upon (1) international structures set up to allocate benefits and costs and to resolve disputes, and (2) the configuration of coalitions in each of these fields. These institutional structures and coalitions are unlikely to be congruent with the hierarchy of power based upon either standard military or economic indicators. The relevant "balance of power" in such areas would take in a much wider set of critical actors and interdependent relationships than is contemplated in most visions of a five-power world.

Moreover, the emerging international system would not be congenial with the concept of "multipolarity," if this term is used to connote a magnetic pull by certain powerful countries, presumably over the other nations in their respective regions, and the resulting creation of spheres of (hegemonial) influence —jurisdictions of domination marked out for themselves by each powerful country, and respected by the others. Such a carving up of the globe, even if ostensibly agreed to by the major actors, would not be sustainable, given the condition of multiple interdependence and crosscutting coalitions. Smaller countries within a region would actively seek extra-regional partners for commerce or other functions in order to retain bargaining leverage against the dominant regional country. Rather than being a pole of attraction, a dominant regional country with pretensions to hegemony is likely to reinforce the centrifugal tendencies already present in the system. It might appear to succeed in the short run, but would tend to produce in time a subregional coalition in opposition. The existence of this coalition would tempt other big powers, or other coalitions outside of the region, to subvert the sphere of influence of the dominating regional power by establishing special ties with the aggrieved nations and publicly championing their causes.

Just here one sees readily a principal threat to the new system. As in the Czechoslovakian and Dominican episodes, it may be very hard for a regionally hegemonial power to choose to relax its overbearing control when challenged, instead of applying physical force to keep extra-regional influence out of its would-

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be satellites. The coercive option, even when applied to a smaller power within one's region, is likely to revive the salience of power in international politics, and rather rapidly destroy the underlying preconditions of the postulated system.

Indeed, if countries with nuclear weapons and other powerful military capabilities invoked their military superiority for purposes of facing down opponents in any type of conflict situation, then military force and militarized diplomacy—although bad currency—in a kind of Gresham's law of international politics, would tend to drive out the good currency of coöperative and limited coalition-building. Inevitably, many prestige-seeking countries would refuse to rely on their own material resources and diplomatic skill for protecting their interests. Instead, they would want their own weapons of mass destruction, and a dangerous nuclear "Nth-country" pattern could become a fundamental feature of international politics.

Thus a few instances of escalation to high-level military coercion by one or some of the most powerful actors could engender a retrogressive chain-reaction of coercive diplomacy, throwing most countries back into the classic mode of attempting to balance one another's power by military means, which now, for any adversary of a nuclear-armed country, would require some sort of devastating second-strike capability. The system of multiple interdependence would soon contain multiple arms races and multiple paranoia. And there would be strong temptations to resort to the drastic Hobbesian alternative of a global "Leviathan": a centralized authoritarian law-and-order system imposed on the world by those with sufficient coercive power to overwhelm all opponents. It takes little imagination to recognize that any attempt to impose such a system probably could not be undertaken without provoking a world war.

IV

Obviously, the maturing of a full-blown system of multiple interdependence where power would be exercised largely in the form of constructive exchanges of valued resources rather than threats of physical destruction cannot be forecast with confidence. In Washington and Moscow, the habit of calculating power primarily in terms of military capabilities and of displaying these capabilities, as a tiger displays his teeth, in conflicting situations still appear to be strong. The United States, though

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pledged to liquidate its participation in the Southeast Asian war, has for most of the last decade applied major military force against a smaller adversary in that region. The Soviet Union, having just a few years ago enforced a régime change in Czechoslovakia with tanks and bullets, does not yet appear ready to abandon the use of brute force as a control mechanism in Eastern Europe or to withdraw the 450,000 troops it has there. The NATO countries in Western Europe still view the 300,000 U.S. troops deployed in Germany as a critical bargaining chip in East-West negotiations. The Sino-Soviet border issues continue to be prosecuted in the classic mode of exhibiting menacing deployments of force on each side. The balance of military power between the Arab nations and Israel is buttressed on each side by equipment from the Soviet Union and the United States. And in many areas of the globe more removed from great-power rivalries, smaller powers often seem even further behind in accepting the new disutility of physical coercion.

What then are the requirements of a providential statesmanship that will increase the likelihood of the world's political development toward a more peaceful and just world order?

First of all, a special responsibility falls on the existing nuclear-armed countries, particularly the two military superpowers, not to utilize their military superiority, even as an implicit bargaining chip, in order to influence weaker military actors to comply with their demands. If such self-restraint is not exercised, other countries—most prominently Japan, but also India, Brazil and others—will be compelled to conclude that an essential factor in one's bargaining position is status as a nuclear-armed country.

Second, the largest, strongest and wealthiest countries will have to refrain from attempting to maintain or establish spheres of dominance, or even to maintain permanent extended alliance systems. Such "hegemonial multipolarity" is inherently unstable given the trends we have postulated. Moreover, there are certain to be overlapping, and thus contested, areas in the would-be spheres—a situation making for dangerous miscalculation in the bipolar system, which would be compounded in a multipolar system.

Third, the leading economic and technological nations not only will have to allow substantial lines of interdependence to run between countries within their geographic regions and extra-regional countries, but should actively encourage the elaboration

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of multiple and intersecting webs of interdependence between countries formerly in rival ideological blocs and between pairs of nations that have had historic rivalries. The objective should be to create on the world scene the dense interlinking and cross-cutting of communities that prevent extreme polarization and civil war within the more stable domestic societies.

Fourth, in order to counter a bitter polarization between the more affluent and mobile elements of world society, and those elements which because of their relative poverty and vulnerability to competition are susceptible to exploitation, a global system of open access and interdependence will have to be regulated by institutions and policies designed to redress this kind of imbalance. If political borders are to become significantly more porous on a North-South basis without in effect reinstituting new forms of colonial dependence by the world's poor on the world's rich, then the world's political economy will have to be structured to implement redistributive interferences in the global market analogous to those that now obtain within the advanced democracies.

Finally, to prevent the misuse of and conflicts over the world's common resources, and a new stage of dangerously competitive empire-building in newly exploitable environments—the oceans, the atmosphere and outer space—new sets of representative institutions will need to be elaborated and empowered on regional and global bases to ensure that all the communities affected have a fair say over how these common goods of mankind are used.

V

The stark alternatives are becoming increasingly evident to peoples all around the globe. But few societies have a secure enough material base and physical insularity to maintain the well-being of their own people and still devote substantial energies to world community tasks. Yet without some societies willing to take the initiative in sloughing off the anachronistic habits of 300 years of international politics, the new pattern of relationships required to avoid world anarchy is probably not going to emerge.

Is the United States likely to be one of those societies that constructively come to grips with the new forces? Could its people become ready and willing to support this kind of statesmanship?

The apparent obsolescence of the cold war, which for most

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Americans has a special sting of despair associated with the tragedy of Vietnam, has disposed even those segments of the policy community and the public which have been most internationalist to doubt that their country has any business trying to look after the well-being of others. There appears to be growing support for policies that would reduce the foreign commitments of the United States, bring American military personnel home, trim the defense budget and cut foreign military and economic assistance.[1]

Yet it would be unfair to the essential character of American society to infer a long-term trend toward isolationism from the current fatigue and frustration associated with recent foreign policy failures. There is a deep strain of idealism in the American political ethos which is continually seeking expression on a universal scale. The country in its best image of itself is a place of domicile and shared power for peoples of all cultures, religions and nationalities—a great experiment, perhaps, for the fashioning of the polity of the globe—and, in the twentieth century at least, a catalytic participant in the construction of a just and noncoercive world order. When this part of the American identity is suppressed, when the country turns inward to become totally preoccupied with its own maladies, it loses an essential part of its purpose.

An American leadership that was concerned to raise the spirit of the American people and, once again, the hopes of mankind, could begin today to reshape U.S. foreign policy along the following lines:

(1) The United States, by its own example, would play down the use of force as a sanction behind diplomacy, and encourage the dismantling of permanent military coalitions premised on an international clash of arms between major ideological groupings. This would not preclude the maintenance of the minimal military forces necessary to assure the Soviets or any other potential adversary that it would be futile for them to resolve their disputes with the United States by force. And to dissuade the powerful nations from picking on the weak, it may be necessary occasionally to underline the fact that the United States reserves

[1] Opinion data as of 1971 show less than a quarter of the American public willing to approve the use of U.S. troops to defend major allies such as West Germany or Japan in the event they were attacked by Communist-backed forces. Even fewer would fight on behalf of smaller allies, with surprisingly large portions of those polled unwilling to provide any support at all. See Albert H. Cantril and Charles W. Roll, Jr., "Hopes and Fears of the American People." Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1971.

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the right to help the victims of military attack. At a minimum, the marginal role military power should play in contemporary big-power diplomacy could be conveyed by demilitarizing the vocabulary of power that has been featured in U.S. foreign policy pronouncements since World War II.

(2) The United States would seek out special opportunities for practical coöperative projects with those with whom it has had general ideological disagreements. This would involve resisting temptations to mobilize cold-war allies to speak in concert on new issues or for alliance structures to form the scaffolding of new institutions. It might require more work, and some sacrifice of efficiency, to put together new functionally specific coalitions that cut across the preëxisting military alliances. Without such initiatives by the United States, an open world of interdependent and mutually respectful communities has little chance of evolving. A necessary corollary to such initiatives, however, is self-restraint against inflating particular conflicts of interest into ideological conflicts over ways of life.

(3) The United States would coöperate in funneling substantial capital and other resources from the rich to the poor countries through international institutions. If this mode of effecting "North-South" resource transfers is to be enhanced, the people of affluent industrialized countries, particularly the United States, will need to be roused to share part of their wealth with those less fortunate on grounds other than economic self-interest or military security. It will be necessary to develop new world community and world interest rationales as motivating appeals.

(4) As the world's leading center of technological innovation, the United States would make it attractive to others to share in the opportunities now arising to develop global systems for exploiting the earth's wealth for the benefit of mankind. If access is to be granted to U.S. scientists and technologists into coastal and seabed areas containing sources of new mineral wealth; if preferred frequencies and orbital slots for space satellite systems are to be granted willingly to U.S. systems; and if other nations are to coöperate with the United States and other advanced industrial nations in constructing global networks for monitoring and regulating the use of the globe's atmospheric, water and terrestrial resources to assure that essential ecosystems are not dangerously destabilized—then the United States will have to stimulate other countries, particularly the technological have-

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nots, to coöperate with U.S. nationals in these ventures. This probably means that equity criteria will have to be significantly injected not only in the setting of funding responsibilities for the new multilateral ventures, but also in the distribution of benefits.

(5) Finally, in promoting greater reliance on multilateral institutions, the United States would support principles of representation that would give voice, in so far as possible, to all communities affected by the multilateral activities. This implies that in international lending institutions, the recipient countries would be given more responsibility than at present for the allocations and setting the conditions of repayment. It also implies that the consumers of the various resources of the sea as well as their producers and marketers should have a say in how the ocean "commons" is administered. The same would hold for other transnationally used environments and resources, some traditionally considered subject only to domestic jurisdiction. The shared participation would be on more than a token basis, and would include decision-making functions as well as technical tasks. In short, the people of the United States in the first instance would have to be more forthcoming than they have been in dispensing with some of the traditional trappings of national sovereignty.

A foreign policy responsive to these guidelines would be consistent with the basic international objectives of the United States since the end of the Second World War. Those objectives —a world environment conducive to the survival of the American society; and a system of international relations in which disputes are resolved without war, and in which opportunities to partake of the good life are extended to others—were pursued for a generation through policies that now need to be supplanted by a new set of policies. The fact that it is time for a new American posture, less reliant on military power and alliances, does not mean we must condemn this country's entire cold-war role. It does mean that we must free ourselves from the snares of inertia and false pride so as not to confuse the policies and commitments of the past with the fundamental objectives they were supposed to serve.

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WHO AFTER MAO?

By Mark Gayn

THE great hurrahs of the Cultural Revolution, the slogans, the messianic fervor, the public humiliation of the heretics are all gone. A visitor to Peking is impressed by nothing so much as by the return to normalcy, by pragmatism and—if one could imagine it in a Spartan land—a feeling of relaxation. Indeed, one might easily think that there had never been the awesome upheaval of 1966–69 "to change men's souls." Human frailty is once again understood, and there is at least an implied recognition that man does not live by faith alone.

One need only open the pages of the *People's Daily* or listen to the provincial radio stations to discover that the stress is on production rather than revolution. The worker who only yesterday was urged to be Red rather than Expert is now told to improve his technical skills. The managers, subjected to public "struggle" in 1966–68, once again manage. When some workers in the Northeast complain that their manager, ousted during the Cultural Revolution but now back on the job, is demanding tighter labor discipline, a Peking newspaper tells them sternly that firm discipline and experienced management are essential. And only six years after Peking coined the terrible word, "Economism"—man's unforgivable desire for material rewards—the workers are again being offered material incentives for harder work.

In the communes, the leading cadres are told that the members of the smallest unit, the production team, must be heard out and, once they meet the state grain quota, be allowed to earn some more money. In Shansi, a local radio station notes that "during the Cultural Revolution certain commune and brigade cadres failed to consult production team cadres and masses. When arranging sowing areas, they blindly demanded uniformity. As a result of such blind commands . . . losses were increased in production." The commune leaders would be foolhardy now if they disregarded the complaints or the acquisitive desires of the villagers.

Even more striking have been the changes on the campuses. Closed in 1966 to enable the young to "make revolution" under a Maoist banner, the universities were reopened in 1969 and 1970

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with new curricula, changed rules of admission and a new style of education. Today, this reform is being hurriedly modified, largely as a result of the discovery that impeccable social origins do not necessarily qualify a youth for higher education. On two visits to the Tsinghua University campus in Peking I heard cadres and professors complain that the whole level of education was being dragged down by the ill-schooled newcomers. The children of workers and peasants, the young soldiers, the deserving graduates of junior high schools who had spent two or three years at a factory lathe or behind a plough have all had to be given "supplementary" education to equip them for even vastly simplified university lectures. Now the problem has been made harsher by the greater emphasis on physics and mathematics, on chemistry and foreign languages, and by the reintroduction of examinations. Could it have been only a few years ago that the *People's Daily* approvingly ran letters from students who insisted that examinations were a sinister device designed to keep the workers' children out of the universities?

II

But it would be wrong to think that the Cultural Revolution is gone without a trace. It provided a searing experience for tens of millions, especially in the urban areas. It has broken countless lives, divided families and may have produced lasting discontents. But it has also chastened the arrogant and given the young a life-style based on self-denial, modesty, discipline and hard work. It has sent millions into the countryside in tides of unusual political migration. It has changed the ways of governing and the behavior of the governors.

Though Chairman Mao Tse-tung himself had brought the state bureaucracy into being, he has always regarded it as self-seeking, arrogant and tending to expand. Early in the Cultural Revolution, the decision was apparently made to cut it by about a third. To absorb the displaced functionaries, Mao created the rural "May 7th Schools," where the middle class of the new Communist society is being reformed through manual labor and Mao-study. At the "school" I visited, a tea plantation north of Canton, some 2,700 men and women were well into their fourth year of this unusual internment, separated from their families and unsure of when they might be allowed to return to normal lives. At a different type of "May 7th Schools," the cadres (or

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intellectuals) come for six to 24 months of psychological and political remolding. For all that one is told by the cheerful "school" leaders, these are thoroughly unhappy places. But the policy has helped to streamline the overgrown bureaucracy and, more important, it has changed the relationship between the bureaucrat and the public. The official arrogance that startled me on a visit in 1965 is now rare. The new administration, beyond doubt, is simpler, closer to the administered, and far more sensitive to public criticism.

But perhaps the most significant change has been in the balance of power. To a wider degree than is realized abroad, the Cultural Revolution altered the political alignments. Up to the summer of 1966, the military, the industrial managers, the scientists and party intellectuals formed important pressure groups. But it was the immense party apparatus that dominated all life, and the Party's inner circle that shaped policies, often through compromise among its factions.

Partly by design, the Party was shattered during the Cultural Revolution, and though efforts have been made to reconstitute it since 1968, it is not at present the dominant force. I was told in China that a man seeking assistance is far more likely to come to the Revolutionary Committee than to the Party offices where he would have called half a dozen years earlier. (It should be noted that most Revolutionary Committees are still headed by military men who may concurrently serve as Party Secretaries.)

The purger's axe during the Cultural Revolution had fallen with deliberate severity on Mao's own circle of associates, on the Politbureau and the Party's Central Committee, and on the Party Secretaries in the regions and provinces. The Party leaders who govern in Peking are still the Old Revolutionaries, the originals who started with Mao in the mountains nearly half a century ago. But their number has been greatly depleted by death and purge, and they share the power with army professionals to a far greater degree than ever in the history of the People's Republic. Morever, the reconstituted Party seems to be affected by divisions and crosscurrents. New groupings appear to have emerged —the Centrist Group of Premier Chou; the old marshals, back on the job and allied with Chou; the radical leaders based in Shanghai; and the powerful military men at such regional commands as Nanking and Shenyang.

The continuity of policy is still provided by the Old Revolu-

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tionaries, led by Premier Chou. But there is no mistaking the fact that the balance of power has shifted as a result of the Cultural Revolution, and that there is vast fluidity in the ruling circle. It is only the sight of Chou and of Mao's towering figure that makes it seem that little has changed.

III

The growing normality at home has permitted the leaders in Peking to begin putting China's foreign relations in order. They had long realized that China could not influence the Third World by urging all to mount the barricades, and that the principal enemy, the Soviet Union, had exploited the years of China's self-isolation to win influence. But, in part, the decision may have also been influenced by the feeling that Mao's formula of self-reliance served as a brake on industrial progress, and that sooner or later China must turn abroad for sophisticated equipment and perhaps credits.

By historic happenstance, Peking's decision, probably made in 1969, coincided with the decision in Washington to seek a worldwide détente. This coincidence of interest made possible President Nixon's visit to Peking, served to reduce U.S.-Chinese tensions and eventually led to the opening of Peking's diplomatic relations with Japan, West Germany and a score of other nations. China was now back in the community of nations, seeking to project the image less of a militantly revolutionary state than of a big brother, eager to unite and help all friendly countries.

The conversion from militancy to moderation has not been easy. Beyond doubt, it alarmed the young radicals created in the crucible of the Cultural Revolution. Though now dispersed through the countryside, they still present a large and volatile element. Eventually, it became necessary to reassure them that this was merely a tactical move, and that just as Mao joined hands with Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists in the 1930s to fight the greater foe, Japan, so today he was reopening contacts with the lesser enemy, the United States, to confront the bigger one, the Soviet Union. The decision to seek a détente with Washington also sent a powerful shock through the friendly states and movements. Nowhere was the shock felt more acutely than in Hanoi, which reacted with unconcealed anger. The Chinese had

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anticipated the bitter response, but they had reëxamined their interests and obviously decided that their own strategic, political and economic needs outweighed Hanoi's victory. This has led to the spectacle of Peking rolling out its reddest carpets for the worst capitalist of them all, even while his troops and planes were killing Vietnamese revolutionaries.

IV

By the end of 1972, thus, Peking had gained considerable ground, at home as abroad. But the problems remain, many and harsh. China's economy is backward, her population is too big, and the gap between the slowly rising production and the slowly declining birth-rate is still dangerously narrow. By and large, China today is where the Soviet Union was in the late 1930s and the United States a generation or two earlier. Mao has given his people a sense of dedication, discipline, an egalitarian society in which social injustice is not the explosive element it is elsewhere in Asia. He has made collective human effort displace the mechanical devices the country does not have. Remarkable ingenuity has been shown in employing limited resources to cope with complex problems. But, still, as Premier Chou admitted to a group of visitors including this writer, the country is backward and the problems are beyond count.

At the moment, though, none of these problems is as crucial as that of political succession. When one looks at the circle of men who now rule China, one is struck by their heroic background, by the toughness and courage they displayed on their long march to power—and by their age. The great Chinese Revolution is led by a tiny circle of men ready to meet their Maker.

It is difficult to determine the exact pecking order in Peking now, but the decision-makers clearly include Mao, who is in his 80th year; Premier Chou, who is 73; Yeh Chien-ying, who apparently heads the military establishment and who is 76; and 68-year-old Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. The charmed circle, it is true, also includes three younger persons—Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), now in her late fifties, and the two Shanghai leaders, Chang Chun-chiao, now in his late fifties, and Yao Wen-yuan, in his mid-forties. But this trio holds a curious position, with no power base, with few allies of consequence and with the main reliance apparently on Mao's favor.

The decision-making, of course, involves a far wider circle.

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This includes key Party functionaries and a number of generals. But none of these, at the moment, looks like a potential successor to Mao or Chou En-lai. More important, there are no younger heirs visible on the stage.

The present succession crisis is a by-product of the Lin Piao Affair which remains, despite the numerous statements by Mao and Chou, mystifying. If it is true that Lin Piao, Defense Minister, Vice Chairman of the Party and Mao's heir-designate really wanted to assassinate Mao, it is not clear why he would want to do so—unless he had become convinced his opponents would block his rise to the top. But if this was so, what motivated the opposition?

The foreign ambassadors I saw in Peking in the summer of 1972 believed there had been sharp disagreements within the inner circle on many key policies—on economic priorities, on the strategy to be used against the Soviet Union in the event of war and on defense appropriations, on the treatment of peasantry, on the uses of militia, and even on the détente with the United States. Various intra-Party documents available in Hong Kong suggest that Mao and Lin Piao clashed at Lushan in August 1970 over the unlikely issue of whether it is a great man ("genius") or the masses who account for human progress. The documents, though of uncertain authenticity, support the belief of diplomats that the conflict had first become apparent in the fall of 1970. But the picture has now been confused by Premier Chou, who has been telling his visitors that the differences really began when Lin Piao and his military claque persuaded a reluctant Mao to name Lin as his heir at the Party Congress in April 1969.

At thousands of meetings across China in the past year, the people have been told that Lin Piao—or, to use the Peking idiom, "swindlers of Liu Shao-chi's ilk"—had differed with Mao on military strategy and tactics for tomorrow, that he wanted to abolish the militia, and that he sought to restore capitalism to the countryside. True or not, this would at least suggest that the clashing viewpoints covered the broad field of national policy. And since a moderate and pragmatic policy is now in effect, it might also be deduced that Lin Piao had argued for a more extreme course.

We may never know. But it is clear that Lin's disappearance has revived the problem of succession, and this at a point when

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Mao and Chou have little time left to find an enduring solution.

V

Whatever the reasons that led him to break with Mao and Chou, Lin Piao found his supporters primarily in one of the factions into which the military establishment is divided. This group was powerful enough. It included the chief of staff, air force commander, naval commissar, and director of army logistics. All were in the top dozen or so of the Politbureau; all were members of the inner circle in Peking. But it now appears that they had few adherents in the provinces, and certainly none among the regional commanders.

Ranged against them was an improbable coalition. It has been suggested that the "September [1971] Crisis" represented a struggle between Lin Piao and Chou En-lai. This may be true, but it is also clear that Chou did not fight the battle single-handed. The anti-Lin coalition that came into being had for its mainstay Chou's own powerful State-Party organization, cemented in part by old personal loyalties. Allied to it by a community of interests were the "radicals" (including the Shanghai leaders), the regional army chiefs, the old marshals, led by Yeh Chien-ying, and the obscure but influential men from the Party apparatus in Peking. Mao's own role was crucial. The only question is whether he had named Lin Piao as his successor in 1969 only with the deepest reservations, or whether he had fully trusted Lin at the time but had his suspicions awakened by Lin Piao's enemies a year or so later. Whatever the answer, the destruction of Lin Piao would have been very difficult without Mao's personal assent and involvement.

Today, the nation is governed by Chou En-lai. His stamp is unmistakable on both domestic and foreign policy. But it is plain that to remain in power he needs the continued support of the coalition which ousted Lin Piao. It is equally apparent that the members of the ruling circle are deeply, and with a mounting urgency, preoccupied with the question of succession. Chou has told some of his foreign callers that, thanks to the Lin Piao Affair, the Party leaders now know better than to replace Mao with one man. Instead, he has insisted, the China of tomorrow would be governed by a group which would include such men as Yao Wen-yuan, the youthful literary polemicist from Shanghai. If this is so, it will be a rare experience for Mao's China,

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which has had collective leadership only in the early 1960s, when Mao had briefly retired from the scene. This collective leadership was in 1966 destroyed by an unforgiving Mao, who felt he had been pushed out of power by his then heir-apparent, Liu Shao-chi. Will the next collective leadership fare better, or will it break up in a power struggle? Some diplomats in Peking also wonder if the Old Revolutionaries would, or could, reverse their almost pathological refusal to transfer power to younger men.

The fact is that when the Old Revolutionaries leave the stage, they will leave behind no known or tested national leaders. At that point, the men behind the floodlights could be army commissars or leading *apparatchiki* from Peking, provincial Party Secretaries or chairmen of Revolutionary Committees. It may be assumed that they will be in their mid-fifties or early sixties; that they will belong to the generation of guerrilla leaders whose political philosophy, biases and style were shaped in the civil and anti-Japanese wars; and that few of them will have had any experience in governing the nation. Many of them were students in Peking and Shanghai when Japan attacked in 1937; they walked out into the countryside, and became quickly swallowed by the Communist organization. From those days, they bring with them a strong anti-Japanese and anti-American bias. They have an equally strong anti-Soviet bias dating back to 1960 and earlier. All are fierce nationalists, proud of what China has achieved since 1949. With a varying degree of conviction, they are also Maoists.

Up to this point, the deductions are reasonably easy. It is only when one begins to consider how the Old Revolutionaries might transfer power to the younger men that difficulties begin. It may be assumed that it will be younger men who will take over from Mao and Chou. But one might wonder if the differences of policy and personality among the inheritors would lead to the emergence of factions, each seeking adherents. And, almost inevitably, the contenders would seek the support of the military, for in the foreseeable future it is the army rather than the Party that will provide genuine power. Just as Mao sought Lin Piao's assistance in 1966, so will his successor, Comrade X, turn to the generals for help.

It is easier to predict the emergence of factions than to anticipate the policies they might espouse. My own feeling is that the

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moderate faction of tomorrow would be likely to win the required wide support. But some specialists in Moscow argue that tomorrow's leaders, like Mao in 1966–69, will launch new Cultural Revolutions as a means of ensuring national discipline and social justice. In other words, the Russians suggest that turmoil is likely to recur, with no Mao or Chou En-lai on the scene to put an end to it.

VI

There has been no lack of decision-making in Peking in the past two years. Whether in foreign or domestic policy, there have been bold and dramatic changes. But still, one cannot escape the feeling that what one sees in Peking now is an interregnum, a time of transition, a season of many crucial decisions put off. China is the only state in the world today that has no chief of state, no defense minister, no chief of a general staff, no chief of the air force. The choice of new men would have to be confirmed by a people's congress, but, in defiance of the Constitution, none has been held in eight years. And, of course, with the Politbureau now reduced to half its size in 1969, a Party congress is needed to fill in the holes: in the Politbureau, in the Central Committee, and in the Party secretariat. But, as of November 1972, no one has mentioned it. According to Chou En-lai, the people's congress was scheduled to be held in 1971, but had to be sidetracked because of the Lin Piao crisis. Are the two congresses being put off now because of new strains—perhaps between Peking and the powerful provincial leaders, who want to remain in full control of their delegations? Are they being delayed because of disagreement on who is to run the Party and the state? Is the center, its influence eroded by the Cultural Revolution, unwilling to clash openly with the provinces? And is the question of who is to rule China after Mao the real stumbling block?

The crisis of succession thus makes the present stability seem less enduring. What men or groups will take over in Peking? Will they be moderates or radicals? At what pace, and how, will they want to lead China into the dangerous tomorrows? Will they turn to isolationism, in which they can settle their domestic problems (as Mao did in 1966–69), or will they fling wider the gates to the outside world, which can provide the means for China's dramatic leap into the twentieth century? And if they finally choose the latter course, will they turn to Japan, the

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United States or the Soviet Union as their principal partner?

Any forecasts of national fragmentation or chaos are unsupportable. One of Mao's great achievements has been to give the people a sense of pride in their unity, strength and achievements; in effect, to join the country together with the cement of national pride. In critical ways, China's future will depend on who will ensure cohesion in the tests ahead. If the Party is fully reorganized, it might be able to do the job. If not, the task will be performed by the army which, for all its own fissions, is nationally minded. Some Japanese experts argue that if and when a crisis boils up in Peking, the military "strong men" in the provinces will simply wait it out until there is a clear winner. It is more likely that the military will use all their influence to avert a crisis that, like the Cultural Revolution, would divide and weaken the nation. This, in fact, was one of the by-products of the Cultural Revolution: it taught many of the leaders some useful lessons.

But the crisis of succession cannot help but create uncertainty —for China's own élite as for the major foreign nations seeking rapprochement with China. Remarkable progress has been made in establishing contacts since the "Spring of Ping-Pong" in 1971. But can the United States, Japan or West Germany be certain that the arrangements now being made will be observed by the younger policy-makers who will replace the old guard? Will these men view the Soviet Union with the relentless hatred of the present leaders? And, finally, how much of the present policies, and of Maoism itself, will survive the passing of the magnificent Old Revolutionaries?

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JAPAN'S ROLE IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

By Kei Wakaizumi

IN July 1972, amid mounting public clamor for "a change in the political current," Kakuei Tanaka became Prime Minister of Japan. He pledged a policy of "resolution and action." Two months later, in the course of a five-day visit to China, Tanaka turned Japan's China policy completely around.

This dramatic shift, with the earlier visits of President Nixon to Peking and Moscow, has prompted Japanese observers to pose a host of questions. Have we witnessed simply an agreement to open diplomatic relations between the governments of the two big powers in Asia, or are we looking at the still dim outline of a new "Tokyo-Peking axis"? Should not Japan now review completely her other foreign policies, which have been excessively dependent on the United States, and go her own way hereafter amid a general easing of tensions in East Asia? With rapprochement in the air, why does Japan need a special security relationship with the United States? Can Japan achieve a successful, independent foreign policy without becoming a big military power? What sort of impact will Japan's rapprochement with China have on Japan's relations with Southeast Asia and the two Koreas? What effect will recent Japanese moves have on the Soviet-American-Chinese triangle and on the constraints which operate on each of these relationships? Has the fragile balance of power among these three been upset?

Of all the Japanese national sports, judo is perhaps the best known throughout the world. In judo, beginners are first required to undergo thorough training in mastering the passive art of being "thrown down." This defensive technique is intended to enable one thrown by his opponent to fall without being hurt, so that he is ready for the next action. Only after one has attained sufficient adeptness at that art is he allowed to learn a full variety of offensive tactics.

As if in compliance with this art, Japan's postwar diplomacy has always been passive, and has seldom played a positive role on its own in the arena of international politics. This was the result of Japan's loss of self-confidence through her defeat in World War II, and in a sense was inevitable and even natural. Even her policy toward China was no exception to the passive

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character of Japan's diplomacy. Japan was the last of America's major allies to part from the United States on the question of Taiwan and China, having faithfully followed the U.S. policy ever since the War.

This was precisely why the Japanese were so disturbed when President Nixon announced one day in 1971 his intention to visit Peking. The President's announcement was dubbed "the Nixon shock." Nevertheless, the Japanese government showed enough wisdom and discretion to declare that it welcomed the Nixon move, and thus kept anti-American feelings from erupting among the Japanese people. The response proved perhaps that Japan had finally achieved a mastery of the technique of being thrown down without being hurt.

Now the situation in and around Japan is conducive, in my view, to more positive foreign policy initiatives, affording Japan perhaps the first golden opportunity in the quarter of a century since the War to carry out truly autonomous diplomacy of her own. For instance, the United States, rather shaken by the pervasive effects abroad of its dramatic actions, has apparently recognized the need to pay greater attention to other countries, particularly Japan. Perhaps in recognition of this new independence, the United States hastened to repair the damage of the "Nixon shock," and to avoid further difficulties over Japan's approaches to China or Japan's huge trade surplus. It is significant that last September President Nixon invited Prime Minister Tanaka to meet with him in Hawaii—halfway between Washington and Tokyo.

The Soviet Union likewise has a strong interest in Japan's moves. In Soviet eyes, the prospect of Sino-Japanese coöperation may be almost as unwelcome as that of Sino-American coöperation. It was to counter the latter that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko hurriedly visited Tokyo immediately before President Nixon's visit to Peking, and agreed with Japanese leaders to open negotiations within 1972 for a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty and to endeavor to realize an exchange of visits by the prime ministers of both countries. Japan and the Soviet Union continue to differ over their territorial claims to the northern islands off Hokkaido, and this has prevented them from concluding a peace treaty. Indeed, as some foreign observers point out, the Soviet Union must reckon that an inflexible position on the northern islands could delay not only a peace treaty

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but also economic and technical coöperation, including the development of Siberia with Japanese assistance. For their part, Japanese sense that too rapid a rapprochement with China could impair Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, thereby making it more difficult to achieve the reversion of the northern territories.

The confrontation between China and the Soviet Union seems to be very serious and deep-rooted. From a purely theoretical point of view, it has provided room for Japanese diplomacy to maneuver, although the Japanese government naturally maintains a stand of strict neutrality and nonintervention on the Sino-Soviet conflict itself.

Since the several dilemmas with which the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be faced in their relations with Japan are not products designed by Japan, they appear fairly strange in the eyes of the Japanese people. However, this is perhaps only one aspect of the so-called multipolarization of the world. The influence of the two superpowers, which maintained dominant power and prestige during the cold-war years, has gradually declined in recent years, whereas the diplomatic options and influence of other countries have increased. Of course, it cannot be denied that only the United States and the Soviet Union have the capability to destroy mankind, and this fact still carries much weight in international politics. Japan realizes that she must come to grips with both old and new great-power situations in the world.

Most basically, however, it is Japan's rapidly growing economy and the vitality of her people that attract the attention of other countries. In a war-devastated Japan, the people concentrated their postwar energies on economic reconstruction and national rebuilding. Although they were aware of the importance of economic growth, they did not pay much attention to the significance and influence of Japan's growing economic power in the field of international politics. During the quarter of a century since the War, it has been the wistful dream of most Japanese that Japan would be able to make some positive contributions to the world. It took considerable time before they came to realize that many peoples around the world had begun in recent years to show very great interest and concern about the future course and international role of Japan, still very much an unknown quantity.

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Within the last few years, the Japanese have come to gain growing confidence in their economic and technological capabilities, together with a better understanding of the pressure and urgency of expectations of various other nations about Japan. At this juncture it seems imperative for the Japanese to define their intentions and national objectives in a fluid world, and to ask themselves what role and responsibility they should assume.

II

"Will Japan go nuclear?" This has been a favorite question in much of informed and uninformed speculation about Japan's future foreign policy. Foreign analysts who answer this question in the affirmative usually argue, first, that Japan's economic power, science and technology are fully capable of undertaking nuclear armament, and second, that the Japanese are a proud nation with a strong desire to be independent in world affairs. They also note that some public opinion surveys have shown substantial percentages of the respondents, while not necessarily desiring this outcome, believing that Japan would eventually have to go nuclear.

My answer to this question is in the negative for the following reasons. Unlike the United States, China and the Soviet Union, which are all continental countries, Japan is a small insular country with a large, heavily concentrated population and industrial facilities; she is, therefore, highly vulnerable. Also, it is nearly impossible for Japan, which has no substantial uranium resources, to secure uranium in large quantities in order to build an arsenal comparable to those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, it would entail huge spending to acquire an effective nuclear-weapons system with second-strike delivery capability, for which Japanese would be forced to make a tremendous sacrifice in their personal lives.

Various nations are still feeling the traumatic effects of World War II and are still unable to shake off the nightmare of a "militaristic Japan." They are strongly opposed to Japan's nuclear armament. The United States and the Soviet Union, which have been coöperating in the nuclear field despite their differences in other fields, would attempt to prevent Japan's nuclear armament, and the opposition of other Asian nations would be particularly strong. China, despite her position that nuclear proliferation is theoretically desirable, in practice would undoubtedly feel the

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gravest threat from a nuclear-armed Japan. If nuclear armament is a means to assure a nation's security against international tension, then what is the "tension" that requires nuclear armament that will create a new tension?

If Japan went nuclear, some Japanese fear there would be a real danger of being isolated from the rest of the world militarily, politically and perhaps even economically. All Japanese, recalling in part 1940 and 1941, are acutely aware that their economy depends on other countries for most key raw materials, such as oil, iron ore, copper ore, bauxite, cotton and wheat, and is extremely vulnerable to international isolation. And utter economic chaos would result if Japanese goods were shut out of foreign markets.

Finally, the Japanese people's deep-rooted "pacifist" sentiment, stemming from their unique experience, serves as a brake on nuclear armament. This earnestly felt pacifist sentiment, born of their miserable experience in World War II, reflects their deep soul-searching and determination never again to be made victims of militarism and never again to attack other countries. Although the arguments against nuclear armament are gradually shifting in emphasis to cool and rational reckoning of merits and demerits, the pacifist sentiment has a deep-rooted bearing on this issue, and no politician can ignore it.

The Japanese national opinion polls concerning nuclear weapons appear to indicate not only that a clear majority of Japanese are absolutely opposed to their acquisition, but that public opposition to nuclear weapons may even have increased. In an April 1969 *Mainichi Shimbun* poll, 46 percent responded that Japan absolutely ought not to have nuclear weapons; in April 1972 the proportion taking this position had risen to 58 percent. In the 1969 poll, a combined total of 45 percent felt that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons (now—2 percent, in the near future—16 percent, sometime—27 percent). In the 1972 poll 35 percent favored acquisition (now—2 percent, in the near future—11 percent, sometime—22 percent).

Among those in the 1972 poll who are supporters of the ruling conservative Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP)—which is expected to remain in power for a considerable period of time in the future—45 percent are opposed to nuclear-weapons acquisition. Thus, if a conservative government decided on Japan's nuclear armament, it would face the alienation of one-half of its

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own LDP supporters as well as the almost total opposition of all four opposition parties.

That the majority of the respondents in this opinion poll flatly opposed Japan's nuclear armament under any and all circumstances merits attention. Probably no similar opinion poll in any other country that has the potential ability to go nuclear would show such a high percentage of absolute opposition to nuclear armament.

Thus, it may be natural that the LDP leadership has concluded that nuclear armament by Japan is neither realistic nor desirable. The four candidates in the LDP presidential election in July 1972 (which in fact meant the election of the Prime Minister) all issued lengthy statements declaring that they would never opt for the road to major military power, thereby winning the support and sympathy of the overwhelming majority of the people. Prime Minister Tanaka pledged that he would put Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (which perhaps is the most thoroughgoing pacifist provision in the world) at the very heart of his foreign policy. This trend seems to form a strong undercurrent within the LDP.

The Japanese government thus intends to ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty just as soon as negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency have been concluded on safeguard arrangements on a par with those of other nations concerned with the exchange of information on technology for peaceful purposes. I hope this will dispel any remaining doubts that Japan seeks to retain the option of nuclear armament.

All factors being taken into account, it is exceedingly difficult to find any important stimulus that would lead Japan to alter this course, at least in the 1970s, unless the situation should change in some drastic way now hardly conceivable—for example, the unilateral abrogation by America of the Japanese-U.S. security treaty or the use of nuclear threat or blackmail by the nuclear-weapon states. Japan's security policy in the age of multipolarization should thus be essentially as it was forecast in 1969, by myself among others.[1] In brief, Japan will continue to maintain the security treaty, as confirmed at the Japanese-U.S. summit talks in Hawaii last summer. More concretely, we will continue to depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and will maintain the effectiveness of the

[1] See Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969.

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treaty by allowing the United States to retain its key military bases in Japan. On the conventional weapons level, it is desirable for Japan to reinforce qualitatively her minimum requirements for purely defensive purposes to the extent that she can at least initially deter external aggression involving the use of conventional weapons. This, and only this, is the meaning of Prime Minister Tanaka's first military budget.

To be sure, some Japanese advocate the abrogation of the security treaty, asserting that it is a product of the cold war. They demand that "cold-war diplomacy" should be scrapped now that Sino-Japanese relations have been normalized. However, this kind of argument will not win majority public sympathy as long as the treaty is operated flexibly and effectively for the maintenance of the peace and security of Japan and of East Asia by accommodating it to developments in the international situation. The North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact still remain in effect, although tension is easing there. Furthermore, it is significant that both China and the Soviet Union, highly critical of the security treaty in the past, have come to refrain from criticizing it and even seem tacitly to condone it.

III

Proceeding from this security posture, how do the Japanese propose to fulfill their role and responsibility in the international community? Prime Minister Tanaka once observed: "Japan will stake its fate on world peace." To foreigners, this may sound too idealistic or meaningless, flowery words of the kind often uttered by politicians. In contemporary Japan, however, idealism is realism. It is the absolute truth, and forms the basis on which Japan wants to achieve her second postwar miracle. In the light of modern history, one would expect a big economic power like Japan to acquire military power commensurate with her economic strength. Japan's national policies run counter to the traditional point of view. In what deserves to be called a "grand experiment," Japan is determined to try a new path, that of economic power without a major military establishment.

Quite frankly, this even sounds odd to Japanese. They know that no nation has ever done it before; they also know their own past excesses. So cynics might argue that this experiment is nothing more than idealism without any relationship to the realities.

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Nevertheless, the policies which I am about to elaborate are not just casual ideas or dreams, but the product of thorough discussion in political, business and academic circles since the latter half of the 1960s—gradually shaped into their present form in the melting pot of serious deliberations and reappraisal. They spring, above all, from a felt need for boldness, for a new and imaginative sense of purpose.

It is clear at once that Japan can contribute most to international society in the field of economic and technical coöperation. Ironically enough, Japan has been criticized most in this field, for the exclusive pursuit of her own economic growth through aggressive industry-oriented, export-first policies, and for lack of consideration for the economic conditions and national feelings of her trading partners. While flooding markets of the world by her overwhelming international competitiveness, Japan has been reluctant to open her domestic market to foreign goods and capital. While amassing dollars earned by exports, she has been close-fisted in giving foreign aid. This attitude has many aspects that lend themselves to criticism.

In recent writings and statements, political and business leaders, as well as influential newspapers, have come to recognize these shortcomings frankly and to call for a more positive Japanese role and greater responsibility in her economic relations with other countries. Japanese leaders, including some influential business executives, have now come to realize that Japan must aim for an expanded equilibrium of world trade and stabilization of the international monetary system even if this means sacrificing in part more immediate gains. Japan must realize that, as others see it, a voracious economic power sometimes can pose a greater threat than a well-controlled military power.

This involves major and sharp change, starting with a much reduced emphasis on exports and far greater stress on national welfare and social overhead capital. Next, Japan must endeavor to create a favorable climate for well-balanced trade by taking drastic trade and capital liberalization measures, lowering tariffs and reducing or eliminating nontariff barriers on her own initiative. This means that we must carry out to the full our announced intent to work with the United States and the European Community (EC) to ensure the success of the New International Round in 1973, to be conducted within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

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More broadly, as Prime Minister Heath of Britain suggested when he visited Japan in September 1972 (as the first British prime minister to travel here), it is indispensable for Japan, North America (the United States and Canada) and the expanded EC to hold close consultations on a wide range of problems of common interest for the development and stabilization of international economic order. In this connection, it would surely be useful if leaders of these major advanced countries were to hold summit talks regularly, in order to strengthen solidarity among them. I propose that Japan take the initiative in realizing this idea.

The proposed summit talks should discuss not only economic problems, but also a wide range of other matters that require international coöperation, such as urban problems, environmental pollution, resources and energy. Japan should be able to make great contributions and benefit greatly in these fields.

As regards bilateral problems, the balance of payments in Japanese-U.S. trade is particularly important. In 1971, Japan's balance of payments in her trade with the United States registered a surplus of $3.2 billion, and the imbalance is expected to grow further in 1972. The Japanese now realize that this abnormal imbalance is a major factor underlying a series of international moves, including President Nixon's drastic economic measures announced in August 1971 and the multilateral currency realignment at the end of 1971, which resulted in the revaluation of the yen, and indeed the continuing pressure for another upward revaluation. Economically, Japan needs to listen and respond to the argument that countries with excessive international payments surpluses are partly responsible for the deficits of other countries. Politically, it is imperative to prevent the worsening of relations with the United States.

Hence, I am of the opinion that Japan should remove trade barriers, make even greater efforts to increase imports and export her goods in an orderly manner and try to reduce her excessive surplus in bilateral trade by 1975 below $2 billion a year. (The figure was suggested by U.S. Ambassador Ingersoll in a speech in Tokyo after the Hawaii talks.)

Worldwide, Prime Minister Tanaka has spoken (at Hawaii) of reducing Japan's surplus in current international transactions to about one percent of her gross national product (perhaps $3 billion) within a few years. This compares with a 1971 trade sur-

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plus in current transactions of $7.7 billion. It is an ambitious goal, whose realization would entail many difficulties; the statement can be taken as expressing the Japanese government's thorough recognition of the gravity of its responsibility and also its uncommon determination to carry it out.

Next, Japan is greatly expected to extend her economic coöperation with developing countries and to increase her aid. At the third UNCTAD in May 1972, Japan pledged to achieve by 1975 her previously stated goal of increasing her foreign aid to the equivalent of one percent of her GNP. This should certainly be welcomed: in my opinion, Japan should go further still. Japan's total economic outflow to developing countries in 1971 amounted to the equivalent of 0.96 percent of her GNP. However, her official development aid, which contributes to the improvement of social overhead capital in recipient countries, was the equivalent of only 0.23 percent of GNP, a level much lower than those of other advanced countries. The bulk of Japanese foreign aid was export credits intended to increase Japanese exports.

This self-centered aid policy should be corrected promptly. The Tanaka government should increase Japan's official development aid to the equivalent of 0.7 percent of the GNP by the end of 1975. This will be a decision of enormous magnitude. In realizing this plan, Japan must eliminate tied loans and offer aid on concessionary terms—and also improve promptly her present system of preferential duties. As Japan's GNP in 1975 is estimated at somewhere between $350 and $400 billion, the proposed official development aid would be between $2.5 and $2.8 billion.

To achieve this aid target, it is absolutely necessary for Japan to shift the emphasis of her overseas effort from the conventional industry-oriented, export-first principle to a new approach oriented to welfare and international coöperation. In this connection, I consider it essential for Japan to review thoroughly and critically the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and to establish a new Ministry for International Coöperation, as suggested by some government leaders.

The problem facing Japan is not only how much to spend but in what manner. To avoid criticism for neocolonialism and economic aggression, Japan must show maximum respect for the industrial-social structure, culture and national feelings of the recipient country, coöperate with it in its efforts for self-help

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and regional coöperation, and offer aid from the point of view of the long-range development and prosperity of the recipient country or of the region concerned.

For this purpose, it will be most effective to channel aid through international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank, instead of using the conventional bilateral aid formula. It may be necessary to create new multinational bodies to handle such aid. As another example, in the reconstruction and development of Indochina, including North Vietnam, after the Vietnam War, Japan should take the initiative in creating an international fund and announce her readiness to contribute half of the amount required.

Japan will inevitably come to put greater emphasis on Asia in her economic activities and foreign aid in the future. But it will run counter to the interests not only of other Asian countries, but also of Japan in the long run, if these Asian countries, especially those in Southeast Asia, become too heavily dependent on Japan. Although the American military presence in Asia will gradually diminish, in line with the Nixon Doctrine, a self-controlled and receptive American economic presence will remain indispensable and should be welcomed. Already, Japan is beginning to face in East Asia the same economic problems that the United States apparently has in Latin America, and these problems, which will become more pronounced in the future, require special emphasis.

IV

Japan normalized her relations with China not only to end the long abnormal state of affairs but also to contribute greatly to the easing of tensions in Asia and the world. On this point, the Japan-China joint communiqué states that "the normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries." Prime Minister Tanaka stressed at Honolulu the need for a continuing dialogue between Japan and the United States, and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira visited the United States in October. As these actions indicate, whatever meaning the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations may have from the standpoint of Japan's national interests, it must not impair basic Japanese-U.S. relations of friendship and coöperation. This attitude of the Japanese government has won the strong support of the people.

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Many Japanese observers in the mass media—some officials as well—are increasingly critical of the continuation in world affairs of inflexible "cold-war diplomacy" and "power games of big-power egoism," despite changing world realities. Japan does indeed turn away from such traditional diplomacy, which seems to many to have outlived its usefulness; she wants to adopt a new foreign policy that may be called an "all-directional foreign policy for peace."

The normalization of Sino-Japanese relations should be understood as part of this new diplomacy. Japan intends to seek positive diplomatic relations even with countries with different social systems and to work with them in fields where this is possible, thus eliminating unnecessary mutual distrust and apprehensions, and creating coöperative ties of a highly stable and resilient nature. In the present international political situation, the classical idea of a military power balance has become less valid than ever before. Diplomacy today requires the striking of a political and economic as well as a military balance. Japan intends not only to strike such a balance, with emphasis heavily on the economic and political, but also to make constructive contributions to the maintenance of this balance, especially in Asia.

Specifically, most Japanese, while continuing to regard the security treaty with the United States as crucial to the peace and security of Japan, are beginning to think that it may be useful to supplement that treaty by added insurance. Thus, Japan may try to conclude bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and China based on the principles of nonaggression, non-use of force and peaceful coexistence. The possibility of concluding such treaties is by no means small in view of the fact that leaders of both China and the Soviet Union have expressed their readiness to do so. Those who remember that nonaggression and antiwar treaties were easily abrogated before World War II may doubt and distrust the effectiveness of such treaties. However, one must not lose hope for the future out of disappointment with past events.

Since the summer of last year, Japan has established diplomatic relations with the Mongolian People's Republic and the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and is now considering establishing diplomatic relations with Albania. Japan intends to promote cultural, scientific and commercial exchanges with countries with which it is difficult to maintain diplomatic relations (for instance, Taiwan, with which Japan had to sever diplomatic

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relations as a result of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations; and North Korea and North Vietnam).

Japan is second to none in hoping for the peaceful reunification of divided countries, a holdover of the cold war. In the light of the close and varied relations Japan has had with the Korean peninsula, Japan welcomes independent moves of late for the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. Japan intends to maintain and promote her relations of friendship and coöperation with South Korea, while opening a dialogue with North Korea and promoting as much as possible economic, cultural and personnel exchanges with her. This dual course naturally is not easy, and calls for the understanding and coöperation of other countries concerned. But it is necessary and by no means impossible.

Government and business circles continue to work on plans to offer bank loans totaling about $1 billion and technical aid to the Soviet Union for the development of the Tyumen oil field as one project in Japan's future involvement in the development of Siberia. It is also reported that Japanese business circles are studying various plans for economic coöperation with China. These projects could be a touchstone of Japan's all-directional diplomacy. A proposal has been made for a tripartite arrangement among Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union in the development of Siberia. American participation is desirable to make the plans a success; a coöperative arrangement could have a great and favorable bearing on future possibilities.

To reinforce this diplomacy, there is a need to review the role and functions of the United Nations. Although the United Nations' activities and achievements since World War II have disappointed many, it remains a vital forum for discussion, and no one can deny the reality that in the long run there is no substitute for it, as U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim has said. U.N. achievements in the economic, social and cultural fields have been significant if not spectacular, and it has proved that its limited peacekeeping function can work effectively depending on circumstances, as evidenced by U.N. forces in the Middle East and the Congo.

Perhaps the first thing Japan could do would be to make a unilateral and unconditional contribution toward an emergency fund to cover the $65 million deficit of the United Nations in response to Mr. Waldheim's appeal. Of course, this would be

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a temporary relief measure only, and Japan should spare no effort to put the finances of the United Nations on a firm basis by effecting an equitable and amicable settlement of the problem of contributions by member countries.

Earnest discussion will have to be conducted to reorganize the United Nations and strengthen its functions, to accommodate it to changes in the international community. In this connection, I believe that Japan, together with other influential non-nuclear countries, should formally seek a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council in the future in order to represent opinions of the non-nuclear countries and speak on behalf of many countries desiring to make positive contributions to world peace through nonmilitary means. That the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are all nuclear powers is undesirable because it gives the impression that nuclear armament is the passport to big-power status and gives prestige to the possession of nuclear weapons. It is encouraging to note that a considerable number of countries, including the United States, seem to favor the idea of seating Japan as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. If given that seat, Japan will usefully discharge her due obligations and full responsibility.

In or out of the Security Council, Japan is bound as a non-nuclear state to have a particular concern for the issue of nuclear disarmament in the international arena. After she ratifies the nuclear nonproliferation treaty she will surely then take an active lead, inspired by moral conviction and fortified by self-restraint, in calling upon the nuclear powers for a broad halt to the nuclear arms race and for international management and control of nuclear weapons. Inevitably, it appears to the Japanese gravely inconsistent for the nuclear powers to discourage other nations from gaining access to nuclear weapons while maintaining and building up their own nuclear armaments. Although the SALT agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is a significant step forward, it is far from satisfactory from the Japanese point of view.

Moreover, Japan is also bound to be extremely anxious to have China and France participate in the partial nuclear test ban and nonproliferation treaties. To that end, Japan and other non-nuclear countries will call on the nuclear powers to promise that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or threaten them with nuclear weapons. In view of the attitude

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of the nuclear powers, this will not be so difficult to achieve provided they are determined to do so. If this is realized, it will raise the possibility of securing the participation of China, which has declared that she will never use nuclear weapons first, in a nuclear arms-control and disarmament conference.

It seems ironic that a country must maintain armaments in order to seek disarmament. The Japanese people, who have rejected such a notion, are poignantly aware that the possible role and influence of non-nuclear Japan are extremely limited in nuclear arms control. Nevertheless, Japan will continue to oppose the nuclear "chauvinism" of the nuclear big powers that reflects their "arrogance of power," and to make tenacious and steady efforts, in coöperation with other non-nuclear countries, toward disarmament including nuclear disarmament.

V

In 1972, Japan got the reversion of Okinawa and held summit talks in Hawaii on her relations with the United States; normalized her relations with China; and opened negotiations with the Soviet Union for a peace treaty. She thereby entered a new, epoch-making phase in her post-postwar diplomacy. The holding of such high-level political negotiations simultaneously with the three big powers should not suggest that Japan intends to keep the United States, China and the Soviet Union at equal diplomatic distances. A leading Japanese newspaper, discussing Japan's relations with these countries in an editorial, likened Sino-Japanese relations to cutting a path in a place where there has been no road, Japanese-Soviet relations to paving a road already built and Japanese-U.S. relations to repairing an existing highway. It would be not only meaningless but a great loss to destroy a highway to build a new one. It is equally useless to close an existing road. Maintenance of Japan's relations of friendship and coöperation with the United States is absolutely necessary for Japan's security, economy and technology in the foreseeable future. It would seriously undermine the peace and prosperity of the world if the present Japanese-U.S. relationship, built through the strenuous efforts of the peoples of both countries over many years, were impaired.

It is neither possible for Japan to play a military game of power politics with the United States, China and the Soviet Union nor conducive to Japan's national interests in the long

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run. It is very encouraging that Japanese leaders and the nation as a whole seem to be politically mature enough and have the wisdom to appreciate this point sufficiently.

Indeed, in line with the all-directional concept, Japan must deal not only with the three big powers but also with other countries as well. It is very important for Japan to make the distant road to the EC-member countries into an expressway, broaden the road to Australia and New Zealand and improve the narrow and complicated roads to the developing countries, including those in Southeast Asia, in order to eliminate blind alleys and mazes. As already mentioned, Japan's close coöperation with the EC in the economic field is indispensable to the stabilization and development of the shaky international economic-monetary system. And Japan's responsibility and role are great in helping Asia in nonmilitary fields to achieve peace and stability. The Japanese people, therefore, earnestly hope that the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Taiwan—the most serious issue in the process of normalizing her relations with China—will not threaten the peace of Asia and that the future of Taiwan will be decided peacefully between the Chinese themselves.

Accepting that the Sino-Japanese rapprochment must not be at the sacrifice of Japan's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union or other Asian countries, how will Sino-Japanese relations develop? Some people predict that Japan and China will inevitably become rivals on the international scene, especially in Asia. However, they will not become incompatible rivals in the military, political and diplomatic fields provided that Japan carries out, with sincerity, the various measures mentioned above and provided that China observes the five principles for peace and lives up to her announced policy of not becoming a superpower and opposing hegemony and power politics of any kind. Both countries pledged in their joint communiqué that they will not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese are determined to live up to this pledge. It is possible that both countries will emerge as friendly rivals to compete with each other in the field of economic and technical aid for the developing countries. This kind of rivalry is to be welcomed. It is most unlikely that Japan and China will enter into some kind of alliance with each other, because it seems difficult for two countries with different political, economic, cultural and social systems and outlooks on life to have close relations in all fields.

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The Japanese people hope to maintain as close relations of coöperation as possible on the basis of peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding.

As is evident from the measures of the Japanese government already mentioned and also the proposals made by this writer, Japan's basic foreign policy is "international coöperation" in the true sense of the word. It is noteworthy to find it in complete agreement with President Nixon's words in his U.S. foreign policy report to the Congress in 1972:

> The unprecedented advances in science and technology have created a new dimension of international life. The global community faces a series of urgent problems and opportunities which transcend all geographic and ideological borders. It is the distinguishing characteristic of these issues that their solution requires international coöperation on the broadest scale.

Only great progress in international coöperation can provide mankind with a possibility of survival in the twenty-first century on a planet made smaller but increasingly interdependent by revolutionary advances in communication and transportation. This is becoming a belief common to all peoples, including the Japanese. They see their country as a member of the world. Such problems as security, international politics, international trade, science and technology, culture, education, population, resources, energy and environmental pollution (the most pressing problem in Japan) should be dealt with from the global point of view.

Yet the contemporary international community remains an underdeveloped society where sovereign states seeking their own interests alone are still involved in the game of power politics and where there seems to be a deep gap between ideals and realities. By setting a bold example for all to see, Japan seeks to help move the world from almost total dependence on essentially military power politics to a new reliance on economic, political, social, scientific and cultural coöperation. This is the essence of what I have called Japan's grand experiment. No doubt it will be faced with great difficulties and obstacles and attended with risks one after another. But it is the role that Japan can best play: we wish the rest of the world to understand it and strongly welcome it. Not only is the alternative for us much worse, but also, perhaps, among the major powers, Japan is the only country which can attempt this experiment.

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UNTYING THAILAND

By Maynard Parker

The implications of an uncertain ceasefire in Indochina and the possible beginning of separate political dialogues in Laos and Cambodia have again focused attention on Washington's alliance with Thailand, the only nation on the mainland of Southeast Asia which the United States is bound by treaty to defend. Significantly too, Thailand faces an increasingly serious, if not yet critical, insurgency. No matter how the situation in each of the three Indochina states is finally resolved, President Nixon's decisions on Thailand in the next year will largely determine the future course of American policy and involvement in Southeast Asia during the decade ahead.

Since the end of World War II, a series of American administrations has operated on the principle that an anti-Communist Thailand, friendly to Washington, was an asset, if not a necessity, to the strategic and economic interests of the United States in Asia. This principle was converted into a mutual defense treaty in the SEATO pact of 1954, and in 1962, as a result of the Laotian crisis of that year, this commitment was enlarged by interpretation in the Rusk-Thanat accord, so that the United States agreed to defend Thailand unilaterally if SEATO collectively should fail to heed a Thai call for assistance.

During the last eight years, the commitment has been most visibly expressed by the use of Thailand, with willing Thai acquiescence, as the great rear area for the United States in its prosecution of the Indochina War. Thailand has served not only as the staging area for the majority of air strikes against North Vietnam and Laos, but as the logistics and headquarters base for the semi-covert war in Laos and, to a lesser extent, in Cambodia. The massiveness of the American air war would have been extremely difficult and far more costly to mount, and the land war in Laos an impossibility, if it had not been for the Thai sanctuary. And during the last 18 months the need for the Thai bases became crucial as the military situation in Laos deteriorated and as President Nixon was forced to rely more heavily on U.S. airpower, rather than Vietnamization, as the military substitute for the withdrawal of half a million U.S. troops from South Vietnam. As a result, while the Guam doctrine enabled Nixon

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to effect dramatic withdrawals from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam, he was forced (after having reduced the U.S. presence in Thailand from a high point of 48,000 in 1968 to 32,000 in 1971) at the beginning of North Vietnam's Easter offensive this last spring to reopen one closed airbase at Takli, to open a completely new base at Nam Pong, and to reintroduce nearly 18,000 troops transferred from South Vietnam and the United States. Consequently, there are at present nearly 50,000 American troops in Thailand, a greater number than in any other Asian country including South Vietnam. These forces fly U.S. aircraft ranging from B-52s to a helicopter squadron assigned to the Army Attaché in Laos, and are stationed not only at eight Royal Thai Air Force bases constructed by the United States, but also at a half-dozen smaller installations including the National Security Agency base at Ramsum as well as the headquarters of the U.S. military assistance group in Bangkok.

Although the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, has said that the Indochina peace settlement excludes any restrictions on U.S. forces in Thailand or the Seventh Fleet, a ceasefire in Indochina is bound to stimulate a debate on the American commitment to Thailand. For the last eight years, Washington's Thai policy has simply been the tail on the Vietnam dog; economic and military aid, insurgency advice, the narcotics control program, all have to a considerable extent been subjugated to the need for airbases and the desire for Thai support for the war in Laos. While there will be an interim phase when the Thai bases will still be necessary (particularly those connected to the ground war in Laos), it now appears that the United States is heading toward a period when our policy can be more directly responsive to our own and to Thai long-range interests. This transformation will take place slowly but surely, but a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces in Thailand is all but a certainty. The crux of the policy issue for Washington will be whether the United States should continue to keep bases, planes and a modicum of men in Thailand, and therefore on the mainland of Southeast Asia.

Secretary of Defense Laird, who declared in late September that "we will continue to use the Thai bases for some time to come," has fired the first round in a verbal debate that is bound to grow in intensity. Proponents of a strong military presence believe that such a presence would draw the line at the Mekong;

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militarily guarantee the peace settlement in Indochina; provide training and an advance base against the Thai insurgency; and prevent the Thai leadership from doing an abrupt *volte face* toward China. Advocates of a complete military withdrawal argue that a continuing military presence would impede a permanent Sino-American détente; encourage rather than deter the insurgency, both by giving the movement an "imperialistic" enemy and by serving as a target for attacks against American bases; and be worthless, since the Communist challenge to an Indochina settlement will probably be political rather than military.

Any examination of an evolving American policy toward Thailand must focus on three main areas: the insurgency, the search for détente with China and North Vietnam, and the effectiveness and inclinations of the Thai ruling group led by Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and General Praphas Charusathien.

II

Ever since the late Chinese foreign minister, Marshal Chen-yi, remarked at a New Year's Day party in Peking in 1965 that there would be a guerrilla war in Thailand before the end of that year, expert opinion, both Thai and American, has fluctuated over the seriousness of the Thai guerrilla movement. At first many Americans, mesmerized by the Vietnam War and by the threat posed by Chinese people's wars in general, spoke of Thailand as "our next Vietnam." When the insurgency failed to expand as rapidly as expected, the conventional wisdom swung back to the view that Buddhism, the monarchy, a homogeneous language and culture and the lack of a serious land tenure problem made Thailand immune to Communist insurgency. Within the last 18 months, however, this attitude has once again been under revision as the Communists have demonstrated their ability to regenerate and expand.

Although signs of rural discontent were noted in the 1950s, the genesis of the Thai insurgency in the early 1960s centered around two events: the ascendancy in China of the late Marshal Lin Piao, who believed that China's influence in Asia would come through the spread of people's war, and the introduction of U.S.-paid Thai soldiers in Laos, who were supported by air strikes launched from Thailand.

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The insurgents, then as now, concentrated on three areas of the kingdom—inhabited by racially different peoples, alike in that they were not sharing in the economic prosperity of Bangkok and the agriculturally rich central plain surrounding the capital. These regions were the North, where Burma and Laos meet and where the Meo and other tribesmen have little affection for the lowland Thai; the Northeast, bordering Laos, whose population of nine million is not only racially more akin to the Lao than to the Thai, but has a per capita income estimated at only $83 per year compared to a $180 national average; and the South, bordering Malaysia, with a Muslim population of one million and irredentist leanings toward Malaysia.

In retrospect, it seems clear that the first bands of insurgents surfaced before they had constructed an adequate political base, partly because they wished to prove their ideological purity at a time when the great proletarian Cultural Revolution was sweeping through Chinese-dominated Communist parties, but more importantly because China and North Vietnam wanted to serve notice on Bangkok and Washington that the use of Thailand as a forward base against China and North Vietnam would not be without its costs. Because of an unusually active suppression effort by the Thai army commander in the Northeast, the insurgency appeared to have been nipped in the bud. Hundreds of insurgents were killed, others were captured or surrendered, and insurgent strength seemed to have plateaued out at under 1,500 men. Many observers believed that the insurgency would quarantine itself because its limited appeal was only to non-Thai who lived far from Bangkok, and that it posed no real threat to the central government.

Unhappily, this has not proved to be the case. Learning from their mistakes, the insurgents have quietly endeavored to build a secure political base while simultaneously making themselves less dependent on their patrons in Peking and Hanoi. The training center for Thai insurgents has been moved, first from the Hanoi area to the Laotian panhandle, and finally last year to the Phu Pan mountains themselves, in Northeast Thailand. Vietnamese instructors who ran the school in Laos and Hanoi have trained Thai substitutes. As a result of an intensive effort at political proselytizing, insurgent strength has increased from under 1,500 in 1965 to approximately 5,300 in 1972. The Thai Communist Party has now secured two major base areas, one in the

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Phu Pan mountains and one along the Laotian border in the North; in these areas Communist shadow governments have been created in villages and Thai government officials must be accompanied by an army unit. Perhaps more pertinent to the longer-range success of the movement, the insurgents have succeeded in making tentative inroads on the central plain and in recruiting ethnic Thai.

Despite claims by some Thai government leaders that China and North Vietnam have provided active leadership for the insurgency—including the claimed resupply of the guerrillas by night-time helicopter flights of the People's Liberation Air Force—evidence suggests that the assistance of North Vietnam and China has been cautiously limited to diplomatic and propagandistic support and to the training of a few score Thai cadre in China and North Vietnam. Although the guerrillas have been equipped with a few AK-47s, RPGs and mortars, the observer is struck by the restraint with which both patrons have supplied weaponry to the insurgency.

While no conclusive studies have yet been completed on the division of labor or the differences of opinion between Hanoi and Peking, it appears that the Northern insurgency is wholly a Chinese-supported operation while the North Vietnamese have more influence in the Northeast, and that China has handled the propaganda and front activities while North Vietnam has provided more of the training as well as the logistics for moving supplies into the Northeast.

It is difficult to measure the degree of cordiality between Hanoi and Peking in this joint venture, but it is obvious that each to some degree sees the Thai insurgency as being in its own, rather than the other's, sphere of influence. Peking's support of the Thai insurgents and of the Pathet Lao in western Laos is certainly to some extent an effort to checkmate the expansion of Tonkinese influence, while Hanoi would like to believe that it has a historical right of suzerainty over Laos and Cambodia as well as a special interest in an insurgency designed to make trouble for its traditional enemies, the Thai. One evidence of divergence is that while the Thai Communist Party rear apparatus is to be found in Peking, several leading Thai dissidents connected with the Thai Patriotic Front apparently decamped in 1969 to Hanoi, where they have remained active. And in 1972, at a time when Peking had received a Thai emissary and dropped

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its denunciations of the Thai leaders on Radio Peking, Hanoi proceeded to plot and launch two sapper attacks against the major air bases at Ubon and Udorn.

The United States and Thailand have long reacted quite differently to the growing insurgency. Even during the Kennedy administration, the United States clearly believed that the guerrillas, left untended, would eventually pose a threat to the central government, which could and probably would call for armed American assistance. Acting on this premise, the United States moved with some urgency to assist Thailand while the problem was still manageable, by increasing the suppression capability of the army with training and new equipment while at the same time devoting the major share of American economic aid to projects such as road-building designed to improve the quality of life in contested areas. The results have proven largely disappointing. The insurgency has flourished in those very areas where American aid has been most abundant, and neither the Thai army nor police seems to have learned the art of counterinsurgency warfare. This spring, for instance, the Thai army conducted its first divisional operation at a cost of $3.5 million. No coördination was established with local authorities, no provision was made for refugees, little intelligence was collected beforehand and no insurgents were killed while the Thai suffered 50 casualties. Whether through indifference to the threat or belief that it could be negotiated away if it became serious, the Thai government has responded to it lackadaisically; the government has shown little appreciation of the political nature of its opponents. While the insurgency is still nowhere near that critical point where everything the government does tends to exacerbate rather than suppress the insurgents, a continued demonstration of government incapacity could be extremely dangerous.

III

As its attitude toward insurgency demonstrates, the Thai leadership has always been more preoccupied with dangers from without than from within the kingdom. Although the Thai have always worried about China's intentions, the régime believes its serious security threats lie closer at hand in Laos and Cambodia, specifically in the Mekong valley of Laos and in the two former Thai provinces lost to Cambodia at the end of World War II.

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The principal aim of Thailand's security strategy since the war has been to prevent a Tonkinese Communist presence in either of these regions, and to that end the Thai have been willing to deploy troops, albeit secretly, in Laos, to allow their country to be used as the main base for the air war, and by 1967 to send troops to South Vietnam. Much has been made of the mercenary nature of these deployments, but the fact is that the Thai have been prepared to fight, even outside their own borders, the nation they consider to be their primary enemy, North Vietnam. Although the performance of the Thai Black Panther Division, which fought in Vietnam from 1968 to 1971 at a cost of several million dollars in American assistance, was debatable, the effectiveness and valor of the U.S.-supported Thai contingents in Laos cannot be challenged.

The question is whether the Thai conception of the North Vietnamese is correct and whether they have the same intentions toward Thailand as they do toward South Vietnam, or even Laos. In sending troops to Laos, and later to Vietnam, were the Thai actively provoking trouble from Hanoi that could otherwise have been avoided? As long as the United States remained the paramount power in Southeast Asia and remained committed to victory in South Vietnam, the Thai had no reason to conduct such a self-examination. President Johnson's decision to stop the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968 and President Nixon's proclamation of the Guam Doctrine along with the beginning of American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1969 prodded the Thai to examine whether their security interests could be protected, at less cost in blood, by pursuing a détente with their two adversaries, North Vietnam and China.

Thus, private feelers were conveyed to Hanoi over a period of time by Thanat Khoman, Thai Foreign Minister since 1958. In October 1970 these produced a reconvening of the Thai-North Vietnamese Red Cross talks. Ostensibly the meetings, which lasted for seven months, were to discuss the repatriation of the 40,000 Vietnamese refugees in the Northeast, but Thanat has privately confirmed, since he left office, that the outlines of a possible accommodation were discussed. Although the talks adjourned in public disagreement, Thailand subsequently announced a complete withdrawal from South Vietnam and, whether by negotiation or by an evolving de facto situation, has studiously declined, despite U.S. and Khmer pleas, to become

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significantly involved in defending Cambodia. Aside from training a minimal number of Cambodian soldiers and providing a handful of pilots, the Thai have done nothing to halt the military erosion of Marshal Lon Nol's position, and despite the fact that both North Vietnam and Thailand have large numbers of troops on both sides of the Thai-Cambodian border, neither side has strayed across these lines.

Furthermore, Thanat began tentative discussions with the Chinese in Paris, using as go-betweens the French and former Thai Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong, who had previously been in exile in China (and was at one time the leader of the OSS-sponsored Free Thai movement). In arranging this, Thanat, who is fundamentally a technician without a power base of his own in the Thai system, faced stiff opposition. Many in the cabinet argued that Thanat should not talk peace before Peking had stopped supporting the insurgency. They were also seriously concerned about the effect of a Bangkok-Peking thaw on Thailand's three million Chinese. Even those Thai who believed in the wisdom of a rapprochement wondered about Peking's intentions in resuming the construction of a road in Laos ending 20 miles from the Thai border. (This road is indeed an enigma to observers. Some interpret it merely as a Chinese effort to have a moderate counterbalance to Hanoi's influence in Laos—and it may be significant that the road has never been bombed by the American air force.)

On November 17, 1971, domestic developments in Thailand brought an end to Thanat's probes. Prime Minister Thanom and Deputy Prime Minister Praphas, citing a concern over China policy among several other problems, staged a classic Thai political maneuver by running a coup against their own government. Thanat was dismissed, and with his removal from the scene and the subsequent failure to appoint a foreign minister, most observers believed that the door of the two-track policy, if not slammed entirely shut, was barely ajar.

The case proved to be quite otherwise. General Praphas, sensing the importance of the China question to Thailand's future as well as the personally lucrative aspects of trade, set about placing the reins of Thailand's China policy in his own hands. Seven months after the "coup," Praphas dispatched a Thai table-tennis team to Peking, accompanied by an Under-Secretary of Commerce, Dr. Prasitthi Kanchanawat, who is a Thai Chinese,

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expert on China and a confidant of Praphas. Although labeled an unofficial visitor in Peking, Dr. Prasitthi was received as a state guest, and in a 45-minute meeting with Chou En-lai, directly inquired about Chinese support for the insurgency. According to Dr. Prasitthi's public account, the Chinese Premier replied that although China supported just struggles for independence, she did not interfere in other nations' internal affairs. The Premier went on to send greetings to Thai government leaders and, most important, to King Bhumibol Adulyadej—thus strongly suggesting a degree of recognition of the government.

It is too early to tell what effect this friendly meeting has had on the insurgency, but Radio Peking, although not the Voice of the People of Thailand, has stopped criticizing the "Thanom-Praphas clique." This has been enough for Thanom and Praphas to send Dr. Prasitthi to the Canton Trade Fair and then to Peking for another round of informal talks with China's leaders. As a result, trade agreements between the two nations are in the making and diplomatic relations may well be negotiated before the end of 1973.

IV

With the exception of the initiative toward China, the government of Field Marshal Thanom and General Praphas (the latter in many ways the more powerful of the two) seems to be slowly drifting into a morass of inefficiency and indecisiveness. Compared with her neighbors, Thanom and Praphas have kept Thailand largely free from the destruction of war while at the same time doubling the nation's gross national product. But after nearly a decade in office, longer than any other Southeast Asian government with the exception of North Vietnam, the Thai have begun to wonder whether this team, both nineteenth-century traditionalists, has the energy, perception and ideas to cope with Thailand's future problems.

Their November 1971 "coup" ended a three-year experiment with a constitution and parliamentary rule, the fifth such experiment since the absolute monarchy was abolished in 1932. Explaining their action, Thanom and Praphas cited unease not only over the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations, but over insurgency, law and order, and the country's economic problems. Although the "coup" and the application of martial law were partially triggered by the demands of legislators from their

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own party for bribes to vote with the government, it was difficult to see how the weak parliament, where there was no ministerial responsibility and whose vote was not binding on the government, posed any insurmountable obstacle to government decisions. In effect, the "coup" was designed to give the appearance of change and to meet the problems facing Thanom and Praphas rather than the problems facing the country. The cabinet was dissolved and replaced with a 26-man National Executive Council (NEC) with Thanom as chairman and Praphas as deputy chairman. If there was disappointment among the Thai, it was not over the coup, but over the same old signatures at the bottom of the proclamation.

The first year of NEC rule has confirmed this judgment. Although one of the main purposes was to increase government efficiency and decentralize decision-making, the NEC format has proven to be, if anything, more ineffective than the old system, with issues ranging from relations with the United States to the question of whether after-hours drinking should be allowed at Bangkok's international airport, coming before the full NEC for discussion. In a fluid Asian international situation, Thailand still has no foreign minister and no coherent foreign policy. And aside from the China initiative, the so-called new administration has done little more than order the well-publicized execution of a score of criminals, establish a series of blue laws limiting drinking hours and order nightclubs and massage parlors to close at midnight. The country's increasingly difficult economic and social problems have not been confronted.

Economically, the national growth rate dropped in 1971 from nine to six percent, and the forecast for 1972 is the same; the trade deficit, although partially offset by tourism and the spending from the American build-up, is now running at $164 million for the first six months of this year. And a drought this year in the Northeast will cause a major shortage of rice, one of Thailand's main sources of foreign revenue.

In addition to these important problems, Marshal Thanom and General Praphas must at some point face a variety of complex long-range situations. The World Bank has criticized the third Five Year Plan as being underfinanced and vague in its aims. Unless a birth-control program is initiated, Thailand will find itself, by the end of the decade, consuming all of the rice it produces and in need of another exportable product. There is

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an ever-increasing disparity between the rich and the poor, particularly between Bangkok, where per capita income has increased rapidly, and areas such as the Northeast, where the gain has been very little. If future stability is to be accomplished, the government must find a way to reduce rampant corruption and to create a civil service and police force that are effective throughout the country.

Given the apparent inability of the present government to confront and manage these problems, some experts have predicted that there will shortly be pressures for drastic change within the Thai élite—specifically among those young members of the civil service, the military establishment, and the academic and business communities who consider themselves modernizers. Some diplomats believe such pressure could conceivably culminate in a group of younger army officers seizing power or, at the very least, in the return of a hard-driving government in the style of the late Field Marshal and Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat. Any such thoughts must remain by their nature deeply conspiratorial and hidden from public view; as far as can be determined, no young Nassers are in sight. Indeed, in accepting a second, one-year extension of his retirement this July, Chairman Thanom signaled his intent that the future should be more of the same, a nineteenth-century kingdom minding its elephants.

V

The virtual stagnation of the government, its ambivalence toward insurgency, the nascent rapprochement with China, and the hint of at least a limited accommodation with North Vietnam over Cambodia—these factors all suggest that Washington should seriously consider a complete military withdrawal from Thailand, leaving behind only a military assistance group of perhaps 1,000 men. If the Laos peace talks make any progress at all, the funding of Thai mercenaries in northern Laos should also be ended. Residual air power in Southeast Asia can be the responsibility of the Seventh Fleet's carriers.

Such a policy, which would unfold over a one- or two-year period after a ceasefire in Indochina, could in no way be viewed as a relinquishing of the American commitment to Thailand. One tends to forget that, with the exception of the 1962 Laos crisis, there were no U.S. forces in Thailand from 1954 to 1964, even though the United States was already committed by treaty

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to Thailand's defense. The dangers of any Thai government reversing the policies of the last 30 years and allying itself with China remain largely hypothetical. With Bangkok one of the commercial hubs of Asia, with many senior members of the government and army directly sharing in these business profits, and with the philosophical aversion of the Thai élite to any form of communism, such a turnabout seems unlikely.

Far from placing Thailand in a more hostile environment, a lower American profile would benefit both Washington and Bangkok. The Thai Communist movement has always claimed loudly in its propaganda to villagers that the Thanom-Praphas government is the lackey of American imperialists. The dismantling of bases and the American presence would rob the guerrilla movement of this imperialist bogey man, while simultaneously ensuring that the bases would not become targets for the insurgents and threaten to drag the United States into another war.

This does not mean, of course, that the United States should reduce its counterinsurgency advice to the Thai government, or, in fact, change the present emphasis of the counterinsurgency program from its civilian-police-military orientation to a more wholly army operation, as the Thai military and the American Defense Department have been urging recently. It is obvious that a policy of détente stands a far greater chance of success if the Thai government's strategy to combat the insurgency is successful. Conversely, if the Thai government looks increasingly vulnerable, neither China nor North Vietnam will have as much reason to pursue state-to-state relations with Thailand. While the American counterinsurgency advisory effort has not to date proved enormously successful, the actual advice that American civilian and military advisers have offered has been sound; if the U.S. Embassy had no further reason to pull its punches because of the need to retain air bases, it could talk frankly to the Thai for the first time about their counterinsurgency shortcomings.

Perhaps more importantly, while it is too much to hope that North Vietnam will give up all efforts to support the insurgency, a condition of no American air bases in Thailand, aimed at North Vietnam, would weaken Hanoi's rationale for pursuing an active revolutionary policy against Thailand and strengthen the hand of the moderates in Hanoi who would be arguing that

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North Vietnam's resources should go for reconstruction rather than revolution. Similarly, a private diplomatic message to Hanoi that the speed of the American withdrawal from Thailand would be affected by the pace of the North Vietnamese pullout from the panhandle of Laos could be an added inducement to the North Vietnamese for the fulfillment of their overall Indochina treaty commitments.

At the same time that these essentially American-North Vietnamese moves were beginning, Thailand and the other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations should rapidly open the membership of ASEAN to all four of the Indochina states, including North Vietnam. Such an association—favored by many Southeast Asian leaders—could end a 30-year period of confrontation and open channels of communication in which disagreements were openly aired by all nations in the area, without resort to big-power patrons.

China, the United States and Thailand may also discover that they have a common tacit interest in working to ensure that Laos and Cambodia have governments which are not satellites of Hanoi. Neither China nor Thailand wants a powerful Hanoi-dominated or Russian-influenced Indochina. A settlement in Vietnam is sure to accentuate these Peking-Hanoi differences over Cambodia and Laos. In this new situation, it may be possible to achieve by diplomacy what could not be won by war—Cambodia and Laos in non-Communist, non-Tonkinese hands, reasonably friendly to Thailand. If the United States and Thailand succeed in working with others to these ends, the prospects will be fairly bright for Thailand remaining a prosperous, non-Communist, freely trading nation.

There will be some military and governmental leaders in Bangkok who will agonize over the end of Thailand's dependence on America, and consider the search for détente with North Vietnam and China extremely difficult. But the initial steps toward rapprochement with Peking and accommodation with Hanoi are in an old Thai tradition of flexible pragmatism, going back hundreds of years. The Thai who have been responsible for them, including such apparent opposites as General Praphas and Thanat Khoman, realize that safety can be found in diplomacy as well as on the battlefield. It is such men that American policy should seek to strengthen.

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GROWTH, POVERTY AND INEQUALITIES

By Arun Shourie

GROWTH is a beseiged deity. An increasing number of economists and policy-makers are becoming convinced that it is imprudent for a country to devote all its efforts toward maximizing the rates of overall growth—and wait for the benefits to trickle down to all sections of the population. Trickle-downism is thus on the wane. Developing countries are now being warned that rapid growth is liable to take too long to alleviate the miseries of the poor, and that for long periods rapid growth may indeed worsen the lot of large numbers—hence they should launch "direct attacks" on poverty.

This new advice rests on two assumptions: first, that developing countries have indeed been preoccupied with growth to the exclusion of distributive questions and that it is this single-minded pursuit of overall growth which has kept the governments from undertaking programs that might have benefited the poor; second, that "direct attacks" on poverty—consisting of special programs to improve health, sanitation and nutrition, and to provide drinking water, low-cost housing and the like to larger numbers along with large-scale rural public works that provide jobs and convert local labor and materials into productive assets—that these will alter the character of growth and ensure that henceforth its nature is such as to benefit the poor. Neither of these premises is valid. I will argue that the reasons why growth has been such as to have primarily benefited the well-to-do are much more fundamental and that direct forays against poverty—even if they consist of large and expensive programs—will not alter the character of growth unless they are accompanied by a thoroughgoing political transformation involving drastic redistribution of income, assets and the control over institutions. Finally, I shall argue that such a transformation would make growth more meaningful and not decelerate the rates of overall expansion.

II

Leading Pakistani economists who were closely associated with the high rates of growth of the Ayub period and Western advisers who were in Pakistan in the early sixties are now saying

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that their determination to achieve high growth rates was misplaced and that their euphoria over the rates which were achieved misled them into believing that the country was well on the way toward solving its economic problems. The dramatic events of 1971 that broke Pakistan asunder have attracted much attention to these laments.

Consider, however, the counter-examples of Ceylon and India. Decision-makers in these countries have never been mesmerized by growth rates. Ceylon has been engaged in a costly, sustained and very "direct" attack on poverty for the last two decades. Successive governments have been providing subsidized health, education, transport services and food, with little regard for the effects of these subsidies on the country's ability to grow, on its ability to adjust to the declining prospects of its principal exports and on its foreign indebtedness. Yet economic discontent—especially among the educated youth—erupted in large-scale violence two years ago, and today the country's economic policies are stalemated. With neither growth nor structural transformation, and with a severe problem of short-term indebtedness, Ceylon is finding it extremely difficult to continue its direct attacks on poverty.

In the last 25 years Indian leaders—Nehru in particular—have displayed a lively concern for the poor. There is scarcely a proposal for channeling a larger proportion of the benefits of growth to the poor that has not been enacted and for which institutions, procedures and controls have not been devised. Special programs have been formulated to help the dispossessed tribes and castes; numerous laws have been enacted to redistribute land and to reform tenurial arrangements; the controls that have been instituted to ensure that resources are used only for setting up industries of high priority have been so comprehensive that—quite literally—not a single industrial unit (other than the purely household enterprise) has been established and operated without government approvals and sanctions at every step; corporate laws have been codified and tightened; inheritance, wealth and gift taxes have been introduced and the rates of income tax have been made steeper and steeper. A legion of commissions and committees have often been in session examining the effects of the country's economic policies on people in different income groups and in different regions. Yet today official documents tell us that the number of people living in abject pov-

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erty has not been diminished in spite of 25 years of development effort—that still 200 to 250 million subsist on a diet that is deficient even in calories—and that the controls and programs which were instituted to channel benefits to the poor have in fact ensured them for the rich and the powerful.

These counter-examples document the obduracy of economic forces and suggest that before the debate between growth and distributive justice becomes more strident we must correctly summarize the experience of the last two decades. One danger is that sloganeering about equity will choke off all growth: a nervous self-consciousness arising from the apprehension that they may be accused of being obsessed with growth—that their progressive *bona fides* may be called into question—may paralyze governments and keep them from taking decisions that are needed for higher productivity. Indian industrial policies have been paralyzed in precisely this way for the past two years. The equally grave danger is that some governments will henceforth embellish their plans with a few programs attacking poverty directly—and then sit back with the feeling that indeed they have taken the necessary steps to alter the character of growth. Valuable time can thus be lost in both ways: by decisions that are deferred and by decisions that place their faith in a few ornamental programs.

III

The experience of the last two decades teaches us that the distribution of income, assets and influence over institutions determines the character of subsequent growth. Given the extremely unequal distribution of incomes and assets, industries are set up to produce goods which the rich want, while import policies aim either at importing the materials needed for producing these goods or at importing the goods themselves. This point can be documented by examining the kinds of consumer industries that have been established in India, Pakistan and Ceylon over the last two decades; it is even more dramatically brought out by considering the pattern of growth in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Rhodesia where the richest five percent receive 38, 40, 48 and 60 percent respectively of total income. It is hardly surprising that industries do not get established for meeting the needs of the poorest 20 percent who, in the four countries listed above, receive only 3.5, 2.2, 4.0 and 4.0 percent of total income.

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Indeed, the extent to which the richest five percent affect the pattern of what is to be produced in the manufacturing sector—the sector that often attracts the most enterprising and which directly or indirectly absorbs a very large share of the government's promotional efforts and resources—is even greater than their high shares in total income. The poorer sections spend a much larger proportion of their incomes on basic necessities like foodstuffs and coarse clothing than do the richer sections. The share of the latter, therefore, in the market for industrial goods is generally 10 to 20 percent higher than their share in total income.[1]

Controls over the establishment and operation of industries and over the distribution of resources that are in short supply (such as foreign exchange), or efforts to present projects meeting the needs of the poor in a more attractive light by, for example, shuffling shadow prices—none of these is able to counter the overwhelming pressures of the marketplace. Private entrepreneurs do not set up units to produce goods that the poor need, but instead offer goods which they cannot afford. And if governments undertake to supply these goods on the assumption that they must accord a greater weight to the needs of the poor than the poor are able to exercise through the market, they soon run into resource problems of the kind that have plagued Ceylonese governments.

This lesson has an important corollary. The longer redistributive steps are delayed the larger the proportion of resources—enterprise, skilled manpower, capital equipment, foreign exchange—that will have congealed in industries catering to the demands of the rich, and the more difficult it will be to reorient the pattern of industrial production. Efforts to reorient this pattern forcibly will result in much unutilized equipment and major dislocations of labor. The economy is not akin to a simple and versatile machine like a lathe that can be quickly made to change from boring holes to chiseling rods just by turning a few knobs and replacing one part or two by another. Rather it is like an educational system which has been patterned over a few decades

[1] The rich industrialist and the decision-maker in poor countries often ask "Which of the things that we are producing is particularly inessential or luxurious?" As their consumption aspirations are influenced by the consumption standards of the developed countries they find it difficult to identify goods as luxurious or superfluous. It is the wrong question, put to the wrong people. Instead, we should ask the very poor about what *they* need or what *they* would want in the foreseeable future. Once this is done we at once realize how much of the country's total investment effort has gone into goods that are so very distant from the horizons of the poor and so very irrelevant to their needs.

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on the system of a former colonial power. Decades will pass before the system is transformed, the teachers are retrained, new syllabi and texts are developed, new schemes of scholarships and stipends are devised, new facilities are acquired and new examination methods are developed.

Apart from the fact that they do not command much purchasing power, the poor are numerous, dispersed and unorganized. Because of these features many conventional measures are of little avail. Minimum-wage legislation is an example: it does not help the unemployed and may, in certain situations, actually swell their ranks; even for those who have a job off-and-on, legislating a minimum for the wage that they receive on the days on which they are employed is little help because the number of days for which they have a job is not guaranteed; nor can such legislation be enforced in the myriad fields and small establishments in which the vast majority of workers are employed. Moreover, as they are dispersed and unorganized and have little to fall back on, the poor can seldom agitate and bargain collectively —as industrial laborers, who are in the richest third of the urban population, can.

More far-reaching measures than minimum-wage legislation —measures such as land reforms—also fail primarily due to the fact that the poor are unorganized and dispersed. I shall note later on that the laws attempting to reform land tenure and ownership have been flawed. The basic reason, however, why land reforms in many countries have not fulfilled their original promise has been their paternalistic character. The expectation has been that the patterns of land ownership and operation can be transformed by passing laws in national and state capitals, by relying on itinerant officers to implement them and by making the reforms justiciable. In brief, the expectation has been that outsiders—the distant legislator, the itinerant officer, the scholarly judge—can transform the most important feature of village life, the ownership and operation of land. But how are such men to monitor every lease, to examine the precise relationship between each sharecropper and his landlord, to ascertain the extent to which each landlord actually tills his own land? And how is a lowly tenant—who must continue to live in the village long after the officer has driven off; whose lease, in all probability, is an oral one; who is, most likely, illiterate, weak and indebted to his landlord—to gather written evidence, muster witnesses and accuse

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his landlord in an open court that passes all the Western norms of justiciability?

In a milieu of this kind—in which the poor are desperately poor, in which they are dispersed and unorganized—almost everything a government does ultimately ends up benefiting the rich and powerful more than the poor and the weak. Credit agencies that are set up ostensibly to free the poor tenant and small farmer from the rapacious hold of the money-lender end up channeling the majority of their funds to the large landlords—who themselves often combine the roles of landlord, trader and money-lender, who are often in a position to finance their own investments, and who, therefore, loan the extra (official) funds that they receive to those who do not have equal access to institutional credit and must, for that reason, pay higher interest rates. Canals that are dug to provide water for all end up providing to the large and strong a much more adequate and reliable service than to the small and weak. State trading corporations that are set up to wipe away the profits of intermediaries end up working through agents who, it later turns out, are none other than the traders these agencies were meant to replace. Public sector enterprises that are established with the hoary objective of ensuring the commanding heights of the economy for the state end up working inefficiently and thus ensuring even higher profits for private units in the same industry that manage to work efficiently. And so on.[2]

Thus, the pattern of growth can only be changed if the distribution of income, of assets and of the control over institutions is drastically altered. And here a blunt truth must be faced: a drastic alteration of this kind can only be brought about by a government that derives its strength from the dispossessed. A leadership that exists on the sufferance of a privileged group such as the army, or of the rural organization which is in the hands of the kulaks or large landowners, or which is dependent for its finances on the very industrialists and urban rich whose privileges it denounces—such a leadership can do little.

Political change will have to be accompanied on the purely

[2] Each of these assertions can be amply documented from Indian experience. For perceptive accounts of two field trips that illustrate the situation for water and credit, see Daniel Thorner, "The Weak and the Strong on the Sarda Canal" in "Land and Labor in India," by Daniel and Alice Thorner, eds. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962, p. 14–20; and "Agricultural Coöperatives in India: A Field Report," by Daniel Thorner. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964.

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economic plane by innovations of many kinds, particularly new forms of organization and new types of financial assets. The need for the former is illustrated by the sorry state of government-owned enterprises in countries such as India and Ceylon. Unless these can be made to function well, industrial progress—including the production of goods that are needed by the poor—will be thwarted. State-owned enterprises with enormous amounts of capital locked up in them will remain riddled by poor management, labor-management duels, inter-union rivalry and unproductive relations between them and their supervising ministries, while large private industrialists—who alone in the private sector can now muster the resources required by plants producing fertilizers, steel, aluminum and so on—are hamstrung, not allowed to establish or expand their enterprises in the name of reducing inequalities and preventing the concentration of economic power.

In the interim period during which steps have been initiated to curb the incomes of the rich through, for example, ceilings on urban property and the like, the need for new forms of financial assets is also obvious. Unless new financial assets are created, for example, government paper that provides an adequate hedge against inflation, the rich in countries such as India and Ceylon will begin to transform their wealth into foreign accounts and into assets (such as diamonds) that can be easily concealed and transported. Such developments can only have deleterious effects on the economies of these countries.

IV

If such a political and economic transformation is indeed brought about, if income, assets and the control over institutions are indeed redistributed, will all this retard growth? In the literature and public discussion on growth one comes across three apprehensions about the likely effects of egalitarian policies: (a) that these will divert scarce organizational, administrative and other talent—the talent and time of those who will be trying to implement the policies as well as of those who will be engaged in circumventing them; (b) that the average savings rate of the economy will be lowered, partly because the rich, who account for most of the economy's household savings, will not be able or willing to save as much, and partly because the government's budgetary resources will be frittered away in subsidies as they

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have been, for example, in Ceylon; and (c) that incentives to work and invest will be reduced.[8]

The first apprehension—that egalitarian measures may divert scarce administrative and entrepreneurial talent—seems incontrovertible when one considers the amount of time that hordes of officials seem to spend implementing laws and regulations intended to redress the balance between the rich and the poor. Thus, for instance, many observers in India have been so discouraged by the Indian experience in land reforms—by the apparent time and effort that have gone into them and by what has been accomplished—that they are saying that instead of expending its time and resources on such far-reaching measures as ceilings, the government should focus on issues like regulation of rents and tenancy reform. The fact, however, is that disproportionate administrative and other effort has not been taken up by these measures either because they are egalitarian or because they are far-reaching. On the contrary, such effort as has been put into them has been made necessary (and rendered futile) by the exceptions, exemptions and loopholes that have been incorporated into the laws. The spate of land reform legislation enacted by Indian states and in Pakistan over the years constitutes an excellent illustration of this fact. If tenancy laws are enacted which exclude sharecroppers from the definition of "tenants;" if laws intended to confer occupancy rights on tenants insist that the tenant can acquire these rights only after 12 years of uninterrupted tenancy; if laws limiting rents are passed without any provisions for security of tenure; if landowners are allowed to evict tenants and resume land for "personal cultivation" and the latter is defined so loosely that the owner need not even stay in the village to establish his status as one cultivating his own land; if tenancy laws are passed that explicitly exclude new tenancies from their coverage; if ceilings apply to individuals and not households; if the intention to impose ceilings is announced long before they are enacted and if generous grace periods are allowed in which landlords may dispose of their land in any way; if such laws are passed and if no effort is made to organize or mobilize those who will benefit from the legislation—then obviously much administrative effort will have to be set aside for

[8] Mr. McNamara has commented briefly on the second and third apprehensions in his recent address to the Governors of the World Bank. See Robert S. McNamara, "Address to the Board of Governors," International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, September 25, 1972.

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implementing the laws. And those who might lose under the laws will devote at least as much effort to taking advantage of the loopholes that have been so generously provided as in busying themselves with productive tasks. But clearly there is nothing inherent in egalitarian measures that requires such inordinate diversion of administrative and other resources.

As for the savings apprehension, its arithmetic is clear enough: household savings account for 60 percent to nearly 100 percent of the gross domestic savings in different developing countries and the rich are responsible for most of the household sector's saving. Household savings surveys in different countries suggest that the rate of saving rises very rapidly with income: while the poorest households have negative savings, the richest five percent turn out to save 40 to 50 percent of their income. The conclusion seems simple and straightforward—until one examines the true nature of "savings" and then of incentives.

In surveys from which such results are borrowed, the concept of "savings" includes the acquisition of assets such as houses, gold, silver and jewelry, and consumer durables (such as air-conditioners, cars, radios, furniture, etc.). About 30 percent of household "savings" identified in these surveys consists of assets such as these three.[4] Glorifying this kind of "saving" as being necessary for growth is, as Gunnar Myrdal has so often emphasized, to become a prisoner of words. Indeed much of the "saving" of the rich is just "consumption"—and consumption of goods, like smuggled gold, that are a direct drain on the economy's balance of payments and of goods, like some of the consumer durables, that have a high import content and the production of which requires much capital. On the other side—if the potential effects on output are any criterion—much of the "consumption" that the poor would undertake if some income were to be redistributed in their favor, and which we are told is undesirable because it will diminish the rate of savings in the economy, is more akin to "investment" than to consumption. More food, better health services, modest amounts of protection against the elements, better public transport—all these will improve productivity, reduce absenteeism and improve labor discipline.

[4] The reader will notice here a case of double counting: elsewhere I have noted that a large part of the consumption of the rich consists of goods that are capital- and import-intensive. Yet here many of these appear as a part of "savings." The discrepancy is deliberate, for the "savings" concept referred to in the text does in fact characterize many surveys and thus underlies the inferences that are drawn from them.

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The definition of "savings" apart, the savings apprehension must be examined in the context of the character of growth in any economy.[5] Those who fear a fall in the rate of savings reason as follows: growth requires investment; net inflows from the rest of the world apart, investment requires savings; to obtain savings we must retain inequalities and ensure a high and secure rate of return to savings. Moreover, they argue that the rich will not save unless they are able to enjoy the incomes from such savings in the form of luxury consumption; hence we must not stifle the consumption of such goods and services in the economy.

Two points should be noted in this context. First, the goods (air-conditioners, private automobiles, etc.) and services (foreign travel, accounts in foreign banks, etc.) that the rich demand are capital-intensive as well as import-intensive. As capital and foreign exchange are both scarce, this strategy—of inducing the rich to save by offering luxury consumption standards in return—may well be an inefficient way of maximizing the growth of employment and, indeed, of output itself.[6] The second point is more fundamental: whom does the growth that results from this strategy benefit? The rich provide not only the savings but also command a disproportionate amount of total effective demand in the economy. Consequently, as was emphasized earlier in the article, their tastes and requirements determine the pattern of production; thus the growth that results from their savings is directed primarily at catering to their demands.

[5] For reasons of space, I shall not deal with the question of the effects egalitarian measures may have on public savings beyond noting the following points: (a) subsidies—such as the ones used in Ceylon—are certainly not necessary for pursuing egalitarian and employment-oriented goals; if the laws are unambiguous, land reforms, ceilings on the ownership of urban property, alteration in the relative prices of labor, capital and foreign exchange, etc., require minimal public expenditure; (b) these (*sic*) measures may well increase the total levels of output and hence, if the fiscal system is at all responsive to aggregate production, the government's revenue receipts.

[6] This point is made forcefully by Dudley Seers and his associates in "Towards Full Employment, A Programme For Colombia," International Labour Office, Geneva, 1970—especially Chapter 10. Some of the luxuries that the rich consume are labor-intensive: handicrafts of various kinds (jewelry, carpets, hand-embroidered textiles) and services of domestic servants are cases that are often cited. Each of these must be examined in itself for, apart from their apparent labor-intensity, they have little in common. Jewelry and many kinds of textiles are highly import-intensive. The artisan and laborer employed in many of these labor-intensive industries—carpet-weaving is a case in point—are notoriously underpaid; intermediaries and financiers, who are by no means poor, appropriate disproportionate shares of the price of the product. The real incomes of domestic servants and the numerous attendants on estates place them among the richest 30 to 40 percent of the population. Moreover, in considering these cases we must not assume that if these goods and services were not being produced those currently employed in producing them would be unemployed. A different set of goods would be demanded and labor needed to produce these.

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As for incentives, the first question to ask is the following one: how many times must the incomes of the rich be of the incomes of the poor for the former to have adequate incentives? Such figures as are available (and which are known to understate by a considerable margin the incomes of the richest in a country) indicate that for countries with per capita incomes of less than $200, average incomes among the richest five percent are anywhere from 10 to 35 times those of the poorest 20 percent in each country. The corresponding multiples for countries with per capita incomes between $200 and $350 range from 13 times to 73 times with an average around 31 times. Yet the corresponding ratio for the United States is said to be around 5:1, while visitors to China report that the highest salaries in an enterprise are seldom more than three to four times the lowest. These data with their related evidence on savings rates, growth rates and the like hardly suggest that high multiples have been conspicuously successful in inducing the rich to exert themselves.

Moreover, may it not be that relatively high incomes and high consumption standards for the richest constitute a disincentive for the masses? May they not convince the masses that the system does not reward their labor and sacrifices proportionately? And may this conviction not ultimately incite the masses to destroy icons like nonviolence, parliamentary methods and constitutionalism?

The second point is equally fundamental. In the end it is hardly satisfactory to justify high incomes and high consumption standards for the few by asserting that they provide the few with incentives to engineer a pattern of growth which ensures high incomes and high consumption standards for the few.

V

The last two decades thus teach us that the poor will not obtain a proportionate share in the benefits of growth until the character of growth is radically altered, that this alteration can only be brought about as part of a major political transformation and that were such a transformation to be brought about there is little reason to suppose that it would affect the rates of overall growth adversely. The conclusion that the character of growth cannot be altered unless the political milieu is thoroughly transformed is not a counsel of despair. It does not imply that the developing world must sit back for years and wait for distant

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political changes. In many countries the leadership can initiate the transformation now.

India is an outstanding case in point. Mrs. Gandhi's unique rapport with the Indian masses puts her in a position to transform her party into a party of the masses—a party that mobilizes the dispossessed so that they may acquire the self-confidence to assert their rights and the capacity to police the reforms, a party whose members work with the masses in constructive programs, a party that is no longer dependent on money raked in from the very rich, a party whose dedication to the interests of the masses is proven by the life-styles and the social practice of its members. The last is not to be dismissed lightly; on the contrary, it is the logical place to begin. So many in India are so desperately poor that very large resources must be deployed if the government is to effect any perceptible improvement in their lives. The resources that are needed are so large that even those who are not well-to-do by any absolute standard (for example, factory workers who, as was noted above, are in the richest third of the urban population) must be asked to share the burdens. How will the leadership make groups such as industrial labor accept sacrifices in their modest real incomes when these groups—and indeed the people at large—know that the very leadership that now wails against "the lack of commitment" in the privileged section of the population and which reminds workers that just having a job is a privilege is itself in many ways the most privileged group?

To persuade an alert and well-organized group like industrial labor to accept sacrifices for the very poor, the political leadership in India, Ceylon and other countries must give up its present life-styles—its insistence on living in luxury houses, on traveling in air-conditioned comfort, on receiving imported cars, telephone services, electricity and other amenities at rates far lower than are charged to the people they are meant to represent and serve. It will have to eliminate the impression which now pervades many a country, that while denouncing all sorts of privileges the leaders have feathered their personal nests and those of their relatives by the unabashed use of the privilege *sans* equal, that of dispensing patronage—a privilege that has been greatly enlarged by the spate of controls that has been instituted in most countries over the establishment and operation of industries and the use of scarce resources like foreign exchange.

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Unless the leadership in these countries initiates such a transformation little will come of the "direct attacks" on poverty. Governments like Mrs. Gandhi's will have won elections on brave and bold slogans and then locked up the promises of reform in almirahs of resolutions. They will have introduced bills with sweeping and even with revolutionary objectives and then incorporated caveats which nullify the laws completely. They will have proclaimed the necessity of sweeping institutional change and then frittered away valuable time in the theatrics of nationalizing one industry or another. Finally, they will have launched bold programs for helping the poor and then, as they cannot effectively tax the privileged on whom they depend, be unable to raise the resources these programs require.

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STUCK FAST

By John Newhouse

POLITICALLY, Western Europe is enfeebled if not paralyzed. And the dilemma of the world's most civilized concentration of peoples, deploying more economic power than any region save North America, is more than paradoxical. It is disturbing and potentially troublesome. One wonders if there is still time for Europeans to do anything about it, and, if so, what. Western Europe is caught up in fresh political currents strong enough to restrain any serious efforts by the European Community to enlarge significantly the political influence of the member states and to reduce their dependence on America.

A fine irony runs through this picture of Europe stuck fast. After all, there *is* movement in Europe, in both East and West and within the European Community. Brandt's Ostpolitik and Brezhnev's decision to respond have inspired more contact between the two halves of Europe in the past three years than in all the preceding years since World War II. Much more heartening to "good Europeans," for whom an enlarged and eventually unified European Community remains an article of faith, Britain and other candidate members have finally taken their places in Brussels; the moment then is historic. The question is whether it is also transitional and, if so, to what.

Optimists can and do take heart from the September meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which restored the amenities between Europeans and Americans struggling to maneuver the world payments system out of limbo and onto solid ground. The NATO flank is also abnormally calm. Reasonably enough, Europeans do not see a unilateral American troop withdrawal around the next bend, and nobody is quarreling about strategy for the moment. The caucus of West European defense ministers known as the Euro-group has acquired experience and some coherence. Of greater importance, relations between the senior political figures in London, Bonn and Paris are good. The mutual suspicion and even antagonism that tormented most relationships of the three predecessor régimes seem to have been largely dissolved.

Briefly, West Europeans for the most part appear to be getting on reasonably well with each other, with the Americans

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and with their neighbors to the East. Yet the implications of what is happening are scarcely encouraging.

II

West Europeans now find themselves either observing or participating in three central processes: negotiations and other contacts between East and West; monetary and trade talks with the Americans and Japanese; and efforts to adapt the European Community to its enlarged membership while establishing, as well as improving, modes of coöperation.

Inevitably, these different activities are carried forward separately and in uneven relationship. They are, in short, disjunctive. While the East-West process has acquired a relatively steady rhythm, transatlantic talks on trade and money are fitful and more urgent, yet lacking visible or immediate political gain. Equally, efforts to move toward economic integration, let alone political union, are bedeviled by the differences, no less intractable really than before, between member governments, especially the key governments—Britain, France and West Germany.

Of the three processes the first is now most to the fore. The old orthodoxy of an ascendant North Atlantic system, its European interests eventually represented by an integrated community, has been victimized by time and events. Presently, it arouses more skepticism than articulate support. Logic keeps the concept alive, but a sense of déjà vu, if not futility, saps its vitality. Today the dynamic lies elsewhere, most conspicuously in the process of competition and accommodation between the great adversary powers.

Reluctant themselves to tinker with their political-security edifice, European governments all recognize that the web of East-West negotiations may in time dislodge some of its foundations. After all, Western Europe remains the cape of a continental land mass, politically vulnerable—even, perhaps especially, in a nuclear age—to the strongest neighboring power, the Soviet Union. The balance of power, in its most profound and enduring sense, continues to run through Europe. Not for a long time has it shifted, since neither of the great powers—superpowers if you will—has been willing to tolerate shifts that might be prejudicial to its interests. That was the lesson of Berlin in the years 1958–62 and of Prague, 1968. Yet with both superpowers now taking political risks and nudging the system for European

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security away from the simple rules of confrontation and status quo, the political environment is bound to change, and the balance of power, one way or another, will be affected. Obviously, neither of the great powers intends to lose ground in the process, but almost certainly one of them will. Again, whatever happens, Western Europe is unlikely to benefit politically; it stands to lose ground if and as Soviet influence grows at the expense of America's.

So far, the advantages in East-West dealings have been reciprocal and difficult to equate. The interim Berlin agreement bore clear gains for the Western powers, but also made possible the ratification of Moscow's nonaggression treaty with West Germany (the sine qua non of Brezhnev's opening to Western Europe) and its cherished European Security Conference (ESC). The Ostpolitik launched by Brandt reduces pressure on West Germany and offers access to the East. Equally, it enables the Soviet Union to become a factor in West German political life and to expand its influence in Western Europe. Moscow need no longer rely on pressure and intimidation to exert influence in West Germany. Brandt's victory in the election last fall was an endorsement of the Ostpolitik. Moreover, it became clear during the election campaign that no matter which party or coalition is in power in Bonn, the essentials of the Ostpolitik are irreversible: Barzel had been given carte blanche by the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) to follow Brandt's lead.

The Phase-One SALT agreements amount to a creditable first step and a clear gain for stability, at least in conventional strategic terms. The ABM problem would appear to be disposed of, and the two sides have accepted some equivalent of parity and mutual assured destruction (even though the Soviets have not yet openly endorsed such a doctrine). The political effects of the SALT process are less clear, especially with regard to Western Europe. The Phase-One agreements were by and large applauded by NATO European governments, which have long since acknowledged a state of strategic parity between the superpowers.

SALT's second phase, however, will touch issues closer to home, notably America's forward-based nuclear-capable aircraft on which West Europeans rely to offset Soviet missiles targeted on their cities. The Soviets may also try to link Phase-Two progress with agreement by the United States to deny any of their

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allies assistance in the area of nuclear weapons. Since bilateral arrangements with Great Britain, to date the only beneficiary of such assistance, are due for renewal next year, this so-called nontransfer issue could become divisive. Finally, the fact that there is no direct West European voice in SALT—the first major piece of East-West business that has lacked the participation of West Europeans—reinforces the sense of dependence and feeds the old anxiety about Americans and Russians negotiating over their heads on matters of great concern to Europe.

Europeans are, of course, deeply involved in the European Security Conference and in negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), just getting underway in parallel. To the degree that the ESC responds to a mood in Western Europe that strongly favors reconciliation with the Soviet bloc, it may strengthen the hand of governments. Then there is also a possibility, however modest, that ESC might actually promote progress on issues that affect security.

A reasonable assumption is that the Soviet Union, which proposed the ESC, stands to gain most. The conference formally removes any lingering obloquy earned by Russia when she crushed Czechoslovakia's liberal experiment. All the European states, plus the United States and Canada, are meeting with the Russians and Czechs, not to mention the East Germans. Symbolically, then, the conference is important to Moscow. Politically, it has the great merit in Soviet eyes of freezing the status quo in Europe. And that is the irony of the ESC. It creates the illusion of movement, perhaps even novel departures, yet is designed to formalize the status quo, or what is sometimes called "the recognition of existing realities."

Among these realities are the division of Europe and the Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe. NATO is not vigorously challenging the Brezhnev Doctrine, and therefore tacitly accept the notion of limited sovereignty in Eastern Europe. The Soviets in turn are challenging neither NATO nor the enlarged European Community. Moreover, the Soviets are accepting what some call "interpenetration of blocs," a process that obviously risks strengthening pressure in some East European countries for greater control over their own internal affairs. Clearly, the Russians regard the risk as acceptable and worth taking when measured against the political gains they seek. They intend that the ESC will help to blur an already ambiguous political en-

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vironment and in time serve the traditional goal of weakening Western Europe's (and perhaps America's) will to sustain collective security and joint institutions.

The irony of MBFR is that the initiative was NATO's, yet the Soviet Union enters the negotiations holding higher cards. It has, after all, more troops in Central Europe, the area in question, than the United States and the further advantage of proximity. Departing Soviet units, unless dispatched to the Eastern frontier, could be swiftly returned to East Germany, Poland or Czechoslovakia. The political advantage also lies with Moscow, which is under no internal pressure to thin out its European deployments. Washington, on the other hand, first conceived of MBFR as a means of neutralizing pressure from Senator Mansfield and his congressional allies to reduce America's European commitment, or at least to buy time. Probably few people in Washington believed that Moscow would ever permit its European forces, which after all have the critical role of guaranteeing bloc security, to become the subject of a negotiation with NATO governments.

Very likely, MBFR will buy time. The negotiations should be at least as protracted and arduous as SALT. The issues are even more complex, involving the several forces of many different countries. How to assess their different capabilities in terms of equipment, readiness, training, logistical support, etc.?

Apart from buying time vis-à-vis the U.S. Senate, an MBFR agreement would seem preferable on balance to a unilateral American reduction. With a combination of good luck, good faith on both sides and good management, the parties might reach an acceptable military balance in Central Europe with somewhat fewer forces. Even more useful, perhaps, would be a few political side agreements aimed at reducing the instabilities of the military confrontation. These so-called confidence-building measures might include limitations on the size of maneuvers, advance notification of maneuvers and restrictions on the movement of troops across national frontiers. The utility of such agreements would depend on how tightly they were written. Like the ESC, MBFR has the further advantage of meeting a popular preference for tackling security problems in an East-West context. None of the Western governments is disposed to allow the Soviets to preëmpt the peace issue.

What needs next to be said is that MBFR as an operational

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problem is full of traps. Practically speaking, MBFR need not go very far before NATO's war-fighting capability would be degraded. This in turn might serve to reduce the so-called non-nuclear pause to an unacceptable level. Washington would again be asking itself why nuclear arms should be treated as the weapon of last resort in all parts of the world except Central Europe. Or European governments may come to regard MBFR as the Americans' chosen instrument for their military withdrawal. Soviet diplomacy can be relied upon to encourage the idea that America one day will leave Europe and go back to being a hemispheric and Pacific power. Precisely because this suspicion comes naturally to Europeans, it would not take much to twist it into a politically troublesome anxiety.

Britain has always been hostile to MBFR and will seek to minimize its scope and effect. The French make no effort to conceal their hostility to any proposition that might diminish America's military presence in Europe, and France will not participate in the talks. The West Germans seemed to favor MBFR as long as it remained in the conversational and model-building stage. They, too, saw it as a useful hedge against the Mansfield bloc in Washington. But now that MBFR is on the green baize table, the Anglo-French distaste for it is affecting Bonn's attitude. Europeans and Americans, whatever their identity of interest, perceive many things differently. Washington may come to regard MBFR as a realistic means of helping adapt to a swiftly changing political environment, whereas Europeans, again, may see it quite simply as a first long step toward American disengagement. Such an attitude, however overdrawn, might inspire West Europeans to try extending in common their political influence. More likely, it would induce the opposite effect and contribute to a further lowering of the area's political profile.

III

The progressively greater movement and subtlety in East-West politics tend to obscure Western Europe's political confinement. A kind of "damned if we do and damned if we don't" attitude discourages Western Europe. The absence of political unity—the unwillingness or inability to move toward it—means that Western Europe's political course is influenced as much or more by what the great powers do separately and together than by what Britain, France, West Germany and the others are doing inde-

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pendently, or even together. Without unity, Western Europe is an assortment of middle and small powers, no one of them a convincing figure in the conduct of its own most important affairs. Yet any major initiative frankly designed to promote political unity, as for example a defense community, carries risks which these governments, on past or current form, are unwilling to run.

Little if anything that is being done by the great powers will help Western Europe to extend significantly its political running room. An obsession with China pushes the Russians to anchor more securely their position in Eastern Europe, to discourage Western Europe's political pretensions and to scale down the level of confrontation with the United States. In accepting the Common Market as a distinct economic institution and even agreeing to work with it, Moscow hopes to blunt any incentive the member states may have to develop comparable political and defense institutions. Far better from the Soviet viewpoint to treat such matters in the East-West context. The policy is animated by the parallel purposes of expanding Soviet influence in the world and containing China. There is no place in such a design for a strong and united Western Europe. A permanent U.S. military presence in Europe is less intolerable, but far from desirable. And Moscow will do what it can to encourage the American departure.

America, although once looked upon uneasily as the federator presumptive, seems now to West Europeans to be losing interest in the integration movement. Some perceptive Europeans expect Washington to continue deploying substantial forces in Europe, but to trim or dilute its political involvement there. In a sense, this is already happening and has been for some time. A break in the continuity of America's political priorities probably began some years ago. Other than rhetorically, Western Europe no longer has a reliably preëminent claim to Washington's attention. And it has been some years since anyone could spell out in precise terms America's goals in Europe. Triangular politics and related projects like SALT are seen by Europeans as closer to the center of Washington's interest.

Europeans also sense that triangular politics has given Washington a taste for Realpolitik. Rightly or wrongly, they feel that Washington is telling them, in effect: we will maintain a high military posture in Europe and meet our NATO commitments, but in return Europe must forbear rocking America's boat on

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commercial and monetary matters. In short, many Europeans feel that Washington is using security to gain an advantage in its dealings with them on urgent problems of money and trade. Europeans resent what some of them call America's economic chauvinism. They suspect that Washington now thinks of the Common Market mainly as an instrument for escalating inefficiency, especially in agriculture, and for promoting competition with American exports. They also suspect that the United States will try to bring its principal economic competitors to heel. Once America's problems with Japan have been whittled to manageable size, Western Europe, they fear, will be confronted with a U.S.-Japanese economic alignment. If all this appears as a caricature of the American attitude, the fault doesn't lie entirely with the Europeans. Transatlantic communications are rarely as clear as they might be.

Western Europe cannot play at triangular politics. It lacks power and does not threaten either of the great powers, let alone China. But Western Europe can and will play at triangular economics with America and Japan. Moreover, most West European countries will try to exploit the warming climate to the East by expanding their sales and joint ventures in Soviet client states. In the bargain, they should gain a measure of access to Eastern Europe at other levels. Still, this kind of access relies heavily on Soviet good will. Thus, it is Moscow, not Washington, that can offer West European states opportunities beyond their frontiers. And the process should be reciprocal; certainly, the Soviets will try to exploit it as yet another means of building influence in Western Europe.

Moscow may also find itself in a position to play off Western Europe against the United States and Japan. Suspicious Europeans already worry that America may try to preëmpt the bulk of Soviet trade, which, while not yet very large, will grow. A lively competition could develop for the distribution of advanced technology to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, plus the management techniques and training that go with joint ventures. The absorptive capacity of these countries is limited but growing. Certainly the Americans, the Europeans and the Japanese will seek the largest possible share of the market. The Russians may decide that in certain advanced sectors the American shelf is most alluring. Or possibly the Japanese in others. Or decisions affecting most sectors may be politically based, designed to buy

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influence and perhaps to sharpen tensions among the suppliers.

More and more the Atlantic agenda is dominated by issues of money and commerce—immediate operational problems that focus the attention of governments in a way that equally intractable security matters presently do not. The President offered a glimpse of what may lie over the horizon in an interview with Stewart Alsop last September:

> . . . I think international economic problems will be much more important in a second term than in the first . . . I think there will be really exciting developments in the international economy. With Russia and China, we'll be expanding on the initiative we've already begun. In a second term, we'll also be paying a lot of attention to our friends and allies—to the Latin Americans, Japan, especially Western Europe. Our relations with our allies could be one of the most serious problems in a second term.

Quite clearly, the Administration will take a direct hand in dealings with America's chief trading partners. Within the government, people expect its position to be tough and to meet some issues head on that in the past have been politely ignored. We are entering what one closely involved figure describes, perhaps euphemistically, as a "delicate period." Hopefully, something constructive will emerge. On the monetary side, prospects are less bleak than they had been. The comprehensive American proposals for reforming the system, offered during the last meeting of the IMF, came as a pleasant surprise to European finance ministers. France's Giscard d'Estaing professed to see "a convergence of views," and Germany's Helmut Schmidt hailed the ending of "the religious wars." Still, nobody thinks that much more than an improved climate for monetary reform has been achieved. Western Europe, Japan and America remain sharply divided on familiar lines.

The sharpest clashes will center on commercial issues that would once have seemed too pedestrian for sustained high-level attention. Who, for example, has suffered most from Japanese exports? And should the United States be compensated for losing that part of its trade with Britain that will now be sponged up by Common Market countries? A number of these countries maintain discriminatory quotas on Japanese goods. The dubious restrictions date to the immediate postwar period, and the Common Market Commission would like to replace them with a single comprehensive safeguard clause that would permit some restrictions against Japan, though on a reciprocal basis. Japan

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would retain some of her own restrictions, which are not discriminatory and apply to everyone. Washington argues that America is absorbing a disproportionate share of what is called the Japanese problem. Also, the argument continues, the United States does not have discriminatory trade restrictions (although the recent textile agreement, while technically nondiscriminatory, was directed against Japan, Taiwan and Korea). Washington would like to see the United States fitted into the Common Market's safeguard clause, but the Europeans say no. The issue is extremely sensitive and unlikely to become less so as senior officials enter the scene. The same can be said of the impending quarrel over trade with Britain. The Common Market will argue that America will be compensated for whatever trade is lost by reductions in British tariffs, which are generally higher than the Community's. The Americans disagree and seek more tangible redress.

IV

Adherents of European unity hope—in some cases believe—that the effects of enlargement will stimulate the Community to rise above internal differences and develop unified policies so as to deal more effectively and realistically with both superpowers. Such thinking conforms to the conceptual underpinnings of the European movement; the combination of British accession and an inexorable logic driving the member states together on economic issues should trigger a self-generating process, the product of which will be a politically balanced and integrated Community.

Possibly events, faith and logic will push Western Europe onto this path. It cannot be ruled out, and other governments, especially America's, should not permit fashionable skepticism to obscure the continuing merit of the idea. It must be said, however, that the problems of the Community countries lie at least as much with each other as with the great powers. If this were not so, the Community could provide its own catalyst. As it is, only a reviving fear of the Soviet Union and/or abandonment of Europe by the United States seems at all capable of catalyzing an impulse for political unity. Almost certainly, the Russians will not be foolish enough to frighten the West Europeans into huddling together. Almost certainly, Washington will not be foolish enough to risk leaving Europe to the dangerous uncertainties

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that could follow the departure of all or most American troops.

Now as ever, Western Europe's hope for freeing itself from this blend of vulnerability to and dependence on the great powers rests with Britain, France and West Germany. Only if these, the major European powers, can sort out their differences and agree to agree, will Europeans learn to speak with what Alastair Buchan calls "similar if not identical voices."

Well before joining, Britain had begun to adopt the most rigorously "European" stance of the three. Mr. Heath and the convinced Europeans of Whitehall are likely to put forward numerous initiatives. The question is how hard they can or will push their projects and whether, in any case, they can jostle their principal partners toward compatible ends. Moreover, it will be some time before Britain is ready to pursue seriously other than essentially self-serving projects. And this is entirely understandable. The price of membership is high.

A system whereby each member subsidizes French agriculture seems to Britain unfair. Whitehall urges a regional industrial policy as a kind of quid pro quo; areas with high unemployment and declining prospects would be the beneficiaries. Britain is likely also to encourage the use of Community funds to promote trans-European mergers in key advanced sectors, such as aircraft, computers and electronics, where Britain excels but feels that competing with the Americans will require investment, production and marketing on a European scale.

Finally, the British will find themselves devoting a good deal of energy to the seemingly banal but essential business of maneuvering key places in the Brussels bureaucracy for the gifted people who will be going there. In short, Britain's attention for some time ahead will be focused on the immediate problems and implications of membership, as distinct from imaginative ideas about recharging Europe's batteries.

Favored (if that is the word) with Europe's most productive farmers, France's interest is to sustain the common agricultural policy (CAP). The French also want some monetary solidarity to make sure that exchange-rate alterations do not unhinge the CAP, which seems to be held together with string and glue and does rely on fixed parities. The French will strenuously oppose concessions to America in any trade negotiations. After years of concern about industrial competition from the Germans and Italians, they must now contend with Britain inside the Com-

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munity, not to speak of the very much more formidable Japanese.

Pompidou's France seeks both independent European positions and closer bilateral links with Washington. And it would like to acquire some leverage on Bonn by strengthening links with Britain. France favors the ESC, because it might loosen things a bit in the Eastern bloc and extend France's political margins, especially vis-à-vis the Germans, who are busily regularizing their relations to the East. On the other hand, the French, as noted, yield to none in their hostility to MBFR. Pierre Hassner has said, France "wants to keep the U.S. military presence, but wants to do nothing . . . to help prevent or slow down the disengagement she fears. She wants complete economic and monetary independence from the United States and blames her European partners for not sharing this attitude enough."

No more than ever is France disturbed by the contradictions of her policies. And as far as the eye can see, France will reject the integrationist moves of others except in matters affecting agriculture and money, where the country's immediate interest requires that sort of thing. To the question of whether France can have it both ways, one is tempted to answer, yes, unless her partners, confidently and clearly, take strong, unified positions. But neither is that likely to happen.

The German attitude, as always, is conditioned by geography and history, as well as immediate self-interest. On the one hand, West Germans have cast their lot with the European Community. But the precise implications of the commitment are unclear, because the Ostpolitik also appears irreversible. Though Bonn pressed hard for British entry there is no reason to assume that Bonn will support British initiatives aimed at promoting political unity but which would go down badly in Moscow. Already the Germans regard Britain's entry as a political gain but a distinct economic hazard. The Germans worry that they will be infected by a diseased British economy and dragged down by an accident-prone British currency.

Boxing the compass leads back to the conclusion that no combination of Britain, France and Germany can be expected in the near or middle term to do very much about Western Europe's political confinement. Greater access to the East may only sharpen competition and existing divisions, as it will be pursued bilaterally. The October summit conference of the members and candidate members of the Community was a political dud, which is

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one of the reasons that the French government, after first proposing a summit conference, had been tempted to cancel it. Yet, the Community has no better weapon, really, than a summit conference for taking new departures.

V

Monetary and trade difficulties, plus MBFR and ESC, are edging Western Europe back to center stage in its dealings with Washington. The comments of President Nixon noted above are a sure sign. Still, Washington seems no clearer than before on knowing what it wants, or can reasonably expect, from the Europeans. Perhaps the alternative—something like a precise policy with fixed goals, political and otherwise—is simply not feasible, given America's conflicting priorities and the impossibility of dealing with Europe on most matters as other than a group of states with divergent views.

The tendency, in any case, is to deal with Europeans bilaterally, the traditional and more comfortable diplomatic method. Still, an integrated Europe, on balance, would better suit American interests. The political advantages are no less than before. America could only gain from the greater security that Western Europe would acquire through a sure sense of its own political purpose and integrity. At the economic level, European integration, though its precise effects could not be calculated, would probably prove less difficult for America than a mixed bag of bilateral dealings and episodic negotiations with the Brussels bureaucracy. Once integrated, West Europeans would all be on the same commercial and monetary cycle; no single region or state would be affected very differently by American actions, and America would have a better sense of what to expect from Western Europe. Perhaps more important, Western Europe as a bloc might well be less sensitive to trade issues and able to find a better balance between political and economic questions. A Western Europe bereft of political growth potential will be tempted to focus its energies on, and perhaps to exaggerate, matters like trade. In short, a Western Europe permanently bogged down is likely to present the United States with the worst of all possible worlds.

If and when Europe's political relevance to America declines, or seems to decline in European eyes, there may be quite a nasty reaction. A random, inarticulate anti-Americanism may begin

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to animate Western Europe's activities. Rather than being the eternal tail to an American kite, many Europeans may wonder if they couldn't manage their affairs more directly by relying less on American influence and power than on rapprochement with the Soviet Union, perhaps within a system that would permit dealing evenhandedly with both superpowers, even to the extent of playing them off against one another. In the end, such a tendency would dismember the Atlantic system and extend Soviet influence, however gradually, throughout Europe and conceivably elsewhere.

The United States can't catalyze European political coöperation, let alone unity, and shouldn't try. The Americans, however, can and should avoid taking steps that will discourage the process. Washington must bear in mind that what it does, along with what Moscow does, cannot but affect Western Europe in some fashion.

The Americans can also avoid letting the tail wag the dog. Trade and financial disputes have created urgent operational problems, some of which may defy equitable solutions. At some point, the enlarged Community's agricultural policy will cause measurable injury to American grain exporters, who believe that God intended Europeans to raise livestock, not wheat. Doubtless Western Europe, along with the rest of us, would benefit politically as well as economically from some basic reforms of its agriculture. But since reform will come slowly, if at all, the rest of us had better adjust to what the beneficiary of the system, France, calls the *situation acquise*. And the Americans, at least, should not allow commercial differences with Europe to degrade political links, which are no less vulnerable for their self-evident importance; the all too human but dangerous tendency is to take this set of relationships for granted.

Ultimately, there lies the question of who or what will speak for Western Europe. Americans, if they cannot directly influence the answer, should at least avoid leaving the impression that it doesn't greatly matter. Because obviously it does.

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WHY THE MALAISE?

By Edward L. Morse

THE Paris summit of the heads of the nine member-governments of the European Communities last October presented another in a long series of theatrical non-events that have come to characterize international politics in Western Europe. To be sure, the final declaration of the meetings paid lip-service to a list of central problems that now confront the EC group: the need to coördinate economic and monetary policies and to establish communal regional, social, energy, environmental and industrial policies; and finally the desirability of creating institutional structures for the development of common policies toward the outside world. But the vague final reference to the transformation of the current institutions into a "European union" by the end of this decade was an attempt to camouflage continued political divisions among the nine and the paralysis of each of their governments.

It is ironic that not since World War II have the European governments had as many occasions to assert a single voice over their own destinies as during the past two or three years. Yet, wherever one looks for a response to the challenges before them, one finds passive acquiescence to the status quo, the submission of potentially significant foreign policy decisions to domestic pressures, or, worst of all, nostalgic efforts to patch up the outmoded system of the 1950s and 1960s. Instead of trying to create an autonomous political force, the governments of the Old Continent continue to avoid assuming those political responsibilities that ought to accompany their increasing economic capacities.

The temptations for innovative European actions ought to induce new plans to revitalize the European movement—or objective conditions might by now have led to a resurgence of some of the ideals articulated so forcefully by de Gaulle not even a decade ago. However contradictory these tendencies were then, they were signs of vigor and growing self-assurance. Now instead of vitality in foreign policy, one finds stagnation; instead of assertiveness, restraint; instead of a growing extroversion, an increased introversion.

The monetary field provides a perfect example. When President Nixon and former Secretary of the Treasury John Connally

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challenged the West European countries and Japan through the monetary diplomacy that followed President Nixon's speech of August 15, 1971, Europeans had a rare opportunity not only to concert their action in confronting the United States, but also to suggest innovative reforms for a viable and stable monetary system for the next decade. Yet more than a year after that crisis America's major economic partners still display no signs of initiative on an issue that will affect the lifeblood of the European Community. Worse, they are complacently and passively supporting the nonconvertible dollar as though that system had not already demonstrated its inability to support a growing level of world trade in a crisis-free environment.

The same is true in other fields. The opportunity for revitalizing the movement toward a unified Europe is obviously inherent in the current expansion of the EC to include Britain, the Irish Republic and Denmark. Yet the closest approach to the enunciation of a set of goals for this body are the unimaginative proposals agreed upon by Messrs. Heath, Pompidou and Brandt for a European secretariat to coördinate policies in various fields. Nowhere can one find an explicit formulation of what this body ought to accomplish in a decade or another generation. Nor can one find an explicit set of purposes, be they internal to the European Community or external to it in its relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States.

Not surprisingly, the paralysis is worst in security affairs, where the only certain change that can be envisaged in the near future is the further withdrawal of American troops from Europe. None of the consequences of withdrawal has been confronted, despite almost universal agreement in Europe that any reduction in the present level of U.S. troops in Europe will leave everyone worse off—increasing the vulnerability of the Europeans to Soviet pressures, raising the specter of Germany as the state with the preponderant land army in Western Europe, if not as a nuclear power, and forcing every West European government to reëvaluate its defense budget to avoid rechanneling funds from predominantly domestic goals.

II

It may well be argued that it is pointless at this time to postulate a new grand vision for Europe. The four conflicting visions of the future role of Europe that characterized the 1960s—the

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grand designs of Kennedy, Khrushchev, de Gaulle and the Commissioners of Brussels—each died a painful death. The lesson that seems to have been drawn on all sides has been the inefficacy of visionary politics in today's international system; the system simply cannot be manipulated or molded as easily as the earlier visionaries had hoped.

At the same time, a new level of uncertainty has entered the thinking of all potential actors in the European arena. A repetition of May 1968 in France has become a permanent fear of the politicians of the Fifth Republic; none can now foresee achieving the Gaullist ideal of a neutral Europe free of superpower influence. America projects an imaginary pentagonal global balance of power—where the means of foreign policies have become their own ends and where, by definition, the structure of the international system can have among its major components no goal beyond avoiding war. Khrushchev's design, no less a failure than Kennedy's, has given way to a gradualism in Soviet foreign policy that appears as aimless as that of the Western powers. And, notwithstanding the Hague summit of 1969 and the expansion of the EC this year, the gulf between the ideals of the leaders of the European movement of the 1950s and early 1960s and the results of their policies has restrained the rhetoric of virtually all West European statesmen.

Thus, if one looks at the list of questions and problems which are likely to confront the West European states during the remainder of this decade, decisions tend to be made by inertia rather than through the guidance of a framework of long-term plans. In the case of monetary reform, the illusion persists that the decision of February 1972 to narrow the margins within which the European currencies may fluctuate will be a first step toward European monetary unification as well as the major European contribution to the reorganization of the international monetary system. But that decision, like the subsequent one to establish a European Reserve Fund, was taken under pressure and largely to prove that a European will toward independence existed in monetary affairs. It merely papered over essential Franco-German differences on the requisites of European monetary union, and took no account of the consequences of monetary unification for unemployment or inflation rates, both of which are likely to increase under a unified currency to a degree unacceptable to any of the major European governments. And, in

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spite of vague references to the European contribution to the reorganization of the international monetary system, there is no clear consensus on how a unified currency area in Europe would fit into a reorganized monetary system in terms of future international reserves or rules of the game.

The external commercial policy of the EC suffers from the same set of tensions—between the force of inertia on the one hand and the inability to articulate long-term goals on the other. The EC has a built-in lobby to create a set of linkages between the core area and its periphery in Europe and North Africa. These linkages are paradoxically strong enough to be destructive of the international commercial system, but too weak to replace it with a system built upon a set of coherent rules. That their establishment may wreck the universal rules of trade embodied in the GATT seems to be no one's concern. Instead, trade spokesmen have found a remarkable means of rationalizing an emergent sphere of economic influence. While decrying spheres of influence fostered by the Soviet Union or the United States, they unashamedly argue that theirs are "natural" economic ties deserving special status.

Other problems of a substantive or an organizational nature abound. In almost every field of domestic policy, the original six members of the EC have found that they need to coördinate their efforts if their policies are to be effective. This has been most striking in efforts to control inflation, which, it is claimed, has been increasingly "imported" from neighboring countries. But it is also true in policy areas that have only recently emerged, such as the control of environmental pollutants. Other areas where coördination has become urgent include the consequences of the high level of interdependence that has been created in the Common Market over the past decade. Perhaps most important among these is the need to decide how an emergent European capital market ought to be organized and controlled, what centers ought to be developed, and how short-term capital flows within Europe and between Europe and the outside world are to be handled.

Each of these issues requires a consensus on the proper organizational framework within which decisions can be made or coördinated. But decisions on institutional arrangements continue to be made on an ad hoc basis, as is the case with the recent "hotline" hook-up between central banks in the member-coun-

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tries. Yet these institutional arrangements have a significant bearing on the future development of the EC as a political body. In the absence of foresight on how these institutions ought to evolve, the "spillback" from them may impede the organization of Europe on rational grounds.

Some people would argue that the leaders of Western Europe have in fact been active in the articulation of medium-term goals for their relationship with the external world. The successful ratification of Brandt's Eastern Treaties last May, the four-power Berlin accords, and the recent agreement between the two Germanys could certainly be pointed out. So could the expansion of the EC to three new member-states that has been hailed as the new prime to the European pump. Both Prime Minister Heath and President Pompidou have made generalized statements about the future global role of Europe. And, of course, the EC Commission has been relentless in fostering policy decisions that would, in its mind, be good for the European movement.

All of these policies and statements, however, smack of a superficial reëchoing of past hopes and fears. They reflect an almost aimless situation where activity, largely devoid of objectives, has assumed a value in its own terms. Brandt, for example, has been utterly incapable of passing any legislation in education, in tax reform or in social welfare reform that reflects the traditional goals of European socialism. To prove that he could be effective, he emphasized the ratification of the postwar status quo through his Eastern policy. Pompidou's rhetoric strikes a balance between right-wing Gaullism and traditional French Europeanist interests—no mean achievement, but one where compromise has overcome coherence in foreign policy.

Restricted in their ability to implement or reform domestic programs, the European governments have been carrying out new transcendental foreign policies. These policies are focused less upon tangible than on elusive objectives and are designed to create the illusion in the minds of members of the electorate that the governments have been engaged in significant and even novel activities. Unlike the transcendental politics of the past when the monarchs of Europe sought after "power" and "glory," the new transcendental politics in European foreign policy is one of activity for its own sake, activity uninformed by either grand designs or short-term goals.

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III

It is relatively easy to understand why no new visions for the ideal structure of the international system have emanated from the United States. The reaction to the failure of American foreign policy in Vietnam has inevitably had a dampening effect on American idealism. In the middle-term future, one can find no hope for a rearticulation of a vision of a universal and peaceful world that was the basis of America's post-World War II foreign policies. The acutely felt sense of declining American power has been formidably articulated in the Nixon-Kissinger interpretation of a new five-power world.

Why should Europe, after a decade of almost uninterrupted prosperity and growth, and with no military involvement in the underdeveloped world, feel this deep sense of impotence? Why should Europeans, with a vigorous and young population, tread so fearfully and anxiously? The malaise in Western Europe lies, I think, much deeper than that in the United States—where internal strife has reflected in large part peculiarly American problems, above all the war in Vietnam and racial imbalance. The malaise in Europe is not simply a fear of change from the status quo, nor does it seem the result of an objective inability to achieve stated goals in all fields. Least of all is there a considered rejection of the need for goals. On the contrary, intelligent Europeans see as clearly as anyone how badly new structure and purpose are needed. To them it is obvious that given the level of interdependence among the European states and the crises that interdependence has engendered, especially in monetary affairs, radical changes will be inevitable and must be confronted. It is clear also that whatever its sources at any given time, social tension will continue to be high. Labor restiveness, university unease, the need for reform of taxation and welfare systems in each of the European societies—all point up the impossibility of maintaining the status quo. In sum, Europeans are themselves caught in a system of interdependence that requires focused direction if the forces underlying it are to be controlled and harnessed.

So it is not failure to see the problems that underlies Europe's malaise. Rather, its roots lie in a set of conditions that are in part peculiarly European, but in larger part inherent in modern industrialized societies—conditions that prevent or impede the articulation of long-term visions and goals so that, lacking any

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consensus on objectives, malaise and a sense of aimlessness feed upon themselves in a vicious circle.

Specifically, there are several overlapping factors at work. None of them alone would be sufficient to explain the current crisis of confidence in Europe. But taken together, they have presented a formidable set of obstacles to the constructive revitalization of Europeanism.

First and most persistent—especially for the coördination of policies in Europe—has been the inevitable intrusion of electoral politics into foreign policy. In any one year the probability is high that one of the major European states is preparing for or in the process of an electoral campaign. Each time, it is obliged to suspend its own momentum in the organization of Europe—or it may attempt to manipulate the EC for electoral ends.

Of the four major European countries, three have had or will have major elections during the course of little more than a year.

The first of these, in Italy, did not resolve any of the issues which have hamstrung government policies since the onset of the Italian recession. Italy seems fated to a paralysis brought on by vicious competition among her political parties, exacerbated by the economic gulf between the rich North and the underdeveloped South.

The French election campaign began last spring with the referendum on the enlargement of the Community and has already had its repercussions in Europe. Having failed to free himself of his own right wing, Pompidou has been forced to resume a hard Gaullist stance, with results that contributed to the stultification of the recent summit conference.

Brandt's Germany was immobilized for six months for approximately the same reasons. The Germans continue to walk the same tightrope they have been on since the creation of the Common Market—unable to choose decisively between an Atlantic and a European relationship, forced to balance feelers to the East with reaffirmations to the West.

Successive European elections more and more involve grave economic issues with strong international repercussions. In the German case, inflation and export-led economic growth, major issues last November, each have their peculiar European or external manifestation, as has been clear in the Franco-German debate over the international monetary crisis of 1971. Pressures for flexible exchange-rates as one means of controlling inflation

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have not been completely satisfied. Nor are the Germans likely to move significantly toward the French position on the control of capital movements, given the tenacity of liberal economic doctrine in both the government and opposition.

Of the four major European states, only Britain has not made foreign policy subservient to electoral politics in 1972–73. But current British political problems exemplify a second factor. Even if one sets to one side the acute question of Ulster, one finds in Britain signs of introversion and policy inefficacy that are reflected throughout Western Europe today. Election or no, the twin problems of labor unrest and inflation confront every major West European capital. Organized labor has everywhere reached a peak in terms of the proportion of the active population so categorized, and everywhere labor has turned into a conservative interest group oriented toward maintaining its status. Working classes have never been as rich as they are today, and are afraid of any change in either their job opportunity or wage levels. One result has been that even the unions have been unable to exercise effective control over their membership. Industrial plant sit-ins have increasingly replaced strikes as a major tactic of the rank-and-file in Britain, France and Italy. When unions are able effectively to bargain for their members with management groups or the government, negotiations have grown to look more and more like international political bargaining sessions culminating in peace treaties. As each of the industrialized societies has become more technologically based and dependent upon a highly skilled working force, unions in any one sector have an ability to bring large segments of an economy to a standstill, if not to inflict high levels of damage. Such was the case most notably of the coal strike in Britain a year ago; one could give a long list of examples.

Anticipated increases in personal income on the part of rank-and-file coupled with union tactics have become a major source of inflationary wage settlements since this decade began. These problems have made it exigent that policy coördination be institutionalized in the EC countries—but at the very same time reflect a growing introversion which makes it harder to escape the national decision-making framework.

Thirdly, the expansion of the EC itself has brought mixed benefits. On the one hand it has served (despite the idiosyncratic vote in Norway) as a symbolic example of the tenacity of the

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original European idea. However, the expansion brings with it almost insurmountable barriers to common solutions. Negotiations among six countries have been difficult enough. Now, with nine, it is hard to see how any dramatic steps in policy can be taken with the agreement of all parties.

This will be especially noticeable in the Community's relationship with the outside world and, in particular, with the United States. If there are to be future trade negotiations among all the industrialized societies and if the Europeans are to negotiate as a bloc, as they did during the Kennedy Round, then it is doubtful that a position can be reached that will give the negotiators sufficient flexibility to strike any bargains. Efforts at negotiation will force any potential trading partner to participate in the process by which the Europeans make a decision, with the knowledge that it is only before a common policy is achieved that its own interests will be heard. This in itself may give rise to the accusation that the United States has in one of the European countries a Trojan Horse representing its interests in an expanded Community. This might well be Germany so long as the issue of American troop levels there retains its psychological hold over all aspects of German foreign policy.

Whether the expansion of the Community leads to a revitalization or is an additional reason for stagnation in the EC remains an open question. That could depend in part on how much the United States serves as a common economic enemy (in a new sense, the role that Russia played in the early and middle 1950s) and induces the nine to adopt a common set of goals. The current state of U.S.-European relations is not at this low a point; it would be serious in other respects if it became so.

A fourth factor in the current malaise has been the continued lack of a European lobby able to advance European interests. The Commission has tried to continue its role as federator but so far without much success. Its efforts have undoubtedly been less bold than they were under Hallstein, partly because of the opposition that grew up against him from his tendency to overplay his cards, and partly because of the change in the nature of the personalities of the current commissioners. The Commission did, however, try to play this role during the fall of 1971 in the course of the monetary crisis; when almost no Europeans had a politically viable idea for extricating Europe from the crisis, the Commission relentlessly pushed for a common solution whatever

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that solution might be, under the assumption that any common action would serve the European cause. This sort of exhortation is likely to be continued by Europe's "wise men." But they have virtually no lobby of their own in the various European capitals to push further or in other policy fields. What they need is a set of bureaucracies whose members identify their own personal interests with those of Europe as a whole. But the Eurocracy, such as it exists, has remained a body that suggests common solutions that are to be implemented by the various member-states. In almost no field under its purview does it have the machinery for policy implementation that is essential for it to push Europeanism at the grass roots.

Finally, intra-European political jealousy will continue to play its own role in preventing an imaginative political leap. One can already see some of this in the reluctance with which any of the states views giving up the current international dollar standard. Neither the French nor the Germans want to see the mark begin to play the role in Europe that the dollar has for the past two decades. And neither wishes to give up some of the central-bank functions that it would have to relinquish if a common currency actually were created. Likewise, Heath and Pompidou would each like to play the role of federator, but neither can do this alone. Only the Germans seem to have a capacity to do it and, unlike the other two, do not wish to play the role because of the substantial constraints on German action in almost every field. German assertiveness, it is feared, would only reawaken anti-German feelings elsewhere and could bring an end to the success in Germany's Eastern policy.

Fearful that other parties would come to the fore as the central focus of a new Europe, each of the major governments balances out the others with the result that none is able to play the essential centralizing role. And none of the states is yet willing to see an all-European body play this role if the rules by which it operates are different from its own domestic rules. Since each of the states concerned has traditions in all fields of domestic policy that are distinctive and difficult to overcome, the result is continued stagnation on all fronts.

IV

All these specific points being stated, the most formidable obstacles to innovative thought in Europe today stem from a feeling

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of incapacity to deal with an unknown future. Neither the knowledge nor the will required seems to be available. The status quo has become rather comfortable for each of the governments concerned, although everyone knows that in security, economic and domestic social affairs it will inevitably give way. The contemporary situation is so novel historically that one cannot rely on a continuance of the status quo or on historical experience in coming to grips with its many aspects.

The current paralysis of political thought in Western Europe has to do in part with the trap that Europeans are in, between outmoded structures unable to handle problems that arise on a transnational basis and the fear that changing or adapting these structures to new conditions will involve costs in terms of money or autonomy that no one will incur. But it is more than that. For it pervades intellectual groups as well as political circles. It also transcends Europe and characterizes the other states of the industrialized world.

These industrialized states find themselves in an unprecedented web of interdependence whose unscrambling now seems inconceivable. Moreover, no one really understands the dynamics of these interdependent relationships.

It is clear that activities in almost any field affect those in others—as, for example, the current Common Agricultural Policy depends upon the existence of stable parity relations in the exchange-rates of the European countries. It is also clear that domestic politics and foreign policies have become more and more dependent upon one another in ways that are often surprising. No one knows how stable these interdependent relationships are. No one has any idea what sort of institutionalized arrangements are proper for handling them. The rhetoric of the 1950s would argue that these interdependencies are in fact unstable, that they lead to crises, and that these crises must lead to further institutionalization of the political links among the European states and eventually force them into a political union. No one has truly explored, however, whether any arrangements can be created that fall short of full political integration but can none the less perform the functions of stabilization and coördination.

The problems of interdependence are compounded by uncertainties in the very governance of modern industrialized societies. These are paradoxically both stable and fragile structures. Their stability rests upon political traditions, political cultures if you

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will, that have emerged from a long process of nation-building in Western Europe. Their fragility stems from the incredibly rapid rate of change that these societies have undergone since World War II and the dislocating effects of change on various social strata, but particularly on the working classes. The result has been that governance in modern industrialized societies today has become based on daily decision-making. Governments are concerned more with maintaining the status quo and with keeping the machinery of public affairs operating than with steering a course for the future.

Contemporary governance is also crisis governance. Crises stemming from domestic unrest or from a relatively unstable set of interdependent international transactions seem to be the only way that governments can be forced to think about the future. New institutional arrangements are created in a crisis setting of ad hoc decision-making rather than via long-term planning. There is no reason to bet that such decisions will always be in the general interest of the citizens of Western Europe or indeed those of the Western world.

V

Without an agenda for Europe, without an articulation of goals and a vague idea of how one wants to achieve them, it would be my notion that Europe will muddle along leaving everyone a bit worse off than could be the case. We have already seen this happening in the series of trade arrangements being worked out between Brussels and the countries on Europe's periphery. These trade arrangements have, to be sure, involved very little in terms of total trade. But they have added to the demise of the principle of the most-favored-nation which was one of the few universal rules built into the postwar trading system. There is no doubt that muddling along can have its blessings. But its principal victim will be the ideal universal system which American policy backed for the two decades after World War II. It could also undermine the foundations of the increased wealth that was an offshoot of the higher levels of trade that the system fostered.

Even with the formidable list of obstacles that stand in the way of a new political vision from Europe and for Europe, there is no objective reason for the Europeans to lose all momentum. In the past, the West Europeans were able to define a role

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for themselves through American prodding: either coöperatively, as in the case of the Marshall Plan days, or with the United States serving as a foil against which the European definition could be articulated. In the future the Europeans are likely to get neither from the United States, but rather are likely to have a continued dosage of benign neglect. Even so, there are a wide number of ways by which a set of goals and a new European agenda can be formulated.

The first thing the Europeans ought to do is use the traditional political tactic of bargaining from a position of weakness. This is to define the agenda of future negotiations with the United States so as to prod the United States away from its natural inclination to inaction. Such a definition could have been one of the most beneficial offshoots of last fall's European summit conference, if the heads of state of the expanded Community could have agreed to it. To date, the agenda has been lost either to the whims of the U.S. government or to the Soviets. In the reform of the international monetary system, in future trade negotiations with the United States, in East-West relations and a myriad of other areas, opportunities for defining the agenda are manifold. Even if the Europeans do not now have all the cards that they might want to hold in their hand, they can wield a decisive influence by deciding when and what issues are to be discussed as well as the organizational framework in which discussions are to take place.

The uneasy status quo in Europe may have its comforts. But it obviously cannot be maintained. In the absence of a clear notion of where they want to go, the Europeans will probably be impelled to act only through a series of crises. Or they will be fated to wait until American self-confidence and assertiveness are regained and the U.S. government begins to pay attention to these problems again in a serious way. By then, however, a European program will be even more reactive, and the Europeans will have foregone a unique opportunity to exert a decisive influence on their own future.

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AMERICA'S MOVE

By Benjamin S. Rosenthal

A EUROPEAN Security Conference (ESC) will almost certainly take place in 1973. It will convene with active, if reluctant, American participation. This unfortunate reluctance is especially pronounced in Washington. The United States now has not only an opportunity but a responsibility to lead the Western nations in a search for a new system in Europe. In view of the inevitability of the conference, it would be especially short-sighted to forsake the dynamic and innovative role we could play. Unhappily, I see no signs, at least from a vantage point on Capitol Hill, that the United States will enter this decisive stage with any policy ideas which might wrest the initiative from the East. The Western impetus for a constructive conference comes almost entirely from some of our NATO allies, whose cautious enthusiasm is under a steady restraint from the Washington flagship of the Atlantic Alliance.

II

The Soviet Union first proposed such a conference in 1954 to forestall West German rearmament. As a manifestation of Russian refusal to recognize the legitimacy of a U.S. presence, Americans were to be relegated to observer status.

Although cold-war tensions effectively mooted positive security moves in Europe for a decade, a breakthrough came in 1964. In a U.N. speech, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki revived the prospects for an ESC and his remarks were shortly seconded by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. Only after the setback in détente diplomacy following the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, did the Warsaw Pact change its position and agree to full participatory status for the United States and Canada.

Unquestionably, Russia and her allies have been the prime movers for an ESC. Soviet motives are probably a combination of the following: (a) to legitimize the European territorial and ideological status quo by a multilateral renunciation-of-force agreement; (b) to forestall or delay West European political-military integration by decreasing perceived security threats and freezing current institutional arrangements with a treaty;

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(c) to increase trade and technology exchanges with Western Europe, which may be impossible without corresponding improvement in all aspects of East-West relations; (d) to secure its Western flank in the event of Chinese hostilities; (e) to divorce Western Europe from the United States in various aspects of economic, political and military affairs, perhaps by weakening or dissolving NATO.

While many of the same motives obtain for the other East European countries, they have two major additional reasons to favor an ESC. First, the diplomacy involved in the conference gives the East Europeans substantially more room to maneuver diplomatically and to assert varying degrees of independence from Moscow. Second, the prospect of a renunciation-of-force treaty and Western pressure to weaken or nullify the Brezhnev Doctrine makes an ESC especially attractive to some Warsaw Pact members.

III

The West has already achieved a great deal from the fulfillment of its preconditions for convening the conference. Perhaps most important was the Warsaw Pact agreement in 1970 to a full role for the United States and Canada in the ESC, a move which meant at least temporarily accepting the legitimacy of the American role in Europe.

As further preconditions for an ESC, the NATO Foreign Ministers had insisted on "satisfactory" outcomes to the Bonn-Moscow and Bonn-Warsaw talks, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Berlin negotiations. The agreement on Berlin, which essentially guaranteed the viability and independence of that city, represented a tremendous diplomatic victory for the United States and its allies. With this agreement and the signature of the West German treaties, the West has achieved a great deal before the conference even begins. Another no less crucial precondition, although never stated as such by the West, was the agreement secured at the Moscow summit in May, to pursue force reduction talks in parallel with the ESC.

Now, American and West European planners are focusing their attention on "freer movement of people, ideas, and information *beyond the traditional pattern of cultural exchanges*"[1] (emphasis added), as a prime goal of the ESC. This exchange,

[1] "U.S. Foreign Policy, 1971," A Report of the Secretary of State, p. 9.

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combined with the actual process of multilateral discussions and with visible progress in détente, is designed to loosen Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Washington is taking pains this winter to emphasize substance and preparation for the ESC over "atmospherics," false spirits (*i.e.* "Spirit of Geneva") and a misleading sense of détente. The fear of a propaganda show still pervades Western capitals.

IV

Based on agenda proposals submitted by the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the subject matter of the ESC includes (a) trade arrangements, (b) technology and information exchanges and (c) security issues. Varying emphases and interpretations exist, of course, on both sides and *within* both sides about what these agenda items mean and how they will be pursued.

The West Europeans attach considerable importance to increased contacts across the once impenetrable Iron Curtain. For domestic political reasons and economic motives, as well as for explicit détente objectives, our NATO partners are extremely anxious to continue the already considerable communication and commerce they have with the East.

The East Europeans are equally determined to increase their access to Western markets, industrial techniques and technology. Not only do the East European élites envy Western progress but many of them view increased contact with the West as a significant tool to loosen, even further, Soviet control of their political systems.

Yet the two superpowers are not nearly as concerned with the increasing pan-European activities as are their respective allies. The Nixon-Brezhnev Declaration of Principles called only for a relatively innocuous "improvement of relations and contacts" —a far cry from the affirmative European position. In fact, NATO-Europe is reportedly incensed that the United States backed away from an allied consensus on demanding significantly increased East-West contacts; it appears that the Kremlin is still adamantly determined to police traffic between East and West, and that the President yielded.

The other major area of discussions will be security relations. A good deal of work remains in this area before the ESC can be successfully convened.

While members of both blocs seem agreed on some type of

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renunciation-of-force treaty, President Nixon has expressed concern lest this confirm the present division of Europe. The United States can tolerate the present territorial arrangement but must not appear to support the ideological status quo. We must insist, according to Deputy Secretary of State Irwin, "on an evolutionary process which will help bring the continent together."

Clearly related to this is the future of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The President's foreign policy report of February 1972 states that "the use or threat of force by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe . . . is incompatible with détente in Europe. . . ." Not only the United States but our Western allies are eager to free the Warsaw Pact members from Russian domination, even though some East European ruling parties would feel uncomfortable if Soviet power in their countries were reduced.

Yet the crux of the security issues facing the conference remains the bloc forces facing each other in Central Europe. The issue of force reductions has long been an inhibiting factor in progress toward an ESC, and it is a crucial issue in its own right.

V

If the European Security Conference is the child of Soviet planners, the Western alliance is the somewhat surprised parent of mutual and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR). NATO countries, but principally the United States initially, advocated force reduction talks for two negative reasons. First, their insistence on MBFR talks before an ESC served to brake the Soviet conference proposal. Second, and very importantly, the imminence of negotiations was intended to forestall U.S. critics who called for unilateral troop withdrawals.

Although there were several Soviet responses to the 1968 NATO call for force reduction talks, it was not until May 14, 1971, that Secretary Brezhnev's offer to the West to "taste the wine" of negotiation was accepted as evidence of serious Russian interest. Not coincidentally, Brezhnev's statement came just before the debate on the Mansfield amendment, and figured prominently in defeating the Senate Majority Leader's effort to legislate the unilateral withdrawal of 165,000 American troops from Europe.

Progress on MBFR talks then slowed. Moscow refused to accept Signor Brosio, the retiring head of NATO, who had been designated to explore Eastern views of MBFR. This lull con-

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tinued until the Nixon-Brezhnev Declaration, followed by the announcement in September 1972 that a mutual commitment to conduct MBFR talks in parallel with ESC talks had been substantially agreed upon between Moscow and Washington.

Conventional thinking would have suggested significant Russian advantages in refusing MBFR talks. The domestic pressures in the United States for unilateral withdrawals would increase if there were no prospect of mutual and/or balanced reduction, pressures which would presumably be in Soviet interests. The consequences of the increasingly likely unilateral American withdrawals, or so the predictions go, might well be reduced West European troop levels accompanied by weakened political confidence and decreased stability. This "unravelling" of NATO is then supposed to lead to a "race to Moscow" and subsequent Soviet control over the whole of Europe.

Moscow, however, evidently does not subscribe to quite the same scenario. The General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party must have known that his May offer for troop talks would strengthen the Administration's hand in resisting a large unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces. Typical was Senator Nelson's statement during debate that "If Mr. Brezhnev had not spoken on the subject, I would have been prepared to vote . . . to cut our forces in half in accordance with the Mansfield amendment."

This apparent Soviet interest in maintaining U.S. troop levels in Europe is not as surprising as it might seem. It can be explained by a combination of factors. First, the continued détente which Moscow values so much may depend, as West German Chancellor Brandt has declared, on a firm and visible U.S. commitment to Europe. Second, and complementing this view, the Kremlin fears that unilateral U.S. withdrawals are more likely to galvanize West European political union than to act as the starter's gun for any race to Moscow. (Paradoxically, France, which is reluctant to support MBFR, may take this position both to preclude a race to Moscow and to ensure, by the U.S. presence, a slower movement toward European unity.) Third, political and military union in Europe (following the progress already made toward economic integration) would present the possibility of West German control of nuclear weapons and/or an increased Bundeswehr, either of which would pose severe threats to the Soviet conception of European stability.

This is not to deny that the Soviets are interested in troop re-

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ductions. Given the ironic condition that U.S. troop withdrawals are acceptable to most of our allies, if gradual and reciprocated, Moscow would gain additional troops for its Chinese border, obtain budgetary savings and tremendously facilitate the détente process.

Yet the Nixon administration does not seriously anticipate quick success in troop talks. "We do not expect dramatic withdrawals," reported Deputy Secretary of State Irwin in a June 1972 address, "in the near future."

VI

There are serious domestic objections to current U.S. troop commitments in Europe. These criticisms, raised principally in the U.S. Senate, argue in favor of unilateral reductions of American troops in Europe. The reservations about the size of our troop deployment overseas stem from the following perceptions: (1) a dangerously high U.S. balance-of-payments deficit; (2) costly manpower inefficiency; (3) high budget costs; and (4) the absence of military necessity.

(1) *Balance of payments*

The balance-of-payments problem was not only embodied in the language of the Mansfield amendment, it played a central role in the accompanying debate. The Brookings Institution's valuable study, "U.S. Troops in Europe," estimates that $1.9 billion of our gross balance-of-payments deficit results from NATO expenditures; offset agreements have reduced that deficit to approximately $1 billion. While the current offset agreement, covering FY 1972–73, will only reduce our amount by a like amount, the package is somewhat more favorable to the United States. Previously, offsets consisted of military purchases, principally by West Germany, and bond purchases which earned interest. Now, the Federal Republic of Germany pays the interest and also has made available $184 million for rehabilitation of terribly unsatisfactory U.S. barracks in Germany.

Yet the balance of deficit remains huge and unfair. Even as staunch a defender of NATO as Timothy Stanley judges it "intolerable . . . that . . . U.S. forces abroad contribute to a balance of payments deficit for the United States." Numerous technical solutions are available, but European policy-makers have not displayed the political will necessary to deal with this issue. None the less, though quite serious, it should not be allowed to interfere

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with what should otherwise be political and military decisions.

(2) *Manpower inefficiency*

U.S. forces in Europe are reportedly somewhat "fat." Excessive support troops and an inordinately higher number of top-ranking officers are the most frequent charges in this direction.

Claims regarding excessive support forces result from two different analyses. First, as the Senate Armed Services Committee (chaired by Senator Stennis who, ironically, led the fight against the Mansfield amendment) recently reported, one-sixth (55,000) of our military personnel in Europe are performing general support functions which might be better performed by host country nations. These reductions would in no way affect our combat capability, and the Committee has instructed the Department of Defense to review this possibility in next year's Military Manpower Requirements Report.

Second, a large proportion of our active duty soldiers oriented for European contingencies, whether stationed in Europe or America, will not be required unless a ground war in Europe is of unexpectedly long duration. "Can we truly afford," asks Lieut. Col. Edward L. King, a retired Joint Chiefs of Staff planner, "96,000 active duty soldiers who have no appreciable combat function until 60 days after" hostilities begin in Europe?

Many observers have also found U.S. forces in Europe to be top-heavy. Senator Mansfield reports 128 generals or flag officers in the U.S. European Command, a ratio of one general for every 2,343 enlisted men. Aside from the high salaries these men receive, they represent potentially tremendous pressure from the Services to maintain the status quo regarding our military establishment in Europe.

A related criticism concerns the morale and readiness of our troops in Europe: remaining vigilant and tough without a visible and continual threat is difficult. There is alarming and widespread disharmony and dissatisfaction among U.S. troops across the Atlantic. After a European tour, Congressman Samuel S. Stratton of the House Armed Services Committee told former Chief of Staff Westmoreland in March 1972, "My basic impression . . . was that we don't really have a ready force that would be prepared . . . to handle the Soviets if they came through the gap . . . we are a far cry from a ready force."

(3) *Cost*

The high cost of our troops in Europe impels many to argue

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for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. Operating expenses for our forces in Europe are about three billion dollars annually. We spend an additional five to six billion dollars on common NATO investments. Including forces in the United States earmarked for European contingencies, this brings the total up to $14 billion—while adding a proportionate share of the cost of total U.S. armed forces yields the figure of $25 billion.

Critics on this side of the Atlantic maintain that the Europeans are not bearing their fair share of the burden. Comparisons of the percentage of the gross national product (GNP) spent on defense, per capita defense expenditures, length of military service and the size of military establishments, depict U.S. efforts as considerably greater than those of our allies. Unquestionably, the Europeans must do more.

Yet there are some factors that partially explain these apparent disparities. First, official European acceptance of the flexible response strategy and its increased manpower responsibilities did not come until 1967. Second, it is unreasonable to expect a coalition of still sovereign European states to achieve anything approaching the ostensible efficiency and rationality that a single nation such as the United States can achieve. Third, $14 billion is one and one-half percent of our GNP, which compares favorably with the European average of almost four percent. The corollary to this is that the United States has defense expenditures that not only have nothing to do with Europe but that many Europeans may disapprove of. Fourth, we unquestionably are protecting ourselves and our own interests by protecting our European allies and cannot write off NATO-related expenditures as a form of charity.

Finally, the Europeans *are* now contributing more. Their proportion of combat-ready NATO troops has risen substantially in recent years; in round numbers of units stationed in the central region, our allies now provide 23 of 27 NATO divisions (including two French divisions in Germany, but excluding three others stationed in France.) Financially, although the European Defense Improvement Program represented far less of an improvement than it was purported to be, it set the stage for future increases in the European effort. In fact, the December 1971 agreement by NATO-Europe to increase combined annual defense spending by one billion dollars raised earlier defense budgets by an average of three to four percent.

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Further measures, especially those that would increase the respective host country's assumption of local costs of U.S. military operations in Europe, are necessary to reduce the U.S. burden. At the same time, this would aid in alleviating the balance-of-payments problem.

To many, however, the cost of maintaining large forces in Europe would still be too high. Senators Mansfield and McGovern, based on different analyses, have advocated withdrawing large numbers of troops from Europe. Yet, if U.S. troops are withdrawn from Europe but not deactivated, costs will probably not decrease but actually rise. The one-time costs involved in transporting these troops to the United States, the expense of retaining dual bases in this country and Europe, the somewhat higher maintenance costs at home, and the additional redeployment capability required argue against this type of withdrawal on a cost basis.

Nevertheless, while Senator Mansfield's amendment and Senator McGovern's generally sound defense budget do not provide for deactivation of the troops they would withdraw from Europe, their respective efforts do force a reëvaluation of the political-military necessity of maintaining 320,000 troops across the Atlantic. Although it does not make sense from a budget standpoint to withdraw forces from Europe and maintain them in this country, it is possible to effect large savings if troops are deactivated when withdrawn. Moreover, such a transatlantic withdrawal would help solve the balance-of-payments problem, unless such savings were negated by reduction of the European purchases of U.S. arms which are now part of the "offset" agreements.

(4) *Military necessity*

Force levels in Europe should obviously reflect military reality. The Administration feels that our 320,000 men in Europe comprise an integral part of a flexible response capability to meet any conceivable Warsaw Pact action. This flexible response capability became official NATO doctrine in 1967 and is designed to deter aggression against Western Europe on any level —threats, limited military inroads, major conventional attacks and strategic nuclear assaults.

This doctrine receives support not only from our allies but also from the "Old Guard"—Presidents Truman and Johnson, two former Secretaries of State, five former Under Secretaries of State, three former Supreme Allied Commanders in Europe.

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Such a group constituted the impressive array which was fielded by the Nixon administration against Senator Mansfield's amendment.

The rough conventional balance that many see in Europe supposedly receives increased significance as a result of the strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Presumably, the United States is now less willing than it would have been earlier in NATO history to attack to save Bonn from a conventional attack, because of an increased fear for Chicago. Therefore, in a nuclear standoff, NATO conventional forces must be able to deny Communist forces a quick victory over a small piece of territory.

Serious and varied doubts, however, exist about the status quo. Senator McGovern's proposal to withdraw 170,000 men reflects an optimistic appraisal of the NATO forces' initial capability to withstand a Warsaw Pact attack combined with an equally sanguine estimate of U.S. redeployment capability. Senator Mansfield and others take the opposite approach by doubting the ability of current U.S. and NATO forces to resist Warsaw Pact forces for even a short time without resort to tactical nuclear weapons.

The crucial question, therefore, and the determining factor regarding the military requirements for troop levels, is the expected length of a ground war in Europe. If we must plan only for a short conventional war in view of the estimated threat of escalation and/or the conflict resolution machinery available, our large European deployment is unnecessary. Not only our ground forces, but a substantial part of our entire navy could be reduced if this were the case.

The expected role of the 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons we have in Europe is essential to judgments regarding the expected duration of a European conflict. A low nuclear threshold would dictate a substantially smaller European force than we currently have. There is, however, even less information available to Congress in this regard than agreement among our NATO allies on the actual use of the weapons.

My own judgment is that a protracted conflict in Europe is exceedingly unlikely given the high risks and terrible costs involved. In a strictly military sense, then, present troop levels are probably excessive.

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VII

Admittedly, an invasion of any West European country by the Warsaw Pact powers is a very improbable contingency today. International wisdom, however, recognizing that perceptions are inherent in political reality, dictates considerable risk in unilaterally reducing forces in Europe. The psychological and political effect on our allies would be intense no matter what its direction. As former West German Defense Minister Schmidt acknowledges: "Who would imagine for a moment that any European force could be a substitute for the political weight and the deterrent value of the Seventh Army? And who would seriously argue that a European armada could have the same *psychological* and *political* effects as the Sixth Fleet . . . ?" (Emphasis added.)

Former Defense Secretary Laird's alternative scenario of increased Soviet influence over all of Europe or the European "development of independent nuclear capabilities which could provoke Soviet counteraction" is not unreasonable. Nor are other possibilities, including Europe's becoming a giant Sweden, culturally Western but substantially independent and neutral in external affairs. Thus, the budget savings possible from the withdrawal and deactivation of U.S. troops in Europe do not seem worth an immediate, large-scale and unilateral withdrawal. Instability on the economic, political and military levels is so widespread and intense that a different approach must be found.

Troop talks, however, may be very protracted and hence only a long-run answer. Realistic projections indicate that the MBFR negotiations could be the most difficult in East-West history. Some estimates suggest the talks may last five to seven years. Geographical asymmetries, dissimilar manpower and weapons systems, and the sheer number of nations and bureaucracies involved will prevent rapid and far-reaching agreement.

Yet standing idly by waiting for troop talks to run their course would be the ultimate folly. As the ponderous negotiations edged along, the entire détente process could suffer while both European pressures for the maintenance of our troops, and American pressure for their reduction, would most likely increase. Such a development could well strain NATO to the breaking point.

To resolve these contrary pressures, I suggest a small but significant unilateral reduction (whether in manpower, firepower or both) for all of NATO. This process could be the key to un-

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locking the armed confrontation in Europe, opening the door to successful MBFR talks, and preserving the Western alliance. The reduction should be a coördinated NATO effort, reducing not only American troop levels but European as well. This would make clear to all that our action is not taken out of desperation but motivated by a sincere desire to facilitate force reductions. If handled with diplomatic skill, a synchronized reduction need not diminish the psychopolitical support our troops give to our European friends.

This reduction could trigger a similar response from the East. Showing one's good faith (while expecting the other side to reciprocate) is just as valid an approach in this negotiating area as the Administration's current commitment to a bargaining-chip strategy in SALT. And beginning a modest downward spiral now would immeasurably assist the MBFR negotiations themselves.

As the European Security Conference and the MBFR talks unfold, there can be useful interaction between the two. The ESC may produce "confidence-building" agreements (such as troop-maneuver controls) that could speed success in the MBFR setting. And in time there might be a direct link, tying progress on European coöperation more directly to European security.

For in the long run the two go together. It is time for the United States to tackle both in a positive spirit, to work in new closeness with its NATO partners, and to rekindle some of the imagination of the late 1940s.

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ONE NIGERIA

By Jean Herskovits

IN February 1972, just two years after Biafra's sudden collapse, a news-magazine cover featured "Africa's Forgotten War." Nigerians who saw it thought: now at last the world may learn what has been happening here. In fact, the article was on the Sudan, but the reaction meant something. For all the keen and colorful attention to the civil war by the foreign press, there has been scant interest since the secessionist surrender. Because there was no genocide, the world's attention wandered. But while there has not been reconciliation in, say, Northern Ireland, Bangladesh or Burundi, there has been in Nigeria. This is one thing that makes Nigeria important; another is that, taught by world reaction, Nigeria really does want to go it alone, quietly and without much rhetoric, within a 12-state structure that gives her new opportunities.

To understand the reconciliation and reconstruction, at least a glimpse of the causes of the conflict is essential. In 1967 the phrases "Ibo domination," "Hausa domination" and sometimes "Yoruba domination" were commonplace in political discussions among Nigerians, as they had been for many years. The three regional governments set up by the British—West, East, North, with Lagos as the federal capital—encouraged many to think that the only people who counted in Nigeria were the Yoruba, who were predominant in the West, the Ibo, who controlled the East, and the Hausa, who ruled the North.[1] The political juggling before and after independence rested on that assumption. Each major group worried about being dominated at the federal center by a coalition of the other two.

Except as counters in electoral politics, the Nigerian people who are not Hausa, not Ibo, not Yoruba scarcely figured in the thinking either of Nigeria's leaders or the British. Yet, despite the lack of reliable statistics, it is clear that these dozens, even hundreds, of "minority" groups speaking their own languages numbered close to 50 percent of the population. Thus almost every sizable ethnic group had its own particular fear of domination by someone else, not only nationally, but in each region which a secure majority called its own. From these fears came

[1] The ethnically heterogeneous Mid-West Region was carved out of the West in 1963.

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agitation from minorities in the 1950s to create more regions. A "Minorities Commission," authorized by the British government and headed by a British civil servant, concluded in 1958 that even if the fears were not entirely groundless they were not worth delaying independence to assuage. Both to create states *and* continue with independence in 1960 was judged not to be an option.

In the early years of independence, the minorities and the Yoruba, out of power, worried most. The illusion of Nigerian stability vanished in the military coup of January 1966, which brought to power in Lagos Major-General Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi, an Ibo. But later events gave the Ibo their own apprehensions. After the killings in the North the following May, Ibo had ample reason to fear "Hausa domination," and their fears mounted after the year's second coup, led by Northern officers in July, and further massacres in September.

Yet the Northerners too had their fears. By all accounts, what had provoked the Hausa to turn with such vengeance on the Ibo in the North was a drastic decree handed down in Lagos by General Ironsi's government on the advice of an Ibo civil servant. This decree abolished the federal system, which had given each of the largest ethnic groups the region it dominated. It substituted a central Nigerian administration that looked to Northerners very much like an Ibo administration.

Just as the prospect of national centralization touched off the May 1966 crisis, however, regional decentralization helped precipitate Biafran secession a year later. For on May 27, 1967, only three days before Lieut. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu proclaimed Biafra's existence, the Federal Military Government (FMG) in Lagos announced the division of Nigeria into 12 states. Thereby the Eastern Region, which on May 30 sought independence as "Biafra," was divided into three states, depriving the Ibo of political supremacy throughout the East and control over the burgeoning petroleum industry, which was located in a "minority" area. But the mass of Ibo saw staying alive as the paramount issue, and they were joined in their fears by some non-Ibo from the region, whose relatives had been killed—as Ibo—in the North. Ojukwu asserted that the way to security was sovereignty, and "Biafrans" responded.

II

The issues in Nigeria today, as a commissioner in the Mid-

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West State government put it, are "reconstruction and reconciliation; states and stability." Because of the tensions which led to the war and the conflicts and internal alliances during it, the existence of the 12 states is central to the building of the new Nigeria.

What has happened in the states that were Biafra? The people who live in the former war zones are not, of course, only Ibo. The former Eastern Region, where most of the fighting took place, had its own minority areas of some five million people,

made up of dozens of linguistic groups fiercely proud of their separate identities and of histories that included a record of resisting Ibo control. Reconstruction, then, has been the preoccupation not only of the East-Central State (ECS), the Ibo enclave of the last 20 months of the war, but also of the South-East and the River States, which saw some of the most severe fighting and the greatest tensions.

The challenges have, obviously, been both human and physical. The human ones came first, and General Yakubu Gowon,

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the head of state and himself a Christian from a northern minorities area, set the tone for dealing with them by his proclamation of general amnesty. His immense popularity at the end of the war as the leader under whom the country's unity was preserved gave him leverage among the victors to enforce his policy of no reprisals. The Ibo were astonished at Gowon's magnanimity after having been prepared by Biafran wartime propaganda to expect the worst. The astonishment gave way to gratitude and respect, and finally to a remarkably warm reception when Gowon visited the East-Central State in early 1971. To him personally



Nigerians in all states assign credit for achieving an amnesty and reconciliation that, they like to say, has had its equal only after the American Civil War.

The problem of the defeated Ibo had to be played out on several stages. What would happen within the East-Central State, their heartland? What would be their relations with neighboring states, the former minorities areas of the Eastern Region, now the Rivers and South-East? Could they return to the states

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in the old North, West and Mid-West, and on what terms? And finally, what of the federal government's actions and attitudes?

In 1970 as now, Ibo freely admitted they were Biafrans. Many have since questioned the wisdom of secession, but they do not deny their fervent commitment at the time nor their pride in their achievements—particularly their technological feats—in the face of vast odds: "We believed simply that our lives depended on it." In January 1970 the challenge in the East-Central State was most immediate: there was an army of occupation, and an administrator faced a demoralized, malnourished, defeated people, who expected the disaster their radios had predicted.

The administrator was Ukpabi Asika, a young academic from the University of Ibadan, one of the rare Ibo intellectuals who not only opposed secession but were willing to accept a conspicuous and exposed responsibility with the FMG in helping to defeat the secessionists. Asika was the only civilian chosen to head a state government, and his courage drew admiration even (if grudgingly) from Ibo who as dedicated Biafrans had opposed him.

He shared with the head of state at the end of the war a major fear: "of a somnambulist reaction, a kind of vegetable state," in reaction to sudden defeat. "For most Biafrans were 'True Believers,' their psychological commitment compounded by the impact of propaganda." Certain momentous institutional reforms taken then should, according to Asika, be seen in that light. He abolished the existing provinces and created divisions tied directly to his state capital at Enugu. He abolished customary courts, reconstructed the judiciary and, most controversial of all, ordered a state takeover of all schools—the first in Nigeria. By these moves, he says, "we could arouse people—and we could defuse the debate, the possible recriminations, about the war. Now energies and debate could go into the new policies, justified, of course, in themselves." Whether by this design or by what admirers and detractors alike acknowledge as Ibo resilience and energy, as early as the summer of 1970 the bustle surrounding the efforts of millions in their own reconstruction was striking.

The presence of federal soldiers, after rape and looting of the kind that accompany war's end everywhere had stopped, came to be seen as a boost to the economy. Millions of Nigerian pounds for army wages, poured into a war-torn area whose problems were compounded by currency crisis and frozen bank accounts,

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permitted traders their first savings, used to rebuild for themselves and large extended families. Indeed, the announcement in January 1972 that the headquarters of the First Division would move from Enugu north to Kaduna was greeted, not with the pleasure that outsiders anticipated, but with quite mixed feelings. In some extreme cases, it was seen as a federal government attempt to slow down economic recovery, or as federal disappointment in the good relations between army personnel and Ibo civilians!

In the East-Central State, as throughout Nigeria, there is, of course, impatience that more has not been done, that there, as elsewhere, reconstruction is not past and that all efforts cannot yet go into new development. Inside the state and outside, people ask why. Many Ibo think the federal government is moving less rapidly than it could or should, or exerting less pressure on others than the best of good will might dictate; these doubts do remain.

In military-ruled Nigeria it is no more possible to measure the popularity of the government in East-Central than in other states, and it is unlikely that a government in Iboland, inevitably seen to represent the side of defeat, could be acclaimed. But those who are in the ECS government point out that its members are Ibo, and that a majority of commissioners (equivalent to ministers in a civilian régime) actively worked for Biafra. As one commissioner put it, "Not one of us would stay in this government if we believed it was federal policy to destroy the Ibo—and Asika would be the first to resign."

III

Reconciliation is not, of course, just a matter of relations between the federal government and the East-Central State, or of what happens inside the state. One reason why until mid-1966 the Ibo were the most active and committed Nigerians was demographic: Iboland is the most densely populated part of Nigeria. Indeed, with all the Ibo "at home," many argue it would be critically overpopulated (this was one of the grounds on which some Ibo opposed secession). Therefore, reconciliation involves jobs—in governments, federal and state; work for private companies and individuals throughout the country; opportunities for trading or transporting; chances for big men—contractors, for example—and small—stewards, drivers. Especially for the big men of earlier times, it involves position.

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With the general amnesty, the federal government found itself in a dilemma. If amnesty meant taking back every Ibo into his prewar post, what of those from elsewhere in the country who had taken over the jobs the Ibo had left? One former Biafran, himself not Ibo, suggested that the very grant of amnesty was based on a misguided belief in the accuracy of Biafran propaganda: "The federal side truly expected that there wouldn't be many of us left."[2] In any case, the need to solve the problem contributed to the decision to retire, in most cases with full pension rights, civil servants above the age of 55 who had worked on the Biafran side (junior ones being reabsorbed, as the phrase goes).

The problem was even more touchy for the military, where a careful examination of each case yielded in December 1971 a settlement proudly acclaimed by the Nigerian government for its generosity. With the exception of officers involved in the January 1966 coup and those central to the invasion of the Mid-West State (approximately 30 men, still in detention), the decree allowed a gamut from reabsorption (65) through discharge "with full entitled benefits" (32) to, in 16 cases, compulsory retirement without benefits.

Many Ibo, however, are back at their jobs in Lagos, though rarely in the most senior positions (an exception is a recently appointed Supreme Court justice), and they are back too in such government-run corporations as electricity and broadcasting. Further, outside the former war zones there are nine state governments, almost all newly created and needing skilled, professional personnel. Despite prewar anxieties, heightened by the war itself, about Ibo monopoly of skilled jobs, many state governments have rushed to hire Ibo, more and more frequently on permanent appointments, not short contracts. The Mid-West was the first to reach out to the East-Central State after the war, but all six states of the old North have joined in, with North-West now employing over 300 Ibo, and all are asking for more. "Imagine, an Ibo high up in the Military Governor's office in Sokoto—the Sardauna's bones would turn over!" said a man from the North-West State.[3] Even Lagos State government, with its own

[2] It may be impossible ever to state accurately the number of fatalities, but postwar estimates have been lower than those during the fighting. The most serious effort (by John de St. Jorre, in "The Brothers' War: Biafra and Nigeria," Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972) gives a carefully calculated but acknowledged guess at 600,000 deaths—military and civilian, Biafran and Nigerian.

[3] He was referring to the late Sardauna of Sokoto, killed in the January 1966 coup; Fulani premier of the old Northern Region, he had fought southern political incursions in a territory he ruled as if it belonged to him personally.

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highly trained Yoruba resources, has hired some Ibo. (The Western State, however, whose people moved during the war into vacancies left by Ibo throughout the federation, and whose competition with the Ibo goes back decades, employ almost no non-Yoruba.)

Ibo engineers and administrative personnel are back at work for expatriate companies, including oil companies. Some of the retired civil servants now in business have contracts, for example, to build a housing estate in Jos, the capital of the Benue-Plateau State, and another to supply piped water to the eastern part of the state.

Less prominent people have moved out across the country too: cooks and stewards in Lagos and Yorubaland, traders in the markets to the north and west. But with all there is a difference, a lesson of the war—a hope for "One Nigeria" but with a new concern for personal and family security: "Before the war the Ibo man moved out, and he made money, and he invested his money where he made it," said one Enugu businessman. "But now, oh yes, he moves all over the country again, but the money comes back home. We need it now, but even when we don't, we have learned that it should come back home."

IV

Precisely because of the prewar practice of investing outside Iboland, Ibo property is no less important an issue than Ibo jobs—and in Port Harcourt, the major southern city of the former Eastern Region, it is more important. After the events of 1966 and during the war itself, most states set up "abandoned property" authorities. The workings of those authorities varied: in the Mid-West, the buildings left by fleeing East-Central State Ibo were inventoried and assessed from November 1967; rents were collected, banked in the owner's name, and given over on demand at the war's end. In Benue-Plateau the Governor, asked continually about the matter during the war, replied: "I have an abandoned property authority—and the Ibo will come back." And, as he relates it, "they said, these outsiders, 'No, never.' But I knew my Ibo classmates [at the University of Ibadan] as intimates; I knew they'd be back, and they *are* back. Those who thought they would not be do not know Nigeria."

But the situation was far more complex in Port Harcourt, which has produced the most difficult postwar problem—some

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say the only intractable one. The major port of the former Eastern Region, and the center of the petroleum industry before the war, the city had a predominantly Ibo population, though it was located in the minorities region where feelings against majority domination had for years run higher than anywhere else. An area of enormous ethnic and linguistic intricacy, the Niger Delta, with Port Harcourt its only major city, felt the war with particular bitterness. For in Port Harcourt over 95 percent of the individually owned property belonged to Ibo. Most of the people in what would become the Rivers State were, with those of the South-East, the minorities of the former Eastern Region, which the Ibo had long controlled politically. Further, the vast oil resources of the region were located there, and the Rivers people feared that the resulting revenues would be used in Iboland rather than in the previously neglected delta area.[4]

For the Rivers people, creation of their own state and control of its capital were overwhelmingly important, but Port Harcourt, to all Ibo an Ibo city, was no less important to those who had been born there, and to Biafrans generally. This issue, unresolvable, provoked bitterness during the war and ill feeling in postwar relations unmatched elsewhere in Nigeria.

At the end of the war the capital of the Rivers State, Port Harcourt, was, as observers described it, a "ghost town." Further, the state government had to be run from a place where most of the property still belonged to people from outside the state. Though in time Port Harcourt showed signs of activity, as businesses reopened and oil companies returned and even some Ibo workers came back, the question of "abandoned properties" remained unsettled. Today, despite the release of a very small percentage of houses to their owners, the problem is far from solved. The Rivers' view is simply stated by one official: "Our government cannot be a tenant, nor can we abdicate; we must control our own land for our own people."

In the East-Central State, however, lack of capital is a major issue. Ibo who own property in Port Harcourt, each desperately needing at least rents to rehabilitate perhaps dozens of people in the extended family system, cannot understand the delay now nearing three years. Ibo are emphatic in telling outsiders that if civil strife ever erupts again in Nigeria, "It will not come from here." But some of the most thoughtful then add a qualifier: if

[4] Continuing explorations have since shown oil in what is indisputably Iboland, a fact which, if known earlier, might have alleviated those fears.

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the Port Harcourt issue remains unresolved then some future conflict just might draw in the Ibo.

In the Rivers State the general argument runs that the problem will take time to sort out, but some Rivers people see it differently. One man who suffered at the hands of the Biafran forces during the war says, none the less, that the prolonged impasse on the Ibo problem is not only unfair but will be self-destructive for the Rivers State. As he sees it, Port Harcourt must again become the port for the East-Central State, as it was before the war when produce also came there from western parts of the present South-East State. "But now ECS is turning to the Mid-West ports, and the South-East to Calabar; it's fine to say the Rivers have money, but there's more to a healthy economy than just oil, and before the war P.H. attracted industry from everywhere." Nor do all in the federal government, however understanding of the Rivers' position, appreciate a slowness that undermines the idea of "One Nigeria," the single blatant blemish on a reconciliation whose smoothness has impressed even those who believed in it most.

The Rivers' neighbor, the South-East State, was also originally proclaimed part of Biafra. Sharing with Rivers the problems of Nigerian minorities, its people shared with them also fierce divisions over secession, and severe war damage. Yet the tone of reconciliation is different, and the state's Military Governor says that this is precisely because there was in the area no Ibo city like Port Harcourt; there were fewer Ibo property owners and others in the state. That produced what he calls "very active neglect," but it also created a situation free of the extreme post-war tensions of Port Harcourt, which made reconciliation easier.

Committed to General Gowon's vision of that reconciliation, the South-East State government began among its own. There, as in the East-Central State, former Biafrans have been appointed to a range of government positions, recently even on the level of commissioners and senior civil servants. The official explanation? "Many South-Easterners, especially civil servants, were caught inside Biafra; they did what they had to to survive." Now Ibo businessmen are back, and civil servants too—and there are also South-Easterners working in the ECS.

V

Most Nigerians are thinking about the future. There is hope that lessons have been learned and will not quickly be forgotten,

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but for much of the country what has mattered most has been the creation of the 12 states, all but eclipsed at birth by the crisis of secession and war. Although some, especially from the three largest ethnic groups, still talk as if future politics will be an extension of the maneuvering and balancing of pre-1966 days, most believe that this one stroke has dramatically altered not just the rules but the whole game.

The greatest enthusiasm comes predictably from the former minority areas: the old Northern "Middle Belt," now split between Kwara and Benue-Plateau States and no longer under "Hausa-Fulani" control; the South-East and Rivers, free at last of their fears of Ibo domination; and even the Mid-West, though it became a region separated from the West as long ago as 1963. As the South-East Governor, Col. Udoakaho J. Esuene, put it, "It was the creation of the Mid-West that gave us hope. But only the crisis [1966–67] made the opportunity; states would never have come in the political days. And only the federal victory guaranteed them."

There are different ways to group the states: states that were battlegrounds and those that were not; states of ethnic "majorities" and "minorities" before May 1967; diverse and homogeneous, densely and sparsely populated, large and small, rich and poor states; northern and southern states (as the old politics would have had it).

In a country of perhaps 60 million people, speaking at least 300 different tongues, it is all very complex, and that is a reason for optimism. No longer is the country likely to split over any one issue, with lines drawn fast. There are too many different and mutual problems and interests; any two states will share some and not others. Alliances for eventual political purposes can, for the first time, shift on these bases.

But politics are currently banned and the economic questions press and excite Nigerians now. The country is the world's ninth largest producer of crude oil, which financed the war. (Nigeria had repaid her war debts by April 1972, largely from oil revenues.) The oil boom pays for reconstruction too, through federal government redistribution of revenue and its own grants to the states. Though Nigerians are proud of such achievements, they express concern about "a wasting asset," about the need to plan for diversifying against the day when the oil wells run dry.

What is critical now, as it was two decades ago, is economic

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growth (with obvious political ramifications). Leaving aside the wreckage of war for the moment (Asika and Esuene both say: "I am still reconstructing; I haven't even begun to develop."), the minorities areas have furthest to go economically and administratively. It is quite a different matter to run governments from former provincial headquarters than from the capitals of what were regions larger than many African countries. More serious has been the earlier neglect outside former centers of power of basic necessities—water, electricity and crucial communications. (One can come astonishingly close to mapping pre-1966 voting patterns just by traveling the Nigerian roads; ruling parties in each region were those of ethnic majorities, and for them there was tarmac.)

In the minorities states, enthusiasm is generally high. In Kwara, in Benue-Plateau, in the Mid-West, people speak with pride of their state as a "microcosm of Nigeria"—and by this they mean the heterogeneity and the energy, though they could also include the intricacy of the problems. One would expect less enthusiasm for states in the pre-crisis centers of power, yet there too one finds keen competition spurring activity and confidence.

Most surprising, perhaps, is the reaction in the north, which was always wrongly characterized as monolithic, to its division into six parts. "The creation of states is a great blessing." This statement, heard in each minority area, comes as a surprise from a North-Central State Commissioner in Kaduna, himself from what was always called "the dominant Hausa-Fulani group" in the old Northern Region. He views the new states as a great spur to development. Now there are 12 centers of growth and activity, stimulating the constructive competition; making up for neglect suffered under the old regional system, where Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba reaped most of the rewards; increasing the self-confidence of the former minority groups as their fears of the old domination fade. The result is a major contribution to postwar reconciliation and a more general amity throughout Nigeria.

VI

Vast political implications lie in the new state structure and in the economic changes. For the moment under the military government, politics are dormant, or at least below the surface. But Nigeria is a very political country; whereas in the fifties and sixties animated talk of politics was everywhere, Nigerians now

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speculate endlessly on what these changes will mean when there is a return to civilian rule.

Most believe politics will be quite different from the pre-crisis era. Not only has the creation of states made a variety of new alliances possible, but economic changes should affect politics. Nigeria is now working her way through a four-year development plan, among whose many provisions are four north-south highways, from the northern hinterlands to each major port: Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, Calabar. Each network will pass through at least three states, with obvious economic and social repercussions.

Further, the new Central River Transport Company has been created to utilize the great Niger and Benue Rivers for communications and economic growth; it is jointly owned by the governments of North-East, North-West, Kwara, Benue-Plateau, Mid-West and East-Central States (Rivers has the continuing option to join). "Common interests are bound to develop among these states," asserted one state's Commissioner for Economic Development. "And, of course, the six northern states still have an Interim Common Services Association, and the eastern states also plan together, even if they are all now talking mostly about sharing assets and liabilities. The combinations are limitless, and so are the political possibilities."

But most of the political ramifications lie ahead; for now Nigerians tend to think about development—and stability. Almost without exception, they hope that the tenure of the present military régime will continue untroubled, and that the transition to civilian rule will be smooth, whenever and however it takes place. The future is uncertain and everyone seems to feel it; once the precedent has been set anywhere for violent change, no one rests entirely secure. Further, the army's second takeover in Ghana after a brief period of civilian rule has persuaded many Nigerians that their country should move carefully and slowly, if necessary, to ensure that their military's departure from government, when it comes, will be permanent.

Meanwhile, Nigeria's government is military. The army is large; the total for all branches is some 250,000 (a size whose pros and cons Nigerians frequently debate, usually deciding that, with unemployment a serious problem already, demobilization would compound it in ways no one thinks advisable). Yet as one drives about the country, whether in the former war zones or

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elsewhere, one gets little sense of an oppressive military presence. Nigeria is a very large country, and even a quarter of a million men can recede from view when they are spread throughout the states. Certainly there are military centers, and there are also occasions when the army is very visible, as it was during the six weeks when it directed traffic in the amazingly smooth change-over from left- to right-hand drive.

The energetic Governor of the Mid-West State, taking a visitor around Benin and stopping at the market, commented: "You may have noticed that no one is paying any attention to me; that is because I come here every day." His commissioners explain that they spend two days a week in the countryside: "If we don't, the Governor has seen for himself things we should have noticed and wants to know why we're not doing something about them." This unlikely style for a military ruler is popular with the Mid-West people and one hears, in his case as in some others, that the Mid-West may ask him to play a political role in the future.

Despite the ban on political organization, citizens petition for the release of the detained officers; judicial decisions sometimes go against the government; and the press, as one Nigerian newspaperman put it, "by handling criticism carefully is allowed to keep criticizing. There are no censors looking over our shoulders, and no people with guns standing about." There are sometimes arrests of less-than-careful reporters, but at least one paper has protested in its editorial columns without repercussions.

"Of course, this is a military government," Nigerians all over the country say, "and so we have to keep quiet;" then generally follow some hours of vigorous uninhibited analysis, often at high decibels. Nigerians share with Americans a passion for self-criticism, and in their intricate and challenging country, they find much to discuss.

"Outsiders always ask about corruption," said a professor of economics. "What Nigeria needs is 'productive corruption,' the way you have it in America; don't take the money out of the country, invest it here, create jobs, put it to work for more than just yourself." Among lessons Nigerians have learned recently is that it takes more than a change of government to solve the problem—but they still express determination to do so.

And there are other problems. While the "minorities" have their men in many key posts now, the "majority" Nigerians com-

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plain that they are not receiving their share. In the Western State, the Yoruba have not yet resolved among themselves centuries-old tensions that first brought violence to independent Nigeria in the early 1960s. Inflation shows no sign of abating and unemployment is a problem in all urban areas—most severely in the East-Central State. Nigerianization of the economy is going forward with the "Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972,"[5] but critical debate over timing and extent and the specific long- and short-range economic consequences arises in almost any conversation in any city.

VII

Increasingly pressing are constitutional issues, for it is now 1973, and this year and next are crucial in General Gowon's timetable for turning over the government to civilians. "Because the General says it will be in 1976, it will be in 1976," declares his long-time friend and colleague on the Supreme Military Council, the Governor of Benue-Plateau. Showing an admiration for and faith in the head of state which appear widespread in Nigeria, he continues: "That is why I object to all questions about the return to civilian rule."

Many who share this belief in General Gowon's word raise questions none the less about sensitive related issues. It is by no means certain that 12 is the ideal number of states—one theory has always been that more states rather than fewer would make a stronger, more stable center. (Some Yoruba suggest that the West, for example, be itself divided into four.) Even less certain are the boundaries; the question is to be opened to hearings and new decisions in 1974. And the relation of the states to the federal government is rather complicated. First there are matters on which there are precedents; revenue allocation is central, and highly controversial. As it now stands, distribution of federal revenue to the states is a compromise among many demands. Half of the distributable pool is disbursed in 12 equal parts and half in proportion to population (this in a country where states vary between 1.5 and 9.5 million people). That compromise is infinitely debated.

[5] Popularly called the "Indigenisation Decree," it reserves for Nigerians 22 kinds of business, from advertising through breadbaking, hairdressing, newspaper publishing and printing, and retail trade ("except by or within the departmental stores and supermarkets") to tire retreading. It restricts participation of aliens in 33 others, including beer-brewing, construction, some manufacturing, running travel agencies and wholesale distributing.

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There are also issues for which there are no precedents, such as how to handle abandoned property. "But the point is," says one federal commissioner, talking particularly about plans for development, "that the states dependent on the Federal Military Government financially for grants and loans and so on—they do what the FMG says; those that are not, do not."

Much of the federal government's activity is still in the nature of experiment. Now comes a statement about an imminent federal policy for primary education; now another about federal moves toward controlling all universities; now another about federal government siting of industry throughout the country; now plans for a compulsory National Youth Service Corps. Through all the complexities, however, the central government is quietly increasing its strength.

Finally, for all the country's potential wealth, its human resources and its growing international stature, it must deal with some very basic problems that helped spark the troubles of the sixties. No one forgets that it was from disputed census figures that Nigeria's post-independence crises started. No one doubts that the census of 1973 must not only be accurate, it must be believed to be accurate. "You ask about states and revenue; well, we can't deal sensibly with those problems until we have an accurate census," explained an official in Lagos. "And so when people ask what's being done to return the country to civilian rule, and they look for conferences, and constitutional proposals, and local elections—that will come. Leave aside for now what we have done: the reconstruction, and the reconciliation, even the reorganization of the army which has been so important. The first thing we must have is a census; that's what's being done right now. Bear with us."

Nigerians are bearing, and hoping. Their country has come through a bloody civil war with an imposed unity, strengthened, however, by structural changes they have made themselves. Never unaware of their problems—or of their advantages in numbers, in natural resources and in skilled experienced manpower—they are trying for stability amid ethnic diversity, and for a better quality of life throughout the country. If Nigeria succeeds, the success will be Africa's, for other states may derive strength from her strength, and even ideas for ways to solve problems they all face.

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LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY

By John Norton Moore

THE role of law in the management of national security has been debated throughout American history. Traces of the debate may be found as long ago as 1793 in the exchange between Hamilton and Jefferson about the relative importance of "interests" and "morality" in deciding whether the United States should support France in the war with England. Jefferson found an obligation to support France under the 1778 treaty of alliance and urged that the treaty obligation was binding on the nation. Hamilton countered that there was no obligation but even if there were it did not require the United States to jeopardize its "essential interests."

At the turn of the century the debate achieved clearer focus in the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great sea power strategist, and Elihu Root, Secretary of State and a distinguished American jurist. The core of this second round was the importance of arbitration and other third-party machinery for the settlement of international disputes. Root and other jurists urged greater resort to international arbitration. Mahan countered that law, while sometimes useful, was incapable of dealing with questions of national expediency such as the Monroe Doctrine.

In the aftermath of World War II the debate was resumed more sharply and with a broader focus. On one side were international relations theorists such as Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan, who saw only a small role for international law and who opposed their "realist" position to what they believed were dangers of a "legalistic-moralistic" approach in dealing with national security issues. On the other side were jurists such as Hardy C. Dillard and Myres S. McDougal, who warned that the realists had an incomplete understanding of the role of international law and that their view, if influential, could be costly for American foreign policy.

The realists have, throughout the debate, had an important message. Over-reliance on international law can be a prescription for disaster in a loosely organized and intensely competitive international system. If the disappointments with arbitration treaties and universal disarmament schemes during the interwar years did not drive this home, the advent of the cold war cer-

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tainly did. All this, however, has led to an overly broad indictment of the legal tradition. For while we have been preoccupied with the dangers—some very real—of a "legalistic-moralistic" strain in American foreign policy, we have failed to see the cost resulting from the slender capacity of our national security process to take an international legal perspective into account.

II

National security decisions must consider a range of component issues. At a first stage these include: What are the national goals? Are they realizable in the context in which they must be pursued? If so, are they realizable at a cost-benefit ratio which makes their pursuit in the national interest? Are preferable alternatives available which will achieve the goals at a more favorable ratio? And how can policies, once chosen, be most effectively implemented and justified?

Legal considerations, like political, military and economic considerations, are relevant to each of these issues. Yet there are no international legal specialists on the increasingly important staff of the National Security Council even though that staff now comprises over 50 substantive officers. Similarly, there is virtually no reference in the Pentagon Papers to the legal dimensions of policy in the Vietnam War. These examples illustrate a structural weakness in the national security process which impedes the consideration of international—and sometimes constitutional—legal components of policy.

There are, of course, showcase examples of national security decisions in which legal considerations have played a constructive role. Chief among them are the Berlin crisis of 1948 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The "Forrestal Diaries" indicate that Forrestal and President Truman discussed "the controlling legal rights and undertakings" as a starting point for policy in the Berlin crisis. The United Nations was also used extensively and helpfully during the crisis. Similarly, because of early involvement of the State Department's Legal Adviser's Office, international legal considerations played a significant role in shaping U.S. policy during the missile crisis. Legal initiatives included designation of the action as a quarantine—since a blockade might have been construed as an act of war—and collective authorization by the Organization of American States (OAS).

Much more abundant examples can be found of insensitivity

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to international legal considerations. In order to justify the initiation of bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965, for instance, the raids were announced as reprisals for Vietcong attacks on the U.S. military advisers' compound at Pleiku. A case can be made that this bombing of the North, like U.S. participation in the War, was a lawful defensive response against a prior intervention by North Vietnam amounting to an armed attack under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. But there is overwhelming authority that reprisal, which is a technical legal term for minor coercion in response to a breach of an international legal obligation not amounting to an armed attack, is barred by the Charter. By their unawareness of the relevant legal considerations or their unwillingness to take them into account, American policy-makers had chosen a public justification blatantly in violation of international law.

The April 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic provides another example of insensitivity to legal considerations. The announced purpose of the first phase of the U.S. action in landing 400 marines was to protect U.S. nationals, a purpose which if carefully implemented would be lawful. But the action was neither implemented nor justified with the legal basis for such action in mind. And the second phase of the action, which committed more than 21,000 U.S. forces to an effort to end the Dominican civil strife, was undercut from the beginning by the failure to initiate the action under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and by the overly broad rhetoric of President Johnson in proclaiming the inadmissibility of another Communist government anywhere in the hemisphere, a reason for the action which would make it in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. These failures subsequently obscured the real differences between the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic and the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.

Still another, and poignant, example is the lack of vigorous effort in the Indochina War, at least during the early years, to implement the laws of war. The United States is party to a variety of treaties relating to the conduct of warfare, including the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. It also recognizes a substantial body of customary international law setting minimum humanitarian standards for the conduct of warfare.

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As the Son My tragedy amply confirms, violation of these standards may undermine the national effort as well as offend moral sensibilities. But the Son My tragedy also raises broader problems concerning the present status and effectiveness of the laws of war, problems which have been insufficiently considered by U.S. policy-makers. First, officially defined restrictions on combat too frequently have not been understood or implemented in the field. For example, there seems to have been wide disparity in understanding among regional commands in Vietnam that the "body count" was to include prisoners of war as well as enemy casualties and that "specified strike zones" did not override the laws of war which hold that attacks on noncombatants are not permissible. Second, the manifest ambiguities and deficiencies of the law, in face of the complexities of a counterintervention-ary setting and newer military technology, have largely gone unattended. For instance, the principal legal analysis for the massive use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam seems to have been a memorandum prepared in March 1945 by Major-General Myron C. Cramer, then Judge Advocate General, concerning the possible use of chemical anti-crop agents against pockets of Japanese on the Pacific islands. This example is symptomatic of a lack of adequate legal review of newer weapons and tactics.

Most important, adequate national and international machinery that can deal with the full sweep of these problems has been lacking. Though army regulations require compliance with the laws of war and many military and other government advisers made significant individual efforts to ensure compliance in the field, the chances for a more vigorous and imaginative implementation would have been improved if an international legal perspective sensitive to the issues had been systematically structured into higher levels of the national security process. This might have been supplied by an interdepartmental group charged with responsibility for oversight and development of the laws of war.

A fourth example of insensitivity to legal considerations is in the recurring failure to prepare an adequate constitutional basis for major military actions abroad. The failure of President Truman to secure explicit congressional authorization for the Korean War was followed by President Johnson's unnecessary reliance on an ambiguous series of attacks on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin as the occasion for obtaining congressional authorization for the Indochina War. In both cases the failure

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to allow more adequately for the constitutional legal dimensions proved to be major weaknesses of policy.

The Cambodian incursion of April 30, 1970 provides a fifth example. There were at least three ways that more adequate consideration of international legal factors might have strengthened the U.S. response in the crisis.

First, North Vietnamese attacks on Cambodia might have been protested by the United States in the Security Council much as the Soviet actions in curtailing access to Berlin were taken to the Security Council to lay the groundwork for subsequent Allied action to reopen the city. The Cambodian complaint to the Security Council on April 22 would have seemed an opportune time to press such a complaint in the Council. And at a minimum, the incursion should have been immediately reported to the Security Council pursuant to the obligation under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

Second, the principal legal basis for the Cambodian incursion was that a belligerent state may take action to end serious violations of neutral territory by an opposing belligerent. Yet the important presidential address explaining the action to the nation did not mention the principle. This and other public pronouncements might have been more focused and carried greater weight had they emphasized the substantial international legal authority for the action.

Third, and most important, a prior understanding with Cambodia might have been obtained for public release at the time of the operation. In view of the requirement of Article IV, paragraph 3, of the SEATO Treaty, which provides that no action on the territory of a protocol state such as Cambodia "shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned," such an advance agreement would have seemed particularly advisable.

Finally, and most recently, there is the example of the U.S. response to the Pakistan-Bangladesh-India war. Perhaps the lack of clarity in the U.S. position was attributable to the complexity of the situation. It is, after all, difficult to distinguish the damsel from the dragon when one side is engaged in mass murder of noncombatants and the other intervenes in a war of secession against a traditional rival. Nevertheless, America might have been more persuasive in focusing on the shortcomings of both sides if she had taken account of the legal aspects of the conflict.

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Initially, the United States should have vigorously urged Pakistan to live up to the provisions of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Article 3 sets out a series of minimum standards for the protection of noncombatants "in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory" of a party to the Convention. In fact, the United States had an obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to undertake "to ensure respect for the . . . Convention in all circumstances."

With respect to the Indian action, the United States might have pointed out more specifically that the intervention violated a series of recent General Assembly Resolutions, including the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the 1965 Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention. The 1960 Declaration was particularly on point. Section 6 declares: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

The point is that the actions of both sides had their warts and that legal analysis could have helped to isolate the virus and prescribe the treatment.

The memoranda of the meetings of the Washington Special Action Group, made public by Jack Anderson, confirm that greater sensitivity to legal considerations was called for in the India-Pakistan crisis. These sources demonstrate that the National Security Council understood the advantages of utilizing the United Nations, a use which was helpful. But they evidence little awareness of international legal norms as a basis for appraisal of the Indian and Pakistani actions or for support of U.S. policy. For example, there was no mention of the General Assembly Resolutions condemning intervention in a war of secession—Resolutions which strongly supported U.S. opposition to the Indian intervention. Similarly, no mention was made of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons, despite a discussion of how best to ensure the safety of the Biharis in East Pakistan and the Bengalis in West Pakistan. More dramatically, although Henry Kissinger posed a question concerning the legal basis for the Indian naval blockade, there was no legal specialist present to answer it. The resulting discussion too easily suggested that there was no legal

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basis for an Indian blockade and failed to consider whether incidents involving American ships subsumed violations of international law even if the Indian blockade were legal.

The legal tradition is important in making policy as well as for its implementation and justification. The 1960 Bay of Pigs invasion illustrates the cost of failing to take an international legal perspective into account in planning for U.S. action. There is no evidence that the U.S. planners weighed the effects of supplying illegal assistance to the insurgents. It should have been evident that the effort—successful or unsuccessful—would establish a precedent for external assistance to exile insurgents which would work strongly against the national interest when transferred to Indochina or the Middle East. The effort was also likely to contribute to a loss of national influence as a result of the associated violations of the charters of the Organization of American States and of the United Nations. It would probably overstate the case to say that the abortive invasion would not have taken place if the legal tradition had been adequately considered, but it might have been less likely had there been full and candid presentation of the international legal costs of the action.

Quite apart from the utility of an international legal perspective in crisis management there is also a need for more systematic representation of the legal tradition in formulating a coherent and intellectually powerful foreign policy. Under the pressures of the cold war the nation has drifted away from a consistent vision of world order. Yet a foreign policy which focuses on the importance of the stability of the system and coöperative solution of global problems seems strongly in the national interest.

Internationally, such a foreign policy may be the best strategy for the United States to recoup its leadership; and nationally it may be a prerequisite to adequate domestic support of foreign policy. The present neo-isolationist tendencies within the United States are qualitatively different from the isolationism of the "America first" movement preceding World War II. Then the predominant strain was to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, whatever the moral cost. In contrast, the predominant strain in the present movement seems to be a pronounced—though sometimes misplaced—concern for the moral dimensions of American foreign policy. If such concern can be channeled into a coherent vision of world order, it may revive domestic support for the more active international policy which the na-

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tion must undertake in order to deal effectively with the myriad of problems in security, development and environment which lie ahead. The legal tradition has no monopoly of vision on world order; it does have a special contribution to make to the normative aspects of state conduct as well as global organization for solution of social problems.

III

The realist-jurist debate has done little to dispel widespread misperceptions about the value of the legal tradition in the management of national security. At least three such misperceptions continue to obscure its importance.

First, international law is thought of as saying what cannot be done, solely as a system for restraining and controlling national actions. No one proposes to exclude military or political considerations from planning simply because they do not always determine policy. Yet because of a misleading image of law as a system of negative restraint, we make such a judgment when it comes to law. In fact, the legal tradition can play a variety of important roles in planning and implementing national security decisions. These include, among others, focus on the long-run stability and quality of the international milieu; calculation of the costs and benefits resulting from violation of the law or compliance with it; focus on a range of international legal options for conflict management; concern with appraising and justifying national actions by reference to shared global interests; and supervision of the national interest in domestic operations that involve U.S. adherence to international agreements.

Law is also useful for solving social problems and communicating intentions. Examples include the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the recently signed Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, and the ongoing efforts to reach agreement on an international régime for the resources of the deep seabeds. To focus exclusively on the difficulties of international law in constraining international behavior is to miss the creative opportunities which the law provides.

There are, of course, dangers in simplistic legal approaches to national security issues. These include, among others, equating general goals with specific policies without assessing the

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effectiveness of those policies, as for example, to urge that since we wish a warless world we should unilaterally disarm; pursuit of policies which are unrealistic in the present international system, as for example, to advocate submitting the Arab-Israeli or Indochina conflicts to the International Court of Justice; and over-reliance on the deterrent effect of international law or on formal legal arrangements divorced from power realities, as, for example, to rely solely on international law for the protection of the *Pueblo* despite the demonstrated willingness of North Korea to violate international law.

Though these dangers are real, none of them is inherent in a sophisticated legal approach. More important, the legal tradition complements the realist approach precisely where that approach is weakest, that is, in preoccupation with short-run goals at the expense of long-run interests in a healthy world order.

A second misperception is that a concern for international law is opposed to a concern for the national interest. But the "national interest" is not a self-defining concept. As it is understood by most theorists, it would include a strong interest in the stability and quality of the international system. Thus Raymond Aron says: ". . . the West must stand for an idea of an international order. The national interest of the United States, or even the collective interest of the Anglo-Saxon minority, will not win over any country nor will it cause any loyalties if it does not appear to be tied to an international order—the order of power as well as the order of law."[1]

International law may also help to elaborate the national interest in a variety of operational settings. For example, international law has distilled from centuries of experience a substantial body of norms for the conduct of hostilities. Not to comply with these is to risk breakdowns in military discipline, brutalization of participants with resultant social costs on return to civilian life, unnecessary escalation or continuation of conflict, reciprocal mistreatment of nationals, domestic loss of support and unnecessary destruction of human and material resources.

The real conflict between law and the national interest, when it arises, occurs in terms of the costs and benefits to the nation of pursuing a policy which is illegal. When the conflict arises,

[1] Raymond Aron, "The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs," in Stanley Hoffmann, ed., "Contemporary Theory in International Relations." New York: Prentice-Hall, 1960.

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too often the legal costs are not adequately appreciated. In the case of the Bay of Pigs invasion, for example, the probable benefits to the nation deriving from a successful action should have been weighed against the short-run cost in loss of U.S. influence resulting from a blatantly illegal policy and the long-run cost of undermining legal constraints contributing to the stability of the international system.

A third misperception comes in judging the utility of the legal tradition on an oversimplified model of law. A common error in this regard is to underestimate the importance of community perceptions of legality as a base for increase or decrease in national power. International law, particularly on issues of war and peace, does not always manifestly control the behavior of states. But it is not as widely perceived that even when international law does not control behavior, there are international norms—community expectations about the authority of national action which may in a variety of ways translate into power realties. For example, an action such as the Korean War, in which perceptions as to lawfulness are high, is likely to produce more allies than actions which are controversial such as the Indochina War or widely regarded as unlawful such as the British and French invasion of Suez.

If beliefs about the illegality of a nation's actions are intense and widespread there may be a generalized loss of national influence. The Soviet Union seems to have paid such a cost in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, as indicated by the disaffection of Soviet-oriented Communist parties and front organizations throughout the world. Perceptions about legality may also influence votes within international organizations such as the United Nations, the OAS Council of Ministers or even the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Another error resulting from an oversimplified model of law is the tendency to overestimate the indeterminacy of international legal norms. The lack of centralized legislative and adjudicative competence in the international system is a real factor contributing to gaps and tears in the legal fabric. But it is wrong to conclude that all international law is amorphous. International law has areas of clarity as well as of uncertainty and in this respect is not as qualitatively different from national law as one who has never suffered through the confusion of first-year law school might suspect. It is virtually undisputed among inter-

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national lawyers that the U.S. role in the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Soviet role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the British and French Suez intervention violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter which proscribes "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . ." It is also widely accepted that the allied intervention in the Korean conflict was a lawful exercise of collective defense under Article 51 of the Charter, that the Son My tragedy was in violation of Hague and Geneva rules and that the North Vietnamese mistreatment of allied prisoners is in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Many other examples of reasonably definite legal conclusions about war and peace issues could be given.

IV

One important reason for the failure to take legal perspectives into consideration in the management of national security is that the machinery, as presently structured, is inadequate to the task.

The principal international legal adviser to the government is the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. In addition, there are many other offices engaged to some extent in the process, including, among others, the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice.

There are a number of structural problems which prevent full utilization of this plethora of legal offices. The most important is that there is little legal advice used by the important National Security Council and NSC staff portions of the security process. Since its creation in 1947, the NSC and its staff have played an increasing role in the management of national security. There are persuasive reasons for dividing the national security process between State and the NSC-White House. Unfortunately, a consequence of this division has been to minimize concern for international legal considerations since there are no international legal specialists on either the White House or NSC staffs.

A second structural problem is the lack of centralized responsibility for the general development and supervision of the international legal aspects of national security decisions. The press of day-to-day business within each legal office and the lack of clear lines of responsibility between offices have hindered vigorous efforts to strengthen and develop international law.

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Although not to overemphasize the importance of structural change as such, certain changes might improve the present inadequate consideration of the legal component of policy:

First, make the Legal Adviser of the Department of State a regular member of the National Security Council. This would have the advantage of introducing international legal considerations into crisis management where they are most needed. It would also give the Legal Adviser, who is called upon to justify policy, a better opportunity to influence the making and implementation of policy. In his new capacity, the Legal Adviser would be available to advise the President as well as the Secretary of State. An obvious parallel to this dual advisory role is the dual role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who advises both the President and the Secretary of Defense. As a corollary to this change the Legal Adviser might also be made a member of any NSC group dealing with security crises, such as the Washington Special Action Group.

Second, add a new position, which might be called Counselor on National Security Law, to the staff of the National Security Council. One of the important mechanisms for coördinated foreign policy planning is the National Security Study Memorandum supervised by the NSC staff. Of 138 such memoranda prepared from 1969 through October 2, 1971, some 20 to 30 have a significant legal component. These include memoranda on Indochina, Cyprus, the Middle East, southern Africa, the nonproliferation treaty, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, tariff preferences, chemical-biological agents, toxins, the seabed treaty and U.N. China admission. Though legal considerations are undoubtedly present in many of these memoranda as a result of interdepartmental consideration, an in-house legal expert within the NSC staff could assist in recognizing and coördinating the legal components of such planning. The Counselor and his staff would also be available to the President to provide advice on the legal dimensions of national security issues when, for reasons of speed or secrecy, the President chose not to utilize the formal machinery of the National Security Council. Finally, the Counselor could serve as a liaison with other government legal advisers, particularly the Legal Adviser of the Department of State and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. Indeed, the coördinating function might extend to many hitherto-domestic agencies. The U.N. Conference on the Human En-

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vironment and the upcoming conference on the law of the sea are illustrative of a new global consciousness that promises both a multiplication of national obligations and an increase in the impact of international law on national life. In this respect, the creation of a Counselor on National Security Law would parallel the recent addition of an Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

Third, create a permanent Interdepartmental Group on International Legal Affairs chaired by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. Its purpose would be to coördinate and initiate government programs for the implementation and development of international law. More specifically, the Group would coördinate the executive position on issues with a substantial international legal component, for example the position on ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare. It would also identify international legal problems in current U.S. foreign policy and prepare position papers for consideration by the National Security Council. An example would be the U.S. obligation under Article 25 of the Charter to accept and carry out the U.N. sanctions against Southern Rhodesia—sanctions which the United States supported and could have vetoed—by refusing to import Rhodesian chrome once such sanctions had been decided by the Security Council.

The Group would also have responsibility for assessing any government action against the legal obligations binding on the United States. This would include, for example, continuing appraisal of compliance with the laws of war during the course of hostilities. Another recent and practical example is the case of the Lithuanian defector, Simas Kudirka, who was hastily returned to Soviet custody on November 23, 1970, from the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Vigilant* in violation of the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The incident might have been prevented if the Protocol had been previously incorporated in Coast Guard regulations (as it has been subsequently) by prohibiting the immediate return of defectors pending subsequent determination of status as required under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Finally, the Group would have responsibility for promoting the progressive development of international law by the United States. In this capacity the Group might identify and promote areas in which U.S. leadership could strengthen international

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law. It might also encourage greater training in international law for government officials, for example, by enlarging the programs in international law offered by the Foreign Service Institute, the National War College and the Naval War College or by instituting such programs elsewhere. Similarly, it might identify and sponsor research in areas of international law which are unclear and which are of potential concern.

In its composition, the new Interdepartmental Group would be chaired by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State and would include the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and (if the position of Counselor on National Security Law were created) the newly created Counselor as well. In addition, the Group would include any government legal counsel deemed important for its effective functioning. In some respects, it might be modeled after the highly successful Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea which is chaired by the State Department Legal Adviser and responsible to the National Security Council. It would, however, be structured as a permanent interdepartmental group.

Finally, consultants on international law should be added to the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. The simplest and most effective way of doing so is to regularize the consideration of international legal factors in the day-to-day work of the principal congressional committees dealing with national security issues.

In the consideration of these proposals it should be remembered that the question is not whether international law will be controlling but the more modest one of whether it will be taken into account. As Stanley Hoffmann observes, "a comprehensive analysis of world politics and foreign policy cannot afford to neglect the law, both because of its *actual* importance and because of its *potential* importance for a better order. . . ."[2] By strengthening the national security machinery to take law more systematically into account America could lead in promoting the development of international law as well as in implementing President Nixon's statement in his 1970 World Law Day message that it "is not enough that we merely defend the law as we have known it in the past: we must also work to . . . extend its influence in international affairs as well as in our national life."

[2] Stanley Hoffmann, "Henkin and Falk: Mild Reformist and Mild Revolutionary," *Journal of International Affairs*, v. 24, 1970.

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The Yeats epigraph that civilization is brought "under the semblance of peace by manifold illusion" more truly expresses the grand theme of this stylishly written study of the "origins and significance of the uneasy and interrupted peace" since 1945 than its counter-revisionist position on the cold war. In the epic mold of their account, the authors see the genesis of the cold war in events before rather than after 1945. Documents and notes take up fully one-fifth of this massive volume, sure to be a landmark in the understanding of our times.

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A sweeping, richly written narrative for the general reader. Underlying the history is a conceptual view of postwar developments deriving from the notion that "far from having betrayed Franklin Roosevelt, all his successors in the White House had remained stubbornly true to his legacy."

THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KENNETH YOUNGER. Edited by Roger Morgan. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1972, 309 p. $17.00.

A *Festschrift* in honor of the former director of Chatham House by authors closely associated with its work. Each has assessed the literature of his particular specialty, indicated subjects for future exploration and placed the research activities of Chatham House in context. Of interest to specialists and generalists alike.

PRINCIPLES OF WORLD POLITICS. By George Modelski. New York: Free Press, 1972, 370 p. $10.95.

An unorthodox interpretation which attempts to get away from concepts like nation-state and sovereignty to the ingredients of a more complex and pluralistic world order reflecting new conditions.

THEORIES OF NATIONALISM. By Anthony D. Smith. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, $12.00 (Paper, $3.95).

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THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. VOLUME 3: THE WIDENING CONTEXT. Edited by Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 951 p., $25.00 (Paper, $9.50).

Continuation of the series sponsored by the American Society of International Law, this is a comprehensive and useful collection of statements and articles, most of them on legal aspects and hardly any of them untouched by the winds of political controversy.

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By no means limited to the war, this tome by a member of the McDougal-Lasswell school of thought carefully examines many aspects of international law and foreign policy.

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Beaton's premature death deprived us of a knowing and deep thinker on problems of international security. Fortunately, he left this statement of a philosophy and strategy for building a structure of world order, one which accepts the existence of national nuclear forces but which also suggests long-term arms-control measures.

TOTAL WAR: THE STORY OF WORLD WAR II. By Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint. New York: Pantheon, 1972, 959 p. $15.00.

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HANKEY: MAN OF SECRETS. VOLUME I: 1877–1918. By Stephen Roskill. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, 672 p. $12.50.

The first volume of Lord Hankey's authorized biography, based largely on diaries and personal papers, by a distinguished naval historian. An extraordinary man, Hankey was at the center of Britain's foreign policy machinery, especially the Committee of Imperial Defence, from 1908 to 1942 under six prime ministers. Of special interest to students of the First World War.

DECISION BY DEFAULT: PEACETIME CONSCRIPTION AND BRITISH DEFENCE 1919–39. By Peter Dennis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1972, 243 p. $9.75.

A lively scholarly study of interwar British military policy using the perspective of conscription as a political issue. There are some interesting parallels between the revulsion against conscription following Britain's vast losses of men in 1914–1918 and the motivation for a U.S. all-volunteer army after Vietnam.

ALEXANDER OF TUNIS AS MILITARY COMMANDER. By W. G. F. Jackson. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972, 344 p. $12.95.

A well-written and admiring biography of Field Marshal Harold Alexander by a general who once served under him. Considerable attention, including maps, is given to Alexander's battlefield tactics and to his personal qualities of leadership.

THE DEATH OF THE ARMY: A PRE-MORTEM. By Edward L. King. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972, 246 p. $6.95.

A 23-year veteran's scathing "pre-mortem" of the U.S. Army. The illness, especially in the officer promotion system, is diagnosed and a blueprint for reform is offered. An important book for anyone concerned with the impact of the Vietnam War upon the American military establishment.

NUKLEARE MITWIRKUNG: DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND IN DER ATLANTISCHEN ALLIANZ, 1954–1970. By Dieter Mahncke. New York/Berlin: De Gruyter, 1972, 274 p. $20.50/DM. 64.

The best and most complete analysis of Germany's role in the nuclear debate of the Atlantic Alliance over the past 15 years. Includes discussion of the response to the Multilateral Nuclear Force and Bonn's participation in the Nuclear Planning Group.

SCIENTISTS IN THE QUEST FOR PEACE. By J. Rotblat. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1972, 399 p. $12.50.

A useful documentary history of the 21 Pugwash Conferences held since 1957, meeting by meeting.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

General: Economic and Social

INSTITUTIONS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A THEORY OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By John P. Powelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 281 p. $10.00.

This is an ingenious effort to construct a theory of institutions for economic growth that takes account of conflicting interests, administrative capacity, quasi-rational behavior and the need for consensus. The arguments have major implications for American policy in the opinion of the author, an economist with much practical experience in Latin America.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS. By John White. New York: Praeger (in association with the Overseas Development Institute), 1972, 204 p. $12.50.
THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK: A STUDY IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCING. By Sidney Dell. New York: Praeger, 1972, 255 p. $15.00.

These two good studies by English economists contribute substantially to the current debate over multilateral aid. White, of Sussex, argues that the creation of regional banks should not be regarded as an effort to create little World Banks, but as "an act of political resistance against the developed countries' hegemony in the world." Dell, a long-time U.N. official, concentrates on appraising the performance of the oldest of the regional banks and makes a good case for his view that more innovation and flexibility are needed if the IDB is to keep abreast of current problems.

THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT: A STUDY IN COFFEE DIPLOMACY. By Bart S. Fisher. New York: Praeger, 1972, 287 p. $17.50.

A clearly argued and well-informed analysis of that *rara avis,* a durable commodity agreement. The young author recommends that the agreement be extended through most of the 1970s and suggests some improvements.

UNCTAD: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE. By Branislav Gosovic. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1972, 349 p. Gldrs. 54.

An exceptionally thorough analysis of the work of UNCTAD up to 1970, stressing substantive issues, the development of the organization and the resolution of conflicts among the members. Very much on the side of the less-developed nations, the Jugoslav author (Ph.D. Berkeley) is a little saddened by the "taming" of UNCTAD, which he believes has accomplished much.

ASSISTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PROBLEMS OF DEBTS, BURDEN-SHARING, JOBS, AND TRADE. By Charles R. Frank, Jr., Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Robert d'A. Shaw and Harald B. Malmgren. New York. Praeger (in coöperation with the Overseas Development Council), 1972, 482 p. $15.00.

Four first-rate studies previously published as pamphlets.

RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Howard Sherman. New York: Basic Books, 1972, 431 p. $12.50.

Mr. Sherman, a professor of economics at the University of California, believes that his "independent and nondogmatic" Marxism is "indistinguishable from the mainstream of radical Left thought in the United States." Perhaps because of the book's comprehensiveness—it deals with socialism as well as capitalism, politics as well as economics, and does not omit sex, race or alienation—the treatment of many issues suffers from brevity. The result is a useful volume but not a very enlightening one.

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ECONOMICS AND WORLD ORDER: FROM THE 1970'S TO THE 1990'S. Edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati. New York: Macmillan, 1972, 365 p. $11.95.

Fifteen economists of different nations, ages and ideologies are not likely to converge in their views of the world economy for the rest of the century—but a number of them say interesting things.

FOREIGN TRADE IN A PLANNED ECONOMY. Edited by Imre Vajda and Mihály Simai. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 221 p. $14.50.

A basic subject treated flexibly and interestingly by a number of Hungarian economists, including the late Professor Vajda, an outstanding figure. Unfortunately, the papers could not take account of recent experience but they reflect the intellectual climate out of which the current reform program came.

ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Radoslav Selucky. New York: Praeger, 1972, 179 p. $15.00.

An émigré from Czechoslovakia in 1968 stresses the inevitable connection of economic reform and political relations and the choice between "Sovietizing East European economies" and "Europeanizing the Soviet economy."

DER OSTMARKT IM COMECON. By Alexander Uschakow. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1972, 486 p. DM. 90.

A valuable collection of documents about the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and some related matters.

THE POTENTIAL FOR JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Robert S. Kretschmar, Jr. and Robin Foor. New York: Praeger, 1972, 153 p. $15.00.

While not the critical analysis the important subject badly needs, this compilation of facts, figures, terminology and the like has its uses.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES FOR THE SEVENTIES: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE ATLANTIC AREA AND JAPAN. Edited by Pierre Uri. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Atlantic Institute), 1971, 286 p. $12.50.

A familiar subject enhanced by some good papers and more than the usual quota of Japanese contributions.

The United States

THE DIFFUSION OF POWER: AN ESSAY IN RECENT HISTORY. By W. W. Rostow. New York: Macmillan, 1972, 739 p. $12.50.

This huge book is part personal memoir, part a continuation of the author's "The United States in the World Arena" (1960), and above all an argument and apologia for an interventionist foreign policy. Mr. Rostow believes that the United States must ensure the security of Southeast Asia or lose the credibility of all its commitments and hence its own security.

THE BEST AND BRIGHTEST. By David Halberstam. New York: Random House, 1972, 688 p. $10.00.

In this brilliantly written book Halberstam interweaves a narrative of decisions in the Kennedy and Johnson years with biographies of the decision-makers: Robert McNamara, Walt Rostow, Dean Rusk, McGeorge and William Bundy and scores of less prominent men in State, Defense and the White House. The collective portrait shows energy, bureaucratic skill and a fatal lack of imagination.

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KISSINGER: THE USES OF POWER. By David Landau. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972, 270 p. $5.95.

Landau, who began this study while still a Harvard undergraduate, is informative about Kissinger's pre-White House career, appreciative of his skill but critical of intellectual qualities which have allegedly inhibited an early settlement of the Vietnam War.

THE CRIPPLED GIANT: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES. By J. William Fulbright. New York: Random House, 1972, 292 p. $6.95 (Paper, $1.95).

The Senator reflects in a familiar, dour fashion on postwar U.S. history and concludes that "we are going to have to recover our mistrust of power—in the Presidency and wherever else it is found."

THE BIG FOUNDATIONS. By Waldemar A. Nielsen. New York: Columbia University Press (for the Twentieth Century Fund), 1972, 475 p. $10.95.

The author pulls no punches in this extraordinarily informative and much-needed analysis of the 33 largest American foundations: Ford, Rockefeller, Duke, *et al.* He finds many of the giants unresponsive to social needs, afflicted by archaic attitudes and incompetently staffed.

OSS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. By R. Harris Smith. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 458 p. $10.95.

A mine of detail—names, dates, operations large and small—but devoid of interpretation or reflection. The author corresponded with and interviewed nearly 200 former OSS members. A chapter on the OSS and the CIA is disappointingly thin.

THE PENTAGON PAPERS: CRITICAL ESSAYS (GRAVEL EDITION, VOLUME V). Edited by Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972, 341 p. $12.50 (Paper, $5.00).

Fifteen essays by antiwar journalists and academics on the contents and implication of the Pentagon Papers—Kolko, Chomsky, Burchett, Branfman and others. Contains a useful index to the first four volumes of the Gravel Edition of the Papers.

CLASSIFIED FILES: THE YELLOWING PAGES. By Carol M. Barker and Matthew H. Fox. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1972, 115 p. (Paper, free on request).

A much-needed description, analysis and critique of the government's procedures in withholding and granting access to its records. Invaluable for the actual or potential researcher.

ELEANOR: THE YEARS ALONE. By Joseph P. Lash. New York: Norton, 1972, 368 p. $9.95.

Joseph Lash observes that of all FDR's close associates, only Mrs. Roosevelt grew in prominence after his death. This loving volume, a sequel to the highly acclaimed "Eleanor and Franklin" (1971), completes the biography. Excellent photographs.

THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON. VOLUME I: BEGINNINGS OF EDUCATION, 1900–1941. Edited by Walter Johnson. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972, 586 p. $15.00.

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Letters, speeches, essays from earliest childhood through leadership on the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (1940–41). Superb material on life at Choate School, Princeton, Harvard Law and on participation in the early years of the New Deal. The volume shows that Adlai Stevenson grew wittier and learned more every year. Seven more volumes are to come.

THE THIRD YEAR OF THE NIXON WATCH. By John Osborne. New York: Liveright, 1972, 216 p. $6.95.

This is the third annual compilation of the author's essays in *The New Republic,* a readable diary of a presidency. More to come.

THE STRANGE CASE OF RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON. By Jerry Voorhis. New York: Paul S. Eriksson, 1972, 341 p. $8.95.

The author, defeated by Richard Nixon in the 1946 congressional election and active since then in promoting coöperative community action, views his subject's career with profound alarm.

SOME PRESIDENTS: WILSON TO NIXON. By William Appleman Williams. New York: The New York Review, 1972, 122 p. $1.95 (Paper).

Six sprightly essay-reviews by a veteran revisionist historian, including a particularly perceptive and sympathetic piece on Herbert Hoover.

SEEDS OF REPRESSION: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF McCARTHYISM. By Athan Theoharis. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971, 238 p. $6.95.

Another contribution to the increasingly accepted thesis that the Truman administration was more cause than victim of McCarthyism.

CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC. By Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972, 240 p. $6.95.

A collection of recent essays, all focused on the United States, by an eminent political philosopher; includes her famous reflections "On Lying in Politics" and "On Violence."

AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS: A SURVEY. Edited by Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 425 p. $15.00.

Historiographical essays, organized chronologically and with predominant emphasis on relations with China, by 18 scholars, old and young, mostly American. However, only a portion of the authors read an Asian language and thus can survey the other side of the equation.

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA, 1949–1969. By Foster Rhea Dulles. New York: Crowell, 1972, 273 p. $7.95.

A solid, factual introduction. The author, who died in 1970, was a prolific historical writer and a cousin of Secretary of State Dulles.

The Western Hemisphere

IN DEFENCE OF CANADA: PEACEMAKING AND DETERRENCE. By James Eayrs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, 448 p. $17.50.

The leading scholar of Canada's external and defense policies carries his monumental and readable history from 1945 to 1957. The book (Volume III of the series) was delayed for six years by the Canadian government's unwillingness to release information to which the author had previously been granted access.

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CANADA'S SEARCH FOR NEW ROLES: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUDEAU ERA. By Peter C. Dobell. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1972, 161 p. $2.95 (Paper).
TRUDEAU AND FOREIGN POLICY: A STUDY IN DECISION-MAKING. By Bruce Thordarson. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972, 231 p. $2.95 (Paper).

Dobell's book is a vigorous discussion of Canada's abandonment of her self-congratulatory role as a uniquely moral "middle power." Thordarson covers the same ground, but employs approaches drawn explicitly from recent work in political science. Both books are far superior to the usual tedious rehash of Canada's perpetual identity crisis.

LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. By Harold Eugene Davis. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972, 269 p. $10.00.

Intellectual history is one of the stepchildren of Latin American studies; this highly competent work, reaching back to pre-Colombian antecedents, is therefore a welcome addition. The emphasis, in this case, is on social philosophy and its revolutionary essence.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By Isaac Cohen Orantes. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972, 126 p. $10.00.
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET. By Donald H. McClelland. New York: Praeger, 1972, 243 p. $15.00.

These two volumes update and round out the numerous writings already devoted to the interesting experience in economic integration in Central America. The McClelland volume is oriented toward fuller detail, and the Orantes study to overview and synthesis.

REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE: VOLUME I (1947–1958) OF THE SELECTED WORKS OF FIDEL CASTRO. Edited by Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdés. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1972, 471 p. $12.50.

A useful and substantial collection of Castro's numerous communications, from ten-line personal letters to "History Will Absolve Me," preceded by more than 100 pages of historical and biographical material.

THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION. By Abraham F. Lowenthal. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 246 p. $10.95.

Two notable qualities distinguish this work of high excellence from many of its predecessors. It is marked by a judicious and balanced tolerance, undefiled by cant and jargon, and by the richness of its sources. There are also discerning comments on the wayward, many-faceted process by which foreign policy is determined.

THE CHURCH AS A POLITICAL FACTOR IN LATIN AMERICA. By David E. Mutchler. New York: Praeger, 1971, 460 p. $18.50.

The Church, seeking survival, has tended in the author's opinion to serve the interests of U.S. and European policies, thereby weakening reformist and populist movements.

Western Europe

EUROPE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By George Lichtheim. New York: Praeger, 1972, 409 p. $12.95.

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An attempt, necessarily selective, to encompass European civilization from the pre-1914 age of imperialism to cold war, coexistence and the new Europe. Despite his acute neo-Marxism, Lichtheim's emphasis on "the transformation of inherited life styles under the impact of social and technological change" is not so persuasive as his deft summarization of the political and economic developments and his superb rendering of intellectual movements and the cultural climate.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1970'S. Edited by Steven Joshua Warnecke. New York: Praeger, 1972, 228 p. $15.00.

A wide-ranging, thoughtful and timely series of essays on various aspects of European-American relations. Contributors include Ralf Dahrendorf, William Diebold, Uwe Kitzinger, Harald Malmgren, Andrew Pierre and the editor.

MÉMOIRES D'HIER ET DE DEMAIN: AU SERVICE DU GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE. By Christian Fouchet. Paris: Plon, 1971, 297 p. Fr. 28.50.

Fouchet, a dedicated Gaullist and "old companion" from the dark days of June 1940 and an efficient envoy and Minister, reverently and discreetly recollects several "historical turning points" in the career of his hero, saving for a second volume his part in certain Gaullist reforms for "mustering the French people."

JAMAIS DIT. By J.-R. Tournoux. Paris: Plon, 1971, 490 p. Fr. 30.60.

Seventh in the series of books in which over the past 15 years J.-R. Tournoux has assembled facts, hitherto unpublished documents, testimony of participants, anecdotes, observations of those in the know that make up "l'histoire secrète"—more specifically, the life and actions—of Charles de Gaulle.

THE GAULLIST PHENOMENON. By Jean Charlot. New York: Praeger, 1971, 205 p. $10.00.

Using election returns, opinion polls and systems analysis, this well-translated book studies the transformation of French politics from the characteristic ideological, multiparty government by assembly toward the establishment, beyond de Gaulle's intentions, of a majority parliamentary system.

VICHY FRANCE: OLD GUARD AND NEW ORDER, 1940–1944. By Robert O. Paxton. New York: Knopf, 1972, 399 p. $10.00.

This volume, particularly well written and well documented, is scathing in its presentation of evidence, especially German, which has recently become available. Pétain took advantage of a foreign army to carry out domestic reforms, but any benefits he thought he could gain from collaboration turned out to be illusory.

POINTING THE WAY, 1959–1961. By Harold Macmillan. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 504 p. $15.00.

The fifth volume of the former P.M.'s memoirs. Following the 1959 election Macmillan is at his prime: coaxing the Western allies to the 1960 summit, journeying to Africa and acting as statesman-schoolmaster to young President Kennedy. But his extraordinary diplomatic flair cannot mask Britain's decline in power.

THE MEMOIRS OF LORD GLADWYN. By Lord Gladwyn. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1972, 422 p. $9.95.

A rich diplomatic life recounted in an elegant patrician style. Gladwyn is full of ideas, and among those which came to fruition with his assistance were NATO and the United Nations.

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THE COLLAPSE OF BRITISH POWER. By Correlli Barnett. New York: Morrow, 1972, 643 p. $15.00.

A controversial and only partially successful analysis of Britain's fall from Empire, concentrating on the interwar period. Barnett seeks an explanation in Britain's "national character" and faults British public schools for educating an élite with strong pacifist and romantic beliefs.

AMBITIONS AND REALITIES: BRITISH POLITICS 1964–70. By Robert Rhodes James. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 311 p. $8.95.

The author tends to view history through personalities—a perfectly valid approach, as it includes broader political, economic and social considerations as well. There are excellent sketches of Wilson, Heath and Powell.

GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: AN IRISH PERSPECTIVE. By Richard Rose. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, 567 p. $12.50.

An original case-study of the dynamics of political authority in Northern Ireland today, containing much of value in a wider context.

WHITEHALL DIARY. VOLUME 3: IRELAND 1918–1925. By Thomas Jones. Edited by Keith Middlemas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 268 p. $15.25.

The third volume in the interesting and useful series of diaries kept by an articulate member of the British Cabinet Secretariat, this deals with Anglo-Irish relations during the important period of the establishment of the Irish Free State.

THE ULSTER DEBATE. London: The Bodley Head (in association with the Institute for the Study of Conflict), 1972, 160 p. 95 pence (Paper).

A timely group-study discussing various facets of the situation in Northern Ireland—political alternatives, military aspects and economic implications (including Ireland's membership in the EEC).

FRIEDRICH MEINECKE AND GERMAN POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Robert A. Pois. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 164 p. $7.50.

This volume traces the evolution of Meinecke's *Weltanschauung* from a great faith in the balance between *Macht* and *Kultur,* to recognition that an ideal balance was not possible, to efforts to divorce these concepts entirely. The author tries to show why Meinecke and his class, representatives of the educated, liberal bourgeoisie, ultimately failed on all counts.

GOEBBELS. By Helmut Heiber. New York: Hawthorn, 1972, 387 p. $9.95.

This biography by the editor of Goebbels' early diaries is most revealing about the propaganda techniques Goebbels perfected—and succumbed to—in excoriating the "bourgeois" pettiness and philistinism he himself so completely manifested.

BONN-PEKING: DIE BEZIEHUNGEN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND ZUR VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA. By Ernst Majonica. Stuttgart: Kolhammer, 1971, 259 p. DM. 29.80.

A scholarly investigation, based on unpublished source material, of the period 1949–1966, by a spokesman on foreign affairs for the CDU-CSU grouping in the Bundestag. A fascinating account of how the diplomacy of West Germany and the People's Republic, on the verge of concluding an extensive commercial agreement in 1964, was broken off because of their relations to Washington, Moscow and East Berlin.

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ADENAUER ZWISCHEN WEST UND OST. By Bruno Bandulet. Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1970, 315 p. DM. 36.

A scholarly assessment of Adenauer's foreign policy toward the United States, the Soviet Union and France, stressing his flexibility and readiness to adapt to changing conditions in Europe during his chancellorship.

FEARS AND EXPECTATIONS: NORWEGIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Edited by Nils Örvik. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972, 370 p. Kr. 57.00 (U.S. $9.50).

Norway's recent decision not to join the European Economic Community can be better understood after reading this book. The authors have analyzed the Norwegian debate on this question over the past decade, giving particular attention to élite attitudes toward loss of sovereignty and political integration.

DIX ANS DE LUTTE ANTIFASCISTE, 1931–1941. By Jules Humbert-Droz. Neuchatel: Baconnière, 1972, 429 p. Fr. 30.

With the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin pact at the end of this third volume of memoirs, the veteran leader of the Swiss Communist Party and one of the secretaries of the Communist International is still loyal to the ideal of revolution and the Soviet Union, though thoroughly disillusioned with Stalin.

GREECE WITHOUT COLUMNS. By David Holden. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972, 336 p. $7.50.

The chief foreign correspondent of the London Sunday *Times* is not happy with the condition of democracy in contemporary Greece, but he blames the old political establishment and the lethargy of the Greek population as much as the ruling colonels.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

LENIN AND THE COMINTERN. VOLUME I. By Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972, 683 p. $17.50.

An important work bringing to light much new material, though of course the basic Soviet sources remain unavailable. This volume, to be followed by another covering the years to 1924, concludes with a detailed study of the attempted revolution in Germany in 1921 and Lenin's change of line.

THE STRANGE NEUTRALITY: SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1941–1945. By George Alexander Lensen. Tallahassee, Florida: Diplomatic Press, 1972, 332 p. $15.00.

From the neutrality pact to the surrender of the Kwantung Army, the author recounts a revealing diplomatic history based on both Soviet and Japanese sources.

RUSSIA: THE POST-WAR YEARS. By Alexander Werth. New York: Taplinger, 1971, 446 p. $12.00.

A journalist of long residence and good standing in Moscow gives a fascinating account of the years of the origins of the cold war, 1945–48. Much of the blame falls on the United States, but unlike American revisionists Werth also shows that Stalin's tough policies were no mere reaction to unexpected American hostility.

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COMMISSAR: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF LAVRENTY PAVLOVICH BERIA. By Thaddeus Wittlin. New York: Macmillan, 1972, 566 p. $12.95.

Unfriendly biography in the grand style, combining details of Beria's personal life with the story of his four decades of intrigue and murder on behalf of Stalin and himself. Worth reading despite the author's failure to give the reader any help in determining what is fact and what is surmise.

DIE MARSCHÄLLE UND DIE POLITIK: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ÜBER DEN STELLENWERT DES MILITÄRS INNERHALB DES SOWJETISCHEN SYSTEMS SEIT DEM STURZ CHRUSCHTSCHEWS. By Borys Lewytzkyj. Cologne: Markus-Verlag, 1971, 196 p. DM. 24.

The role of the military in Soviet political decisions. The main argument is that they are less a pressure group than an integral part of the policy structure.

THE VOICES OF THE SILENT. By Cornelia Gerstenmaier. New York: Hart, 1972, 587 p. $10.00.

The history of intellectual dissent—liberal, Christian and Marxist—in the Soviet Union from Pasternak to Solzhenitzyn. The author, well informed and sympathetic, may overestimate the effects of this "democratic movement" on the régime's durability.

CONSERVATION IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Philip R. Pryde. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 301 p. $12.50.

A geographer writes on the history, theory and practice of the Soviet Union in conserving its natural resources, weighing those factors which are general to all countries and those which are peculiar to the Soviet system of government.

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. By Chris Osakwe. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1972, 194 p. Gldrs. 35.

The author examines in detail the Soviet role in three organizations (ILO, WHO and UNESCO), taking full account of the ideological and political premises of Soviet policy.

SOVIET POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: DEVELOPMENTS IN MASS MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA SINCE STALIN. By Gayle Durham Hollander. New York: Praeger, 1972, 244 p. $15.00.

An inquiry into the process the sociologists call "political socialization," and how it works from above through agit-prop and the mass media.

SINO-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON THE PROBLEM OF WAR. By John Yin. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971, 247 p. Gldrs. 35.75 (Paper).

A thorough search into the published material on both sides enables the author to follow and to analyze the ideological exchanges on Leninism, international and civil war, peaceful coexistence and wars of national liberation.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD BLACK AFRICA: THE FOCUS ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION. By Helen Desfosses Cohn. New York: Praeger, 1972, 316 p. $17.50.

Theory and practice during the 1960s, from Khrushchev's adventures in the Congo to the more cautious policies of Brezhnev.

COMECON AND THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION. By Henry Wilcox Schaefer. New York: Praeger, 1972, 200 p. $15.00.

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The principal value of this book by an analyst for Radio Free Europe is the use it makes of public statements by officials and commentators in COMECON countries for the period from the invasion of Czechoslovakia to the adoption of the "complex program" of integration in 1971.

POLAND'S INDUSTRIALIZATION POLICY: A CURRENT ANALYSIS. By GEORGE R. FEIWEL. New York: Praeger, 1971, 747 p. $25.00.
PROBLEMS IN POLISH ECONOMIC PLANNING. By GEORGE R. FEIWEL. New York: Praeger, 1971, 454 p. $20.00.

These two volumes, described by the author as a modest contribution, constitute a massive and informative study of the Polish economy. The data-hungry reader can gorge on hundreds of footnotes and statistical tables.

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL-TENSION MANAGEMENT: A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IN PERSPECTIVE: CASE STUDY OF POLAND. By DENNIS CLARK PIRAGES. New York: Praeger, 1972, 260 p. $16.50.

Using the latest in social science methods, the author attempts to fathom the Polish political and economic system and to throw light on the key question of the relationship of industrial modernization to political change and reform.

NACHBARN IM OSTEN: HERAUSFORDERUNG ZU EINER NEUEN POLITIK. By HANSJAKOB STEHLE. Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1971, 284 p. DM. 24.

A gifted journalist, who is an authority on Poland, writes on *Ostpolitik* and its effects on the evolution of Eastern Europe (not including the G.D.R.). The book is dedicated to Willy Brandt and the conclusions are optimistic.

The Middle East and North Africa

DEAR ISRAELIS, DEAR ARABS: A WORKING APPROACH TO PEACE. By ROGER FISHER. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 166 p. $6.95.

In an attempt to bypass the stalemate and polemics of the past, as well as utopian goals for the future, Professor Fisher writes a series of letters to Middle Eastern, U.S. and U.N. leaders proposing specific operational moves in which each party can help bring about solutions to pieces of the many-faceted larger problem.

EUROPE LEAVES THE MIDDLE EAST, 1936–1954. By HOWARD M. SACHAR. New York: Knopf, 1972, 687 p. $15.00.

This comprehensive history of "eighteen years of equivocal and hopelessly convoluted Western disengagement" is a solid work of scholarship, though bound to be controversial on some points of fact and interpretation. The author sees the chief Western legacy as one of "gall and venom."

THE PERSIAN GULF: IRAN'S ROLE. By ROUHOLLAH K. RAMAZANI. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972, 157 p. $7.50.

Describing the growth of Iran's involvement in the region in the past few years, the author contends that the best insurance for the Gulf's future stability would be an accommodative Iranian policy toward the Arabs and "discriminating" American support to Iran in her active role.

A HISTORY OF ZIONISM. By WALTER LAQUEUR. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972, 640 p. $10.00.

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A full and dispassionate treatment of the movement of Jewish national revival from its diffuse origins in eighteenth-century Europe to the creation of the Israeli state in 1948. Especially interesting is the description of struggles within Zionism and of the reluctance of many Jews at various times to espouse the idea.

MARXISME ET MONDE MUSULMAN. By Maxine Rodinson. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972, 699, p. Fr. 49.

A collection of Rodinson's past writings on many aspects of this vast subject, tied together by a preface and comments on each piece in its contemporary setting.

EBAN. By Robert St. John. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972, 542 p. $10.00.

A possibly premature exercise in hagiography, this lengthy but lively biography is at its best in its portrayal of Eban's activities during the Six-Day War and its aftermath.

THE ENIGMA OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CASE STUDY OF ISRAEL. By David Horowitz. New York: Praeger, 1972, 157 p. $13.50.

An eminent Israeli economist and high official describes his country's development over the past two decades. He expresses the hope that the experience will throw light on problems of other countries.

THE FALL OF JERUSALEM. By Abdullah Schleifer. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, 247 p. $7.50.

Using Jerusalem as the principal illustration of the invasion and denial of Arab rights by Israel, a radical poet and journalist makes the case for the Palestinian guerrillas.

South and Southeast Asia

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. VOLUMES I AND II. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972, 2 v. Rs. 60 per volume.

The first two volumes of this admirable project incorporate much material hitherto unavailable. Letters from Harrow and Cambridge, prison diaries, notes, speeches and correspondence of the budding politician—all combine to cast a new light on the growth of a fascinating and many-sided man.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ASIA. By Patwant Singh. London: Hutchinson, 1971, 208 p. £2.50.

A graceful and wide-ranging appraisal of possible developments in Asian international relations as American influence recedes in the 1970s, Singh's book warns of the dangers inherent in the struggle for power among China, Japan and the Soviet Union, and calls on India to accept the responsibilities of the great-power status he feels is within her capabilities.

INDIA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1953 TO 1969. By Asha L. Datar. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 278 p. $18.50.

This carefully researched book analyzes the experience of India with aid, trade and credit from the centrally planned economies. The author concludes that the diversion of exports to repayment in kind, and the somewhat higher costs of dealing with rigidly bureaucratic suppliers, were not serious disadvantages; but in purely economic terms Soviet aid and trade were not preferable to those of the West.

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COMMUNISM IN INDIAN POLITICS. By Bhabani Sen Gupta. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, 455 p. $15.00 (Paper, $4.95).

India has three Communist parties, and one out of ten Indian voters votes for one or another of them. What are their prospects for the future? The author sees Communist successes as directly related to the impoverishment of the rural poor.

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: PAKISTAN 1962–1969. By Herbert Feldman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, 340 p. $18.75.

The turbulent and tragic history of Pakistan during its brief experiment with Ayub Khan's new constitution is the subject of this incisive account. Its laconic wit and economy of organization make it pleasant as well as worthwhile reading.

FOREIGN AID AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN. By Irving Brecher and S. A. Abbas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 271 p. $19.50.

Well aware of the complexity of the issues and the limits of their study, Professor Brecher of McGill and Mr. Abbas of UNCTAD convincingly demonstrate the substantial contribution aid made to Pakistan's industrial growth in the 1960s.

INDONESIA AFTER SUKARNO. By Justus M. van der Kroef. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971, 253 p. $6.00.

Can the new directorate of technocrats and military men bring harmony and progress out of the shambles Sukarno left? Only with difficulty, implies the author, for the new élites must lead with almost intractable religious, ethnic and ideological tensions to survive.

DILEMMAS OF STATEHOOD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Michael Leifer. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972, 161 p. $6.00.

Political leadership in the new countries of Southeast Asia has concentrated on "building the nation"—creating a sense of popular identity. More important now, says the author, is to build the state, without which "nationhood" cannot flourish and Southeast Asian federalism will remain a chimera. The region, Leifer predicts, will suffer from security problems for years to come.

East Asia and the Pacific

DRAGON BY THE TAIL: AMERICAN, BRITISH, JAPANESE, AND RUSSIAN ENCOUNTERS WITH CHINA AND ONE ANOTHER. By John Paton Davies, Jr. New York: Norton, 1972, 448 p. $10.00.

In these memoirs, history blends with experience in a vivid panoramic picture of 50 years of Chinese war and revolution. The author's comments and interpretations are realistic, intelligent, resigned and ironic. If history teaches, these are some of its lessons.

THE MORNING DELUGE: MAO TSETUNG AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1893–1954. By Han Suyin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972, 571 p. $12.95.

MAO AND CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION. By Stanley Karnow. New York: Viking, 1972, 592 p. $15.00.

Who was Mao? What did he want to achieve and how far has he succeeded in attaining it? No other political leader in recent history excites so much interest, and about no other leader is so little known to satisfy that interest. Two highly

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skilled writers offer their interpretations. Karnow's is reserved, skeptical, ironic; Han's (the first of two volumes) passionate, enthusiastic and worshipful. Both are valuable; read in conjunction their value increases.

MAO'S WAY. By Edward E. Rice. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 596 p. $12.95.

The author, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Consul General in Hong Kong, traces the course of Mao's Cultural Revolution from the cool vantage point of an analyst of political tactics. Of the future, he concludes that its course will be conservative and its leadership will be the army.

CHINA UND DIE HOFFNUNG AUF GLÜCK. By Wolfgang Bauer. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971, 703 p. DM. 75.

Massive, scholarly and fascinating, Bauer's book is a cultural history of Chinese ideas about the good society and the role of the state. The concluding chapter offers some persuasive insights into the relation of Mao's thought to the long tradition which nourished it.

ELITES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972, 672 p. $15.00 (Paper, $4.95).

Who gets what, when, how? That's the political question. To answer it, using only biographical dictionaries published by foreigners, smuggled newspapers, old telephone books and personnel directories, is the task of the diligent sinologist. And then he must ask: "Why these men and not others?" and "Who's next?" Of interest to specialists.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES. By Hungdah Chiu. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 178 p. $10.00.

The author, Professor of International Law at the National University in Taipei, argues that China's concept of treaty law does not differ substantially from that of the West, except in her development of the concept of "unequal treaties" out of her own historical experience. International law, for China as for other nations, will be respected only as long as it serves political ends.

CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER IN WORLD POLITICS. By Leo Yueh-Yun Liu. New York: Taplinger, 1972, 125 p. $5.95.

The author takes a cool look at China's thermonuclear intercontinental capacity and sees these consequences: the vigor with which Chinese foreign policy goals are pursued will increase; the United States and the U.S.S.R. will accelerate their own programs to defend against two potential opponents rather than one; India probably, and Japan possibly, will feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons; alliances will break up as security guarantees are less credible.

JAPANESE POLITICS: PATRON-CLIENT DEMOCRACY. By Nobutaka Ike. New York: Knopf (2d ed.), 1972, 149 p. $2.25 (Paper).

One of the best introductions to Japanese politics when it first appeared 15 years ago, Ike's valuable book has now been completely revised to take account of the striking developments in the interim. It is still one of the best.

COMMUNISM IN JAPAN: A CASE OF POLITICAL NATURALIZATION. By Paul F. Langer. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972, 112 p. $5.95.

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Part of a series on comparative Communist party politics, this little book by one of the foremost Western scholars of the subject asserts that the Japanese Communist Party must "naturalize" itself as a genuinely independent and native organization if it wishes to prosper.

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG IN JAPAN. By Wolfgang Michalski and Others. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1972, 418 p. DM. 88.

Extraordinarily thorough research and the use of econometric models with clearly defined parameters make this study of Japan's economic prospects by six younger economists at Hamburg's Institute for the Study of Technological Development one of the most informative outside the Japanese-language literature. Problems of ecology, social overhead capital, labor shortage and trade relations will be dealt with successfully, they predict; prices, imports, productivity and GNP will continue to rise, the latter at a rate of eight to 10 percent a year.

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA IN THE SEVENTIES. Edited by J. A. A. Stockwin. Sydney: Angus and Robertson (in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1972, 223 p. A$4.00.

The Japan-Australia relationship will be increasingly important as well as problematic in the coming years—not only to the two nations directly involved but also to their neighbors. The urgency and centrality of the issues involved, the caliber of the participants and the general tone make this collection of papers and discussions well worth reading.

THE PACIFIC RIVALS. By the Staff of the Asahi Shimbun. New York: Weatherhill/Asahi, 1972, 431 p. $10.00.

This chatty, colorful and gossipy overview of the Japanese-American relationship was originally published serially in Tokyo's *Asahi*. Query: Why is the "rivals" concept, lacking in the Japanese edition, introduced in the American title?

Africa

THE BROTHERS' WAR: BIAFRA AND NIGERIA. By John de St. Jorre. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972, 437 p. $10.00.

THE NIGERIAN WAR, 1967–1970. By Zdenek Červenka. Frankfurt/Main: Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1971, 459 p. DM. 56.

De St. Jorre's stunningly comprehensive account of the Nigerian Civil War ought to be the last word on the subject by an outside observer for the time being. He manages to combine clear-cut analyses of the main issues with a mass of authenticated de-mythologizing detail about the major figures, motives and events. Cervenka's effort suffers by comparison; at best it is a source book—primarily for journalistic accounts of the conflict written while it was taking place.

LAW, ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Anthony S. Mathews. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 318 p. $15.00.

The author, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Durban, South Africa, demonstrates very quietly in this painstaking analysis of the South African internal-security legislation that freedom is indivisible. He shows how the process which has shorn non-whites of their individual and civil liberties has also deprived white citizens of these same liberties.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale. New York: Free Press, 1972, 418 p. $12.95.

A felicitous collection of essays which together offer a comprehensive picture of South Africa's immediate context—the surrounded nations; the Portuguese territories; Rhodesia, Malawi and Zambia; the OAU; the liberation movements.

AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. By Richard Gibson. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1972, 350 p. $9.75 (Paper, $2.95).

This anatomy of the internal politics of the southern African liberation organizations recounts in great detail their separate histories of internecine strife, seeming to stem more from tribalism and personal ambition than from ideology.

LESOTHO 1970: AN AFRICAN COUP UNDER THE MICROSCOPE. By B. M. Khaketla. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 350 p. $10.00.

An anecdotal narrative about a post-election day *Putsch* by the incumbent—but allegedly defeated—Prime Minister. The author's "inside" vantage point as Secretary-General of an opposition political party makes this a useful primary source.

WHITE SOCIETY IN BLACK AFRICA: THE FRENCH OF SENEGAL. By Rita Cruise O'Brien. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, 320 p. $10.00.

A history of the relationship between colonialists and natives in Senegal, culminating in an inquiry into contemporary French attitudes toward Senegalese. In a curious twist, the author attempts to demonstrate the debilitating effects of the continued African dependency by showing us the Senegalese through the eyes of the French, who continue to dominate them economically if not politically.

UGANDA: A CASE STUDY IN AFRICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. By Peter M. Gukiina. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972, 190 p. $7.95 (Paper, $3.25).

A brief history of the ethnic divisions which have beset Uganda.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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The Transfer of power 1942–7. Vol. II: 'Quit India,' 30 Apr.–21 Sept. 1942, ed. by Nicholas Mansergh. London, HMSO, 1971. 1044 p. (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India.) £9.

New Zealand foreign policy: statements and documents 1943–1957. Wellington, A. R. Shearer (for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1972. 495 p.

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